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Abstract 
The distinction of cognition into kinds of cognitive process has proven theoretically 
fruitful and empirically compelling, but there remain significant challenges in deciding 
how best to carve cognition. First, it is unclear how to design measurement procedures 
that select distinct kinds of cognitive processing as exclusively as possible and, 
conversely, how to interpret the results of different kinds of measurement procedure. 
Second, the distinction between kinds of cognition must be specified with enough 
precision to derive empirically testable and falsifiable predictions. Third, there must be a 
reasonable explanation, ultimately compatible with phylogenetic evidence, for the 
existence of the specified distinction between kinds of cognition. The present research 
investigates the mutual influences between implicit and explicit self-knowledge and the 
influence of perceived validity on implicit and explicit evaluations. The findings 
challenge existing specifications of the distinction between kinds of cognition, which 
suggest that implicit cognition should be less sensitive than explicit cognition to 
situational context. As an alternative, it is suggested that the key distinction between 
kinds of cognition involves the capacity for quantification, which is a result of 
differences in the principles of lower-level and higher-level mental representation. 
Specifically, lower-level cognition is assumed to be holistic, rooted in distributed 
representations, whereas higher-level cognition is assumed to be symbolic, rooted in 
localist representations. Interaction between these processes therefore involves 
quantifying across holistic tokens to produce symbolic types. This perspective has 
important implications for theory and measurement in empirical psychology. 
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1 Three Problems for Carving Cognition 
The desire to carve cognition into kinds is as old as psychology itself. James (1890) wrote 
of the distinction between an inarticulate stream of thought and a discrete train of ideas. 
Freud (1927) focused on the perpetual conflict between the impulsive id and the rational 
ego. Indeed, the creation of taxonomy—the ordering of the world into component parts 
and their relations—is central to science, and is especially critical during the early 
development of a field. Yet it is only with the recent refinement of “indirect” 
measurement procedures (De Houwer, 2006), which attempt to measure cognition 
without requiring any direct self-assessment, that the theoretically useful distinction 
between kinds of cognition has become empirically compelling. These procedural 
advances have fueled research into the relation between indirectly measured “implicit” 
cognition and directly measured “explicit” cognition, although the nature of this 
distinction, and the extent to which these measurement procedures capture it, remain 
challenging questions. 
Within social-cognitive psychology in particular, the idea of a dual-process mind has 
produced a wealth of relevant data that appear to support the hypothesis that human 
social behavior is the product of two distinct kinds of cognition. Yet it is far from clear 
what this evidence tells us about the nature of these cognitive kinds—or even if carving 
cognition into discrete kinds obscures a more graded relation between cognitive 
processes. The goal of the present work is to critically examine current perspectives on 
the dual-process mind in social-cognitive psychology, using my own research to 
illuminate potential shortcomings and to suggest new theoretical directions in response. 
The present chapter is structured around three key problems facing dual-process theories 
of cognition (Samuels, 2009). The measurement problem concerns how different kinds of 
cognition can be empirically distinguished: How well do different measurement 
procedures selectively assess different kinds of cognition? The specification problem 
concerns the challenge of adequately characterizing different kinds of cognition: What 
are the key distinctions that make them different? Finally, the unity problem asks a more 
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fundamental question about the specification of these processes: Why is the mind divided 
into these, as opposed to some other, kinds of cognition? 
Consideration of these problems reveals two general perspectives on the dual-process 
mind in social-cognitive psychology that differ in how they characterize higher-level, 
explicit and lower-level, implicit cognition. It is against this background that my own 
research will be presented in order to challenge assumptions underlying both of these 
perspectives. The final chapter will seek to make sense of these data with respect to the 
three problems identified above and to pursue their implications for developing a new 
perspective on the dual-process mind. 
1.1 The measurement problem 
Because cognition cannot be directly observed, psychologists must rely upon the 
observation of behavior to draw inferences about cognitive processes. The fact that the 
observation of cognition is necessarily indirect lies at the heart of the enduring problem 
of measurement in psychology: The link between observed behavior and underlying 
cognition requires an inferential leap that often seems blind. In practice, this problem 
makes it difficult to know what is being measured in psychological research and leaves 
any claims about underlying cognitive processes vulnerable to alternative explanation 
(Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden, 2004).1 The dual-process approach to 
cognition provides a framework for an answer to this problem by specifying how 
different kinds of measurement procedure assess different kinds of cognitive process. In 
this way, dual-process theories can be understood as setting constraints on inferences 
from observed behavior to underlying cognition, providing a degree of guidance in the 
leap from one to the other. 
                                                 
1
 Understanding how information is mentally represented and processed is, of course, a problem unique to 
the cognitivist tradition of empirical psychology, which seeks to explain behavioral phenomena in terms of 
mediating cognitive processes. Psychologists working within the behaviorist tradition do not face this 
problem, since they do not appeal to cognitive processes in explaining how a stimulus causes a behavior. 
Given that radical behaviorism has failed as a basis for psychological explanation, however (e.g., 
Chomsky, 1959), the problem of measurement discussed here is of quite general relevance for modern 
empirical psychology. 
  
From this perspective, psychological m
to the conditions they establish for the observation of behavior. In the current state of 
social-cognitive psychology, indirect measurement procedures attempt to establish 
conditions necessary for the observation of “automatic” behavior, where automaticity is 
defined by the (disjunctive) presence of various functional properties of behavior (e.g., 
resource-efficiency, unawareness, uncontrollability, uni
De Houwer, 2006; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). These functional properties are assu
to provide the initial link between behavior and underlying cognition, such that behaviors 
that qualify as automatic are assumed to be produced by automatic cognitive processing
(De Houwer, 2006). Hence, the functional properties that characterize a ce
behavior are equated to the 
1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1. The functional properties of behavior as the mediating link in the 
measurement of a certain kind of cognition. In practice, the functional properties of a 
kind of behavior are assumed to be identical to the operating conditions of a kind of 
cognition (e.g., automatic behavior is produced by automatic cognition; De Houwer, 
2006). 
 
In social-cognitive research
resource-efficiency, unawareness, unintentionality,
empirical properties of indirect measurement procedures (e.g., being 
subliminal, speeded, etc.; De Houwer, Teige
 
easurement procedures can be classified according 
ntentionality, etc.; Bargh, 1994
operating conditions of a certain kind of cognition (
, the functional properties of automatic behavior
 etc.) are assumed to correspond to 
multi
-Mocigemba, Spruyt & Moors, 2009). 
3 
; 
med 
 
rtain kind of 
Figure 
 
 (e.g., 
-tasked, 
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Hence, indirect measurement procedures are interpreted as revealing the operation of 
automatic cognitive processes. Currently, the most popular indirect measurement 
procedures within social-cognitive psychology are the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the evaluative priming task (EPT; Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), and the affect misattribution procedure (AMP; 
Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). The IAT requires participants to quickly sort 
stimuli from two different categories (e.g., pictures of black vs. white persons and 
positive vs. negative words) into overlapping groups, and differences in reaction times 
are interpreted as an index of the strength of association between the categories. For 
example, in an IAT designed to measure automatic evaluations of black vs. white 
persons, the left-hand response category may be “Black person or Negative word” and 
the right-hand response category may be “White person or Positive word” (or the 
converse race/valence combinations). Usually, participants are slower to provide correct 
responses when the race/valence combinations are stereotypically incongruent (i.e., 
“Black person or Positive word”) compared to when they are stereotypically congruent 
(i.e., “Black person or Negative word”), suggesting an automatic evaluative bias (Nosek 
et al., 2007). The EPT is procedurally simpler, as it requires participants only to indicate 
whether a target word is positive or negative as quickly as possible; however, each word 
is briefly preceded by a prime (e.g., a picture of a black or white person), the valence of 
which is assumed to influence the reaction time of evaluative decisions about the target 
words. For example, in an EPT designed to measure automatic evaluations of black vs. 
white persons, the typical finding is that correct evaluations of negative words are faster 
following primes of black persons, whereas correct evaluations of positive words are 
faster following primes of white persons (Fazio et al., 1995). Finally, in the AMP, 
participants are required to indicate whether a Chinese pictograph (assumed to be 
meaningless) is more or less visually pleasing than average. As with the EPT, each 
pictograph is preceded by a prime, and the typical finding is that the valence of the prime 
influences ratings of the following pictograph—even when participants are explicitly 
admonished to avoid its influence (Payne et al., 2005). 
In contrast to indirect measurement procedures, which are designed to reduce the 
influence of introspective self-assessment on responses, direct measurement procedures 
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simply allow participants to report what they think. To do so, direct measurement 
procedures attempt to establish conditions necessary for the observation of “controlled” 
behavior, which is defined in contrast to the functional properties of automatic behavior 
(e.g., resource-inefficiency, awareness, controllability, intentionality, etc.). The functional 
properties of controlled behavior are assumed to correspond to empirical properties of 
direct measurement procedures (e.g., being non-distracted, supraliminal, non-speeded, 
etc.), and direct measurement procedures are therefore interpreted as revealing the 
operation of controlled cognitive processes (see Figure 1.1). The most common form of 
direct measurement procedure in social-cognitive psychology is the basic self-report item 
or questionnaire. For example, in investigations of racial evaluations, direct measurement 
procedures often rely upon self-reported evaluations of black and white persons, 
frequently taking the shape of a “feeling thermometer” that allows participants to rate 
their warmth toward a given social group. These ratings are typically interpreted in terms 
of deliberate (as opposed to automatic) evaluative biases, and are often found to be 
dissociated from indirectly measured, automatic biases (Nosek et al., 2007). 
Currently, the distinction between indirect and direct measurement procedures in social-
cognitive psychology is not sharp, largely because there is no standard set of observation 
conditions (e.g., being multi-tasked, subliminal, speeded, etc.) that a procedure must 
establish to qualify as one or the other. Moreover, it is unclear if any of the functional 
properties traditionally used to distinguish between automatic and controlled behavior 
(e.g., resource-efficiency, awareness, intentionality, etc.) should be regarded as necessary 
or sufficient (De Houwer, 2006). As a result, these properties and their empirical 
realizations in measurement procedures are typically treated as disjunctive, leading to 
measurement procedures that combine both automatic and controlled properties (e.g., 
speeded self-report; Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008). The use of such procedures—
and the difficulty they pose for interpretation—highlight the deeper issue of how 
selectively any measurement procedure can assess automatic vs. controlled cognition, an 
issue that will be discussed in more detail shortly (see §1.1.1). 
The correspondence between the observation conditions established by a certain kind of 
measurement procedure (e.g., indirect vs. direct) and the operating conditions of a certain 
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kind of cognitive process (e.g., automatic vs. controlled) is a fundamental psychometric 
assumption in cognitivist psychology—hence I will refer to it as the psychometric 
covariation thesis. Indeed, all cognitivist psychological research is predicated on this 
initial link between the conditions under which behavior is observed and the conditions 
under which cognition is assumed to operate; when left unspecified, the default 
assumption is simply that there is no theoretically meaningful variation in the operating 
conditions of cognition, and therefore that any observation conditions established by a 
measurement procedure correspond to the same (and only) operating condition of 
cognition. With regard to the received view of dual-process cognition, however, the 
assumption is that the observation conditions established by a measurement procedure do 
distinguish, in a theoretically meaningful way, between two different operating 
conditions of cognition. For example, a procedure that requires speeded responses to 
stimuli while combined with a distracter task would generally be assumed to measure 
automatic behavior, and hence to reflect automatic cognitive processing, whereas a 
procedure that places no time or capacity constraints on responses (e.g., a standard 
questionnaire) would be assumed to measure controlled behavior, and hence to reflect 
controlled cognitive processing. 
The key insight of dual-process theories of cognition lies specifically in the assumption 
that there is more than one theoretically meaningful operating condition for cognition, 
which is to say that different operating conditions correlate with different kinds of 
cognitive process. In particular, the distinction between kinds of cognitive process 
becomes theoretically meaningful when different processes are assumed to process 
information in different ways (e.g., via syllogistic reasoning vs. similarity; Sloman, 
1996). Dual-process theories of cognition are thus defined by how they specify the 
covariation between the operating conditions of cognitive processes (via the observation 
conditions established by a kind of measurement procedure) and the operating principles 
that characterize different kinds of cognitive process (see Figure 1.2). I will refer to this 
second link, between the operating conditions and operating principles of cognition, as 
the cognitive covariation thesis. 
 
  
Figure 1.2. The psychometric and cognitive covariation theses as a function of the 
observation conditions established by a measurement procedure, the operating conditions 
of cognition, and the operating principles of cognition. The distinctions drawn between 
each of these criteria according to the “received view” of dual
are noted. 
 
From this perspective, the received view of 
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process. Implicit cognition, in contrast, operates according to the principles of similarity 
(e.g., between a perceived stimulus and an object in memory), and is constrained to the 
associative processing of information available in the immediate situation (e.g., 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Sloman, 1996; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
The essential idea of covariation, as discussed here, encapsulates the problem of 
measurement for dual-process theories of cognition. The problem comes down to how 
strong the psychometric and cognitive covariations really are (Figure 1.2). If both 
covariations are strong, then the initial link between the observation conditions 
established by a measurement procedure and the operating conditions of cognition can be 
used to draw an equally strong (though necessarily indirect) inference from that 
measurement procedure to the kind of cognition it is measuring. This is, of course, the 
hope of dual-process theorists—that indirect measurement procedures allow observation 
of automatic, and hence implicit, cognition, whereas direct measurement procedures 
allow observation of controlled, and hence explicit, cognition. If, however, either 
covariation is weak, then the inference from observation conditions to operating 
principles does not go through, leaving the characterization of the cognitive processing 
underlying observed behavior much less constrained, and hence difficult to describe in 
the precise terms of a psychological mechanism.2 
For researchers theoretically committed to the existence of multiple kinds of cognition, 
the covariation theses offer a natural means to resolve the problem of measurement. Yet 
both of these theses have also been criticized as the cause of this problem, for both 
statistical and conceptual reasons. To move research on dual-process cognition forward, 
it is necessary to make sense of these conflicting views. Toward that end, I will first 
discuss two problems endemic to dual-process measurement that have led some theorists 
                                                 
2
 The present discussion generalizes to all multi-process theories, although the focus will be on dual-
process theories in particular given their dominance in the social-cognitive literature (cf. Sherman, 2006). 
In principle, an n-process model can be specified in terms of both the psychometric and covariation theses, 
given pairwise relations between n kinds of observation conditions, operating conditions, and operating 
principles.  
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to criticize the covariation theses. I will then attempt to clarify what this criticism entails 
and whether the theses have the potential to offer a solution to the problem of 
measurement. 
1.1.1 Problems in the measurement of dual-process cognition 
1.1.1.1 Statistical problems 
A first problem in the interpretation of empirical evidence for the distinction between 
implicit and explicit cognition hinges on how indirect and direct measurement outcomes 
are statistically compared. A common approach is to draw conclusions about 
correspondence vs. dissociation between implicit and explicit cognition based on the 
zero-order correlation between indirect and direct measurement outcomes; thus, low 
correlations are interpreted as supporting the distinction between two kinds of cognitive 
process. 
There are, however, a number of problems with this interpretation due to the many 
alternative factors that can attenuate statistical correlations (Hofmann, Gschwendner, 
Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005). For example, indirect measurement outcomes typically contain 
a greater proportion of random measurement error compared to direct measurement 
outcomes, which reduces the strength of correlations between the two (e.g., Bosson, 
Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). Beyond random 
measurement error, there may be systematic sources of error variance specific to indirect 
procedures, such as the presentation order of critical trials or practice effects on the IAT 
(Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007), that attenuate correlations. At a more conceptual 
level, there is also the problem of construct correspondence between procedures, which 
requires that the stimuli used in parallel direct and indirect procedures be matched as 
closely as possible (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Payne, 
Burkley, & Stokes, 2008; see also Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). These problems are inherent 
in dual-process research, given that such research rests upon a distinction between 
empirical observation conditions that opens the door to unwanted variation between 
different kinds of measurement procedure. Considering the very different observation 
conditions that typically characterize direct vs. indirect measurement procedures (e.g., 
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speeded vs. non-speeded, subliminal vs. supraliminal, etc.), it should not be surprising 
that low statistical correlations between measurement outcomes can often be explained 
on methodological grounds. 
Several responses to this problem are available, though none is perfect. One approach is 
to attempt to reduce measurement error by increasing the reliability (internal consistency) 
of indirect measurement procedures. For example, Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, and 
Deutsch (2010) found that controlling attention to specific features of a prime stimulus 
(i.e., race vs. age) during a Black/White EPT increased the reliability of the procedure. 
To reduce the influence of method-specific variance, a finding can be replicated using 
multiple indirect measurement procedures. The best solution, however, appears to require 
abandoning the correlational approach to dissociation in favor of an experimental 
approach, in which a single experimental manipulation is shown to produce different 
effects on parallel direct and indirect measurement procedures (Hofmann & Wilson, 
2010). In contrast to the correlational approach, this approach compares the same kind of 
measurement procedure across experimental conditions, thereby eliminating confounds 
arising from comparisons between direct and indirect measurement procedures.  
The experimental approach to dissociation is not a panacea, however. For one thing, the 
low reliability of indirect measurement procedures adversely affects the replicability of 
experimental findings, which can contribute to incorrect conclusions about the distinction 
between kinds of cognition (LeBel & Paunonen, 2011). In addition, construct 
correspondence remains an issue, as no matter how closely the experimenter seeks to 
match stimuli between direct and indirect measurement procedures, it remains unclear 
which features of the stimulus and context are driving responses under different operating 
conditions (Hofmann et al., 2005). For example, controlled responses may be inherently 
more (or less) context-sensitive than automatic responses, and context-sensitivity may 
even vary between particular indirect measurement procedures (Gawronski et al., 2010). 
This question bears strongly upon the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis, 
and will be discussed in more detail below (see §1.2). 
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1.1.1.2 Conceptual problems 
A second problem in the interpretation of empirical evidence for the distinction between 
implicit and explicit cognition hinges on the notion of process purity, which is the 
assumption that measurement procedures are pure reflections of a single kind of cognitive 
process, uncontaminated by any other kind of processing. The assumption of process 
purity is widely regarded as a fallacy within social-cognitive psychology, and substantial 
evidence suggests that existing indirect and direct measurement procedures cannot be 
regarded as selective measures of  automatic and controlled processes, or alternatively, of 
implicit and explicit processes (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 
2005; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, in press; Sherman, Klauer, & Allen, 2010). This 
stance has produced a peculiar conflict for dual-process researchers: On one hand, current 
dual-process theories are essentially claims about the covariation between distinct kinds 
of measurement procedures, cognitive operating conditions, and cognitive operating 
principles; on the other hand, the assumption that this covariation is strong is criticized as 
leading to the misinterpretation of data. 
To make sense of this conflict, it helps to examine the notion of process purity with 
respect to the two covariation theses separately, since each thesis independently bears 
upon the interpretation of data. In other words, measurement procedures might be 
assumed to be pure reflections of particular operating conditions (e.g., automaticity vs. 
control), or they may be assumed to be pure reflections of particular operating principles 
(e.g., implicit vs. explicit). In the former case, the process purity critique is understood as 
a failure of the psychometric covariation thesis: that is, as insufficient covariation 
between the observation conditions established by a measurement procedure and the 
operating conditions of a kind of cognitive process (Figure 1.2). From the canonical dual-
process perspective, the failure of the psychometric covariation thesis is implied by 
evidence that (a) indirect measurement procedures are not pure measures of automatic 
cognition and that (b) direct measurement procedures are not pure measures of controlled 
cognition, such that behavioral responses measured using either kind of procedure appear 
to reflect a mixture of automatic and controlled processing. To the extent this is the case, 
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the standard practice of using indirect and direct measurement procedures to distinguish 
between automatic and controlled cognition is undermined. 
The strongest evidence against the process purity of measurement procedures comes from 
the application of mathematical modeling to indirect measurement outcomes (Sherman et 
al., 2010). Mathematical modeling is an analytic technique that mathematically 
decomposes responses on a measurement procedure into underlying processes. Applied 
to indirect measurement procedures, modeling techniques suggest that the cognitive 
processing underlying behavioral responses is not purely automatic, but is also (to a 
variable extent) controlled (e.g., Conrey et al., 2005; Payne, 2001). The strong evidence 
against the process purity of existing indirect measurement procedures suggests that 
mathematical modeling is indispensible for the interpretation of data testing dual-process 
theories. In practice, this means that measurement outcomes must be routinely 
decomposed into automatic and controlled components to draw inferences about dual-
process cognition. Some proponents of mathematical modeling go even further, 
advancing an a priori argument against the psychometric covariation thesis (e.g., Jacoby, 
1991; Sherman, 2008; Sherman et al., 2010). The claim is that because behavioral 
responses on any measurement procedure are inevitably influenced by both automatic 
and controlled processes, behavioral measurement procedures are in principle incapable 
of isolating a single cognitive operating condition.  
Even if the psychometric covariation thesis were assumed sound, however, the process 
purity critique can be understood in a second, independent sense as a failure of the 
cognitive covariation thesis: that is, as an insufficient covariation between the operating 
conditions of different kinds of cognitive process and the operating principles that 
characterize them. In fact, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009) originally identified the 
cognitive covariation thesis (although they did not refer to it by that name) in order to 
criticize it on the grounds of process purity. Specifically, evidence increasingly suggests 
that the automatic/controlled distinction crosscuts the implicit/explicit distinction, given 
standard assumptions about how implicit and explicit processes operate (i.e., implicit 
processes being associative and explicit processes being rule-based; Sloman, 1996). For 
example, Gawronski, LeBel, and Peters (2007) reviewed evidence demonstrating that 
13 
 
 
 
implicit cognition is not necessarily any less conscious, controllable, or context-sensitive 
than explicit cognition. 
In light of this evidence, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009) argued that kinds of 
cognition should be empirically distinguished primarily with respect to their operating 
principles rather than with respect to the canonical dual-process operating conditions (i.e., 
automaticity vs. control). For example, according to Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s 
(2006; in press) Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, the key distinction 
between implicit (“associative”) and explicit (“propositional”) cognition is the sensitivity 
to perceived validity, such that only propositional processes are qualified by the 
perceived validity of information. Thus, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (in press) claim 
that “there is no one-to-one mapping between operating principles and operating 
conditions, such that associative processes would operate automatically, whereas 
propositional processes operate in a controlled fashion…. Instead, both associative and 
propositional processes have automatic and controlled aspects” (p. 6). From the 
perspective of the APE model, then, Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2009) proposal 
appears to require distinguishing between kinds of cognition post-hoc, based on the 
empirical sensitivity to perceived validity in a particular processing situation, rather than 
a priori, based on the functional properties of cognition.3 
1.1.1.3 Summary 
The problem of measurement in dual-process research raises the question of how 
different kinds of process can be measured and, conversely, how to know what kind (or 
kinds) of process a measurement procedure reflects. The statistical problems inherent in 
comparing measurement outcomes from different kinds of procedure are substantial but 
                                                 
3
 This proposal might also be interpreted as calling for a re-specification of the operating conditions of 
cognition in terms of different functional properties, which promote or suppress the influence of perceived 
validity (as opposed to the standard properties used to distinguish automaticity vs. control; Bargh, 1994). 
From this perspective, Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2009) criticism of the cognitive covariation thesis 
for failing to maintain process purity is not a rejection of the thesis in principle, but is rather a call to revise 
its specification. It remains an empirical question whether different operating conditions can be identified 
that successfully discriminate between associative and propositional processing (i.e., in terms of sensitivity 
to perceived validity). 
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become more tractable in experimental research. On the other hand, the conceptual 
problems arising from assumptions about the process purity of these different 
measurement procedures appear more troublesome, calling into question the validity of 
both the psychometric and cognitive covariation theses. From this perspective, the 
problem of measurement in dual-process research appears to be caused by the covariation 
theses, as each implies an assumption of process purity (between observation conditions 
and operating conditions, and between operating conditions and operating principles) that 
can lead to the misinterpretation of data. Yet I have also suggested that these theses are 
vital not only to dual-process research but to the practice of cognitivist psychology in 
general. The next section attempts to resolve these conflicting views. 
1.1.2 The value of the covariation theses 
To understand the value of the covariation theses in dual-process research, it is necessary 
to examine both of the process-purity criticisms discussed above in more detail. 
1.1.2.1 Defending the psychometric covariation thesis 
First, with regard to the psychometric covariation thesis, it has been argued that 
behavioral responses inevitably reflect the operation of cognition under multiple 
conditions (in particular, reflecting both automatic and controlled cognition), and 
therefore that any behavioral measurement procedure will inevitably be process-impure 
(Jacoby, 1991; Sherman, 2008; Sherman et al., 2010). From this perspective, it is 
logically impossible for the observation conditions established by a measurement 
procedure to select a specific kind of cognitive operating condition—implying a rejection 
of the psychometric covariation thesis in principle. 
This argument, however, begs the question of whether behavioral responses are 
inevitably process-impure. In fact, the process purity of behavioral responses is an 
empirical question, which will depend on how the distinction between kinds of process is 
specified. Consequently, the psychometric covariation thesis cannot be rejected on logical 
grounds. It is entirely reasonable to expect that this thesis would hold given a more 
appropriate specification—that is, by identifying the specific observation conditions and 
operating conditions that do covary. Thus, although evidence from mathematical 
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modeling suggests that responses on current measurement procedures are the product of a 
combination of automatic and controlled processes, it would be incorrect to interpret this 
empirical fact as implying the rejection of any specification of the psychometric 
covariation thesis: Empirical evidence cannot rule out the possibility that there is a 
different distinction between observation conditions (other than that between direct and 
indirect) that would cleanly distinguish between cognitive operating conditions (in terms 
of automaticity vs. control or some alternative distinction; see §4.2.2.1 for such a 
proposal). 
1.1.2.2 Defending the cognitive covariation thesis 
Based on evidence that automatic and controlled conditions do not select purely implicit 
or explicit cognitive processing, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009) argued that the 
automatic/controlled distinction should not be used as a guide to distinguishing between 
the operation of implicit and explicit cognition. This negative claim does not necessitate 
the rejection of the cognitive covariation thesis in principle, as it leaves open the 
possibility that a revised specification of operating conditions and operating principles 
could covary more strongly. Nevertheless, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009, in press) 
appear to claim that the principle of covariation should be abandoned (though see 
Footnote 3 for an alternative interpretation). In practice, this means that there is no a 
priori way to test dissociations between implicit and explicit processes, since there is no 
established link between operating conditions and operating principles that can guide the 
choice of measurement procedure to reveal the operation of explicit vs. implicit cognition 
(Figure 1.2). This not only makes it difficult to formulate experimental designs to test 
predicted dissociations, but it also leaves multi-process theorizing disorganized, since 
there are no particular conditions of cognitive operation (and hence of behavior) that are 
characterized by specific kinds of cognitive processing (i.e., operating principles). From 
this perspective, researchers might claim that there are two (or more) kinds of cognition 
but would have no means to specify when one or the other would be expected to 
influence behavior. More fundamentally, this approach does not eliminate the necessity 
of the cognitive covariation thesis for psychological research. Operating principles are 
theoretical properties that can be empirically identified only indirectly via their 
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covariation with operating conditions (and, ultimately, observation conditions; Figure 
1.2). The fact that automatic processing does not appear to be purely associative, or 
controlled processing purely rule-based, does not imply that the assumption of 
covariation between operating conditions and operating principles should be abandoned, 
but rather that their specification may be in need of revision. 
1.1.2.3 Two choices 
The broader point to be made here, with respect to both covariation theses, is that they are 
fundamental assumptions required for empirical research in cognitivist psychology—they 
cannot simply be rejected, since doing so would make the inferences (from behavioral 
observation to cognitive process) on which cognitivist psychological explanation is based 
unwarranted (see Figure 1.2). Rather, it is the specific form of each thesis that should be 
subjected to criticism, not the principle of covariation itself. In the absence of a dual-
process theory that explicitly specifies the form of these theses, cognitivist research is 
nevertheless predicated on an assumption of uniformity, such that all kinds of 
measurement procedure reflect the same (and only) operating principles of cognition, 
regardless of variability in operating conditions. Although this assumption sounds rather 
simple, it constitutes a theoretical claim about covariation no less significant than that of 
the most complex multi-process theory (see Kruglanski, Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, & Chun, 
2006, for one effort to develop such a single-process model). Consequently, given the 
necessity of the covariation theses for cognitivist research, dual-process theorists face a 
choice between working with process-impure (i.e., weak) covariation theses and 
attempting to refine the resulting data, or striving to specify process-pure (i.e., strong) 
covariation theses. 
A priori arguments about process purity aside, the availability of sophisticated 
mathematical modeling techniques for interpreting psychological data might be seen as 
compensating for weak covariation theses. From this perspective, there is no need to 
strive for process-pure theses if weaker versions can be “corrected” with the systematic 
use of mathematical models. The problem with this argument is that data (whether the 
product of behavioral observation or mathematical analysis) cannot unambiguously 
“correct” theory: There is a dialectical relation between the two, with data constraining 
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theoretical claims and theory informing the interpretation of data. In particular, 
mathematical modeling is not theory-free, since modeling techniques themselves require 
theoretical assumptions in order to specify model parameters—that is, assumptions about 
how to divide cognition into different kinds of process and about the conditions under 
which each kind of process will produce a certain behavioral outcome (Payne & Bishara, 
2009; Sherman et al., 2010). Thus, mathematical modeling fails to compensate for weak 
covariation theses because—resting on process assumptions itself—it cannot be viewed 
as a bedrock source of data for evaluating theoretical claims about the operation of 
distinct psychological processes in the interpretation of behavioral data. 
The alternative is to focus on developing stronger covariation theses that approach 
process-purity. This choice implies a stronger, and hence more functional, dialectic 
between theory and data in dual-process research. Indeed, the psychometric and cognitive 
covariation theses jointly constitute a description of this dialectic, running from observed 
behavior to theoretical process and back (Figure 1.2). A dual-process researcher can 
therefore start from measurement procedures, try to determine what operating conditions 
the established observation conditions correspond to, and then try to determine the 
operating principles that characterize processing under those conditions; based on 
empirical feedback, the researcher can then revise operating principles, which should 
inform assumptions about the conditions under which those processes operate, and then 
seek to modify or design measurement procedures to correspond to those conditions. 
These approaches are complementary and are equally valuable. Given that the 
psychometric and cognitive covariation theses are indispensible for cognitivist research, 
then, the most practical response to the problem of process purity is to view any 
specification of observation conditions, operating conditions, and operating principles as 
provisional distinctions susceptible to revision, rather than viewing any particular 
specification as inevitable (and inevitably flawed). 
1.1.3 Summary 
The problem of measurement in dual-process research is reflected in conflicting views of 
the psychometric and cognitive covariation theses. The principle of covariation linking 
observed behavior to inferred process (Figure 1.2) would seem to be a key insight of 
18 
 
 
 
dual-process theories, but it has also been criticized for encouraging assumptions about 
process purity that can lead to the misinterpretation of behavioral data. I have argued that 
the problem is not the principle of covariation itself, which is necessary for cognitivist 
research, but rather how to specify that covariation. Thus, although data (whether the 
product of behavioral observation or mathematical analysis) can speak to the adequacy of 
particular specifications of these theses, they cannot be used to reject them in principle. 
Instead, data should be used to revise the two covariation theses in order to make their 
specification more empirically adequate. Since dual-process research has primarily 
focused on how to characterize the distinction between different kinds of cognitive 
process in terms of their operating principles, the next section will consider the problem 
of how to specify the cognitive covariation thesis in particular. 
1.2 The specification problem 
The specification problem in dual-process research can be treated with respect to both the 
psychometric and cognitive covariation theses. As discussed above, the conjunction of 
these theses constitutes a dialectic between observable behavior and theoretical process 
that can be approached from either direction. Specification of the psychometric 
covariation thesis is undoubtedly an important question, and dual-process researchers 
have increasingly turned their attention to this challenge (De Houwer, 2008; De Houwer 
et al., 2009; Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel, & Peters, 2008). It is the specification of the 
cognitive covariation thesis, however, that has been of primary interest to dual-process 
researchers: How is cognition carved into different kinds of process? How are these kinds 
characterized, and what is the key (necessary and sufficient) distinction between them? In 
pursuing these questions, researchers have generally assumed the standard specification 
of the psychometric covariation thesis, which equates indirect measurement procedures 
with the conditions of automaticity and direct measurement procedures with the 
conditions of control. Although this assumption is vulnerable to empirical process purity 
criticisms, it is (in some form) necessary for testing theories about the operating 
principles that characterize different kinds of psychological process. Moreover, empirical 
feedback from these tests ultimately informs the design of measurement procedures as a 
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result of the observation/process dialectic—an implication that will be explored later in 
light of the present research (see §4.2). 
The current section will focus on two major attempts to specify the cognitive covariation 
thesis in social-cognitive psychology. Many dual-process theories have been proposed to 
explain various aspects of social behavior, including evaluation, persuasion, and 
impression formation. These theories differ in detail, but they share fundamental 
similarities in how they characterize the distinction between automatic and controlled 
cognitive processes. In particular, the assumption is that, by default, automatic processing 
provides the input to controlled processing, which serves a regulatory or “corrective” 
function. Dual-process theories of social-cognition generally describe this relation in 
terms of distinct lower-level, automatic, and higher-level, controlled kinds of cognitive 
process. These attempts to specify the cognitive covariation thesis constitute hypotheses 
about how to carve cognition. Thus, one approach has been to distinguish between kinds 
of cognitive process in terms of the degree of sensitivity to the situational context, which 
I will refer to as the contextualization hypothesis. Another approach has been to 
distinguish between kinds of cognitive process in terms of sensitivity to perceived 
validity, which I will refer to as the validation hypothesis. Admittedly, this analysis might 
be criticized for painting the crowded field of dual-process theories of social-cognition 
with a broad brush, missing their many nuances. Yet this level of abstraction is necessary 
for identifying precisely what each model assumes to be the necessary distinction 
between kinds of cognition, as opposed to merely probabilistic or “symptomatic” features 
of their operation (Samuels, 2009). Indeed, to the extent that any given dual-process 
theory cannot be described in terms of at least one necessary distinction between kinds of 
cognition, it becomes difficult to falsify and loses empirical value. 
Below, I will first outline the basic assumptions underlying the two major attempts to 
specify the cognitive covariation thesis. I will then identify specific models of each type 
that have been proposed to explain various aspects of social behavior, along with their 
empirical successes and challenges. Afterward, I will address the related question of the 
number of mental representations required by dual-process theories, which will be 
relevant to the interpretation of the present research. 
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1.2.1 The contextualization hypothesis  
1.2.1.1 Basic assumptions 
The philosopher John Locke proposed that complex ideas are built out of combinations of 
simple ideas, which are themselves irreducible. The notion that thought is compositional 
in this way underlies the contextualization hypothesis about how to carve cognition. 
From this perspective, the key distinction between lower-level and higher-level cognition 
is the level of complexity, or contextual detail, of the information upon which each kind 
of process operates. The basic idea is that the distinction between lower-level and higher-
level cognition is marked by a bottom-up transition from general, memory-based 
categories to individuated instances through the higher-level integration of situational 
information; in other words, automatic processes operate upon types, whereas controlled 
processes, by integrating situational details, individuate types into tokens. For example, 
when applied to impression formation, the contextualization hypothesis suggests that 
early, automatic reactions toward a social target will reflect relatively rough categorical 
representations (i.e., stereotypes), whereas later, controlled reactions may be influenced 
by details in the immediate situation that can be used to individuate the target (e.g., Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990). Because of this type-to-token dynamic, dual-process models of this 
sort are naturally structured by a monitoring-and-correction processing schema, in which 
higher-level, controlled processing serves to “correct” automatically activated, lower-
level category knowledge as the situation demands. Consequently, these models are often 
assumed to operate primarily in a bottom-up fashion, such that lower-level processing 
influences higher-level processing, but not vice versa. 
The basic distinction between type-dependent processing and token-dependent processing 
specified by the contextualization hypothesis assumes that behavioral responses driven by 
automatic processing are rooted in stable category knowledge stored in memory, and 
hence should be insensitive to situational context. In contrast, behavioral responses 
driven by controlled processing are assumed to reflect the integration of individuating 
contextual information, and hence should be more situationally appropriate. Typically, 
the type/token distinction is augmented by an additional assumption about how type-
dependent and token-dependent cognitive processes operate. Specifically, automatic, 
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type-dependent processing is assumed to be associative, such that it is purely a function 
of similarity; controlled, token-dependent processing is assumed to be rule-based, 
characterized by the principles of syllogistic reasoning (see Table 1.1). From this 
perspective, higher-level, explicit knowledge should be learned quickly as a function of 
reasoning, whereas lower-level, implicit knowledge—being immune to the top-down 
influence of rule-based processing—should be learned slowly as a function of repeated 
associations (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). 
 
The Contextualization Hypothesis 
 Operating Conditions  
Automatic 
Unintentional 
Uncontrollable 
Resource-efficient 
Outside awareness 
 
 
Controlled 
Intentional 
Controllable 
Resource-inefficient 
Within awareness 
 
 
 Operating Principles  
Implicit 
Situation-insensitive* 
Associative 
 
 
Explicit 
Situation-sensitive* 
Rule-based 
 
 
Table 1.1. The specification of the cognitive covariation thesis per the contextualization 
hypothesis. 
*Denotes the key distinction between cognitive operating principles. 
 
An important consequence of the equation of situation-insensitive processing with 
associative principles, and of situation-sensitive processing with rule-based principles, is 
that these two kinds of cognition become imbued with significant normative 
connotations. Thus, similarity-based processing across rough, memory-based categories 
will frequently appear unintelligent, rigid, and potentially maladaptive. In contrast, rule-
based processing of detailed, context-sensitive tokens will appear intelligent, flexible, and 
adaptive. Returning to the example of impression formation, the contextualization 
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hypothesis suggests that automatic evaluations of a social target will reflect stable, 
stereotypical knowledge, which is automatically activated merely as a function of 
similarity between the target and a social category. Lacking the “corrective” influence of 
rule-based processing, which can deliberately qualify evaluations of the target based on 
individuating information, automatic evaluations would in many situations be expected to 
lead to unwarranted discrimination (e.g., Devine, 1989). Despite the fact that these 
normative connotations remain tacit in the social-cognitive literature (or perhaps for this 
reason), they have played a significant role in shaping dual-process research in the field. 
For example, the standard distinction between the operating conditions of automatic and 
controlled cognition (i.e., in terms of resource-efficiency, awareness, controllability, and 
intentionality) is largely informed by the conditions under which cognitively simple 
(unintelligent) vs. complex (intelligent) processes would be expected to operate 
(Greenwald, 1992). Moreover, these connotations perpetuate the folk taxonomy of 
cognition (i.e., rational/reflective vs. irrational/impulsive), which continues to color 
theorizing about the cognitive processes underlying human behavior. 
1.2.1.2 Empirical applications and challenges 
The contextualization hypothesis characterizes many of the classic dual-process models 
of social-cognition. These early models were generally inspired by the belief that 
organisms need to quickly sort stimuli into rough categories to facilitate fast, possibly 
life-saving, behavioral responses, and that contextual, individuating details could be 
added given more time. Bruner (1957) helped set the tone for this work by referring to 
early cognitive processing as “primitive categorization” and describing the overall 
perceptual process as “a ‘bracketing’ one, a gradual narrowing of the category placement 
of the object” (p. 130). In social psychology, this basic notion of contextualization was 
most readily translated into the domain of impression formation in an inter-racial context, 
where it has distinctly negative implications (e.g., Devine, 1989). Although the use of 
rigid categorical knowledge to quickly discriminate predator from prey might seem to be 
evolutionarily adaptive, in the modern world the use of such stereotypes would frequently 
lead to unwarranted discrimination (Dovidio, Kawakami, Smaok, Gaertner, 2008; cf. 
Arkes & Tetlock, 2004). On this view, evaluative and conceptual knowledge associated 
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with a category in memory is automatically activated upon perception of a similar 
stimulus. It is the job of higher-level, controlled processing to monitor activated 
categorical knowledge and “correct” it, through the addition of situational information, as 
appropriate.  
These early dual-process models of social-cognition were primarily focused on 
explicating how the bottom-up, monitoring-and-correction schema could describe 
impression formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and racial prejudice in 
particular (Devine, 1989). For example, both Brewer (1988) and Fiske and Neuberg 
(1990) offered models in which the early impressions underlying automatic evaluations 
are based on categorical representations of a social target; controlled evaluations are then 
assumed to make use of individuating information available in the situation, thereby 
correcting erroneous stereotypical impressions, but only given time and effort. As Brewer 
(1988) put it: 
Impressions are based on an active categorization process in which 
available ‘person types’ are matched to the information given about the 
new person. The search [for a matching category] is presumed to continue 
in an iterative … process, starting at the most general level of 
categorization and progressing to more specific subtypes, until an 
adequate fit is achieved. (p. 17). 
Similarly, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) assumed that “the sequential priority of processes 
[in impression formation] goes from category confirmation, to recategorization, to 
piecemeal integration of attributes” (p. 2). Devine (1989) applied this schema specifically 
to model the interaction between learned stereotypes and deliberate beliefs about social 
groups that was assumed to underlie prejudicial behavior: 
Whereas high-prejudice persons are likely to have personal beliefs that 
overlap substantially with the cultural stereotype, low-prejudice persons 
have decided that the stereotype is an inappropriate basis for behavior or 
evaluation and experience a conflict between the automatically activated 
stereotype and their personal beliefs. The stereotype conflicts with their 
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nonprejudiced, egalitarian values. The model assumes that the low-
prejudice person must create a cognitive structure that represents his or 
her newer beliefs (e.g., belief in equality between the races, rejection of 
the stereotype, etc.). Because the stereotype has a longer history of 
activation (and thus greater frequency of activation) than the newly 
acquired personal beliefs, overt nonprejudiced responses require 
intentional inhibition of the automatically activated stereotype and 
activation of the newer personal belief structure. Such inhibition and 
initiation of new responses involves controlled processes. (p. 6) 
With the subsequent development of easily administered and fairly reliable indirect 
measurement procedures, a major goal of dual-process research became to explain the 
relation between responses on these procedures compared to responses on direct 
measurement procedures, which often appeared to be dissociated (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Much of this research focused specifically on 
evaluative responses, leading to the development of a number of models describing the 
interaction between indirectly measured, automatic, implicit attitudes and directly 
measured, controlled, explicit attitudes in terms of the contextualization hypothesis (e.g., 
Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; 
Hofmann et al., 2005; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). 
Fazio’s MODE model (Fazio, 2007; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), which had a strong 
influence on the field, is perhaps the prototypical contextualization model. The acronym 
MODE stands for “Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants" of the influence of 
attitudes on behavior, where attitudes are specifically conceptualized as stable object-
evaluation associations stored in memory. The automatic activation of these “summary” 
evaluations in memory is assumed to influence behavior unless the actor has both the 
motivation and opportunity to “correct” this influence by taking contextual details of the 
situation into account. As Fazio and Towles-Schwen (1999) described it, “The [automatic 
process] focuses upon preexisting attitudes and their accessibility from memory. This can 
be contrasted with a much more deliberative process in which the individual focuses not 
upon any preexisting attitude, but upon the raw data” (p. 99). 
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The contextualization hypothesis has received empirical support across several domains 
of social-cognitive research. For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2004) developed their 
theory of aversive racism based on the idea that stable negative associations with 
outgroups in memory often conflict with egalitarian goals; once activated, these stable 
outgroup associations can be corrected only under controlled operating conditions (see 
also Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Consistent with this idea, the more strongly 
outgroups are associated with negativity, the more cognitively depleting are cross-race 
interactions, presumably due to efforts to control the expression of these automatically 
activated associations (Richeson et al., 2003; Richeson & Shelton, 2003). The 
monitoring-and-correction processing schema has also been applied to self-regulation 
behaviors more generally, such that the influence of stable, automatically activated 
associations in memory can be “corrected” with respect to the current situational context, 
but only under conditions of control (e.g., Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). In addition, 
both self-esteem and the self-concept have been understood in these terms, with stable 
self-associations in memory influencing explicit self-descriptions unless controlled 
cognition is able to qualify these self-stereotypes (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; 
Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 
2002). 
Although the contextualization hypothesis appears to be consistent with a wide range of 
empirical evidence, it also faces significant challenges. First, evidence for top-down 
influences, in which higher-level processing directly affects lower-level processing, 
challenges the bottom-up flow of processing implied by the hypothesis. For example, 
Peters and Gawronski (2011a, Experiment 2; see §2.2) found that being motivated to 
perceive oneself as extraverted (or introverted) produced congruent changes in explicit 
self-knowledge; significantly, these explicit changes mediated changes in the activation 
of implicit self-knowledge, presumably due to the top-down influence of a biased search 
for relevant memories. Similarly, Whitfield and Jordan (2009) found that reading 
behavioral descriptions of social targets (e.g., “Dan is rude to his mother”) influenced 
explicit evaluations of the targets, and that these changes in explicit evaluations mediated 
changes in implicit evaluations of the targets. This mediation pattern was observed for 
both novel and familiar targets, suggesting that top-down processing can underlie both 
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formation and change of evaluations in memory. Such findings are inconsistent with the 
contextualization hypothesis, which views higher-level processing essentially as a 
downstream integrator and modifier of automatically activated knowledge; from the 
perspective of this hypothesis, higher-level processing should be able to “correct” 
activated knowledge at the time of behavioral expression, but should not have a 
retroactive influence on knowledge stored in memory. 
A second, more trenchant, challenge to the contextualization hypothesis comes from 
accumulating evidence that lower-level processing can be quite sensitive to situational 
context, often even more so than higher-level processing. In fact, empirical evidence for 
the context-insensitivity of implicit cognition is surprisingly rare (e.g., Foroni & Mayr, 
2005; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011b). In contrast, implicit 
cognition has been found to be sensitive to situationally active goals (Ferguson & Bargh, 
2004; Foroni & Mayr, 2005), visual context (Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, & De Houwer, 
2010), social roles and status (Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004; Dasgupta & 
Greenwald, 2001; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005; Wittenbrink, Judd, & 
Park, 2001), directed imagination (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001), and the physical 
environment (Cesario, Plaks, Hagiwara, Navarrete, & Higgins, 2010; Schaller, Park, & 
Mueller, 2003). 
Strong evidence for the context-sensitivity of lower-level processing is difficult to 
reconcile with the contextualization hypothesis and the bottom-up, monitoring-and-
correction models it informs. As a specification of the cognitive covariation thesis, the 
contextualization hypothesis seeks to carve cognition into two kinds of process that are 
distinguished principally by their sensitivity to situational context. Thus, lower-level 
processing is assumed to involve stable, categorical knowledge rooted in memory (i.e., 
stereotypes), whereas higher-level processing is assumed to involve flexible, individuated 
knowledge sensitive to situational demands. Faced with contradictory evidence, some 
proponents of the contextualization hypothesis have attempted to defend it through post-
hoc adjustments to their models that would allow lower-level processing to be more 
context-sensitive. Fazio (2007), for example, has defended his MODE model by arguing 
that evidence for the context-sensitivity of lower-level processing can be explained by a 
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change in how the object of evaluation is construed rather than by a change in the 
evaluation associated with the original object. Specifically, Fazio argues that because 
most objects are multiply categorizable, the evaluation of an object depends on how it is 
categorized within a given context; yet blurring the distinction between object and context 
weakens the conceptual foundation of the MODE model (i.e., the stability of object-
evaluation associations in memory), making it difficult to distinguish from a more 
constructivist approach in which the “object of evaluation” is a unique construction based 
on the present context (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2007; Schwarz, 2007). Ultimately, to the 
extent such post-hoc adjustments are made, the key distinction that makes these dual-
process models empirically interesting (i.e., the contextualization hypothesis) is 
weakened, and the models become increasingly difficult to falsify. 
1.2.2 The validation hypothesis 
1.2.2.1 Basic assumptions 
In distinguishing between different kinds of cognition, the contextualization hypothesis 
depends centrally upon the notion of compositionality, such that higher-level processing 
combines lower-level types, as the situation demands, to produce individuated tokens. 
From this perspective, higher-level processing serves a monitoring-and-correction 
function by contextualizing stable category knowledge to make it more situationally 
appropriate. The validation hypothesis builds upon the same monitoring-and-correction 
processing schema, but it does not draw the distinction between kinds of cognition in 
terms of representational complexity; thus, lower-level representations are assumed to be, 
in principle, as complex and situation-sensitive as higher-level knowledge. Instead, the 
distinction is drawn in terms of sensitivity to truth-values, such that the activation of 
lower-level knowledge and its influence on automatic behavior occurs independent of its 
perceived validity, but its influence on controlled behavior does depend on its perceived 
validity (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The validation 
hypothesis therefore suggests that higher-level processing monitors lower-level 
processing by evaluating its validity and, if necessary, corrects it by rejecting activated 
knowledge perceived to be false. 
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According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006), the perceived validity of activated 
knowledge is assumed to be a function of situational consistency—that is, consistency 
with the set of currently endorsed (i.e., previously validated) beliefs that make up an 
individual’s current state of consciousness. Thus, as discussed below, perceived validity 
can be considered one particular aspect of the situational context. For example, whether 
or not the implication of an automatic negative reaction to a Black man (i.e., “I dislike 
black people”) is perceived as valid will depend upon its consistency with other beliefs 
that are endorsed in the current situation (e.g., “Discrimination against minorities is 
wrong”; Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008). 
A second point of difference between the validation and contextualization hypotheses 
concerns the direction of influence between lower-level and higher-level processing. The 
distinction between degrees of representational complexity assumed by the 
contextualization hypothesis has typically been understood as implying that the 
monitoring-and-correction schema operates in a bottom-up direction, whereby higher-
level processing moderates the connection between lower-level processes and controlled 
behavior, but does not exert a retroactive influence on lower-level processes themselves. 
This is because the more complex, contextualized tokens represented at the higher level 
cannot, by assumption, be represented at the lower level. From the perspective of the 
validation hypothesis, however, top-down influences are more plausible since both 
processing levels are capable of equal representational complexity. Thus, direct 
manipulations of higher-level knowledge are expected to depend upon the activation of 
(indeed, to be identical with the activation of) corresponding lower-level knowledge. In 
contrast to the contextualization hypothesis, it is not the manipulation of higher-level 
knowledge in general that should have an asymmetric influence on higher-level and 
lower-level processes but specifically the manipulation of perceived validity. Thus, 
controlled recall of “true” knowledge (e.g., via logical inference) is assumed to rely upon 
the top-down activation of that knowledge at the lower level. On the other hand, the 
rejection of activated knowledge as “false” in higher-level processing should have no top-
down influence on activated knowledge, since lower-level processing is assumed to be 
unaffected by perceived validity; for example, rejecting one’s automatic negative reaction 
toward a Black man as invalid because it is inconsistent with one’s egalitarian beliefs 
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would not be expected to deactivate that negative association, which might then be 
expressed in automatic behaviors (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
Finally, as with the contextualization hypothesis, the dual-process models based on the 
validation hypothesis also invoke the distinction between associative and rule-based 
operating principles in characterizing lower-level and higher-level processes (see Table 
1.2). Thus, the automatic activation of knowledge is assumed to be a function of 
similarity between associations stored in memory, although the increased representational 
complexity of these associations makes associative processing more flexible. Likewise, 
higher-level processing is assumed to be a function of syllogistic rules, made possible by 
sensitivity to truth-values.4 
 
The Validation Hypothesis 
 Operating Conditions  
Automatic 
Unintentional 
Uncontrollable 
Resource-efficient 
Outside awareness 
 
 
Controlled 
Intentional 
Controllable 
Resource-inefficient 
Within awareness 
 
 
 Operating Principles  
Implicit 
Insensitive to perceived validity* 
Associative 
 
 
Explicit 
Sensitive to perceived validity* 
Rule-based 
 
 
Table 1.2. The specification of the cognitive covariation thesis per the validation 
hypothesis. 
*Denotes the key distinction between cognitive operating principles. 
  
                                                 
4
 In Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2006) APE model, higher-level processing is described as 
“propositional” rather than “rule-based” to emphasize its sensitivity to truth-values.  
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By invoking the associative/rule-based distinction, validation models carry normative 
connotations similar to those based upon the contextualization hypothesis, although these 
connotations are somewhat weaker given the increased context-sensitivity of lower-level 
processing. In fact, given these similarities and the common adherence to a monitoring-
and-correction processing schema, it can be useful to view the validation hypothesis as a 
special case of the contextualization hypothesis in which sensitivity to one specific 
situational factor (i.e., perceived validity)—rather than to the situational context in 
general—distinguishes between kinds of cognitive process. 
1.2.2.2 Empirical applications and challenges 
The validation hypothesis as described above is realized most completely in Gawronski 
and Bodenhausen’s (2006, in press) APE model and in Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) 
Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM). Both of these models view sensitivity to perceived 
validity as the key distinction between kinds of cognition. Moreover, viewed as special 
cases of contextualization models, the APE model and the RIM were specifically 
formulated to improve upon the empirical weaknesses of the monitoring-and-correction 
processing schema by allowing for lower-level context-sensitivity and top-down 
influences. Consequently, these models are consistent with the wealth of evidence for the 
context-sensitivity of implicit cognition and have led to a number of confirmed 
predictions regarding the top-down influence of explicit cognition on implicit cognition 
(e.g., Peters & Gawronski, 2011a; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009; see Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006, for a review). In addition, the APE model has been used to integrate 
various theoretical conceptions of prejudice, including Dovidio and Gaertner’s (2004) 
theory of aversive racism, into a single conceptual framework based on the consistency 
between implicit evaluations and explicit beliefs (Gawronski et al., 2008). 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the validation hypothesis, however, is the 
demonstration of an asymmetric influence of perceived validity on explicit and implicit 
cognition. For example, Gawronski and Strack (2004) employed the classic induced 
compliance paradigm from cognitive dissonance research to manipulate the availability 
of a situational explanation for writing a counter-attitudinal essay. When a situational 
explanation was available, writing the essay had no effect on participants’ explicit or 
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implicit evaluations of the topic. In contrast, when a situational explanation was 
unavailable, explicit evaluations of the topic became more positive, presumably to 
maintain consistency between attitudes and behavior. Critically, however, no effect of 
consistency was observed for implicit evaluations of the essay topic, which remained 
negative. Another line of evidence involves the asymmetric influence of negation on 
explicit and implicit cognition (Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Deutsch, Kordts-
Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009). For example, Deutsch et al. (2006) found that 
the process of negating a valenced word (e.g., “no cockroach”) requires a fixed amount of 
time that is unaffected by practice. Deutsch et al. interpreted this resistance to practice as 
evidence that negation is inherently a higher-level, rule-based process that cannot be 
automatized. 
Despite its consistency with existing evidence and support for its novel predictions, the 
validation hypothesis has begun to face challenges as a specification of the cognitive 
covariation thesis. In particular, evidence has appeared that calls into question the 
distinction between automatic and controlled processes in terms of their sensitivity to 
truth-values. For example, Deutsch et al. (2009) found that evaluations can be quickly 
and efficiently negated when they are assessed with the AMP. As will be discussed in 
more detail below, the present research also suggests that negation exerts a powerful 
influence on the formation of implicit evaluations (Peters & Gawronski, 2011b; see §3). 
As with the contextualization hypothesis, proponents of the validation hypothesis have 
attempted to defend their models by weakening the specification of the cognitive 
covariation thesis. Thus, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2009, in press) have responded to 
these empirical challenges by suggesting that automatic and controlled processes are not 
cleanly distinguished by their sensitivity to perceived validity (see §1.1.1.2). Once again, 
however, these efforts to defend the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis by 
weakening it—which amounts to denying the principle of covariation—make the models 
built upon the validation hypothesis more difficult to falsify. Instead, as argued above 
(§1.1.2), contradictory evidence may be more fruitfully used to make the specification of 
both covariation theses more empirically adequate. I will pursue this approach below by 
suggesting that it is not perceived validity per se that distinguishes between kinds of 
cognitive process, but rather how it is manipulated (see §4.3.1). 
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1.2.3 How many representations are there? 
In pursuing this revised specification of the cognitive covariation thesis, the debate over 
the number of mental representations (i.e., memory traces) assumed to underlie dual-
process cognition will be of central importance. This question was not addressed above 
because it is ultimately irrelevant for describing the contextualization and validation 
hypotheses: Existing single- and dual-representation versions of either hypothesis are 
theoretically interchangeable and empirically indistinguishable (Greenwald & Nosek, 
2008). The reason for this is that existing dual-process models all assume that mental 
representation is compositional, such that complex thoughts are built from simple 
thoughts that possess a basic, discrete meaning and are themselves irreducible (Szabó, 
2009). Contextualization models directly employ this assumption to distinguish between 
kinds of cognition, such that lower-level processes operate upon simple, decontextualized 
representations, which are combined by higher-level processes to create complex, 
contextualized representations. Existing validation models also assume that mental 
representation is compositional, but do not employ this assumption as a general 
distinction between kinds of cognition; instead, these models suggest it is the perceived 
validity, not the complexity, of mental representations that marks the distinction. In either 
case, then, existing dual-process models assume that mental representation is 
compositional, with the key consequence that representation at the higher level is 
assumed to be reducible to representation at the lower level. Thus, in dual-representation 
theories, which posit two distinct memory traces underlying implicit and explicit 
cognition, complex representations must be additive (non-emergent) combinations of 
simple representations; this means that a complex representation can in principle be 
completely reduced to simple representations, though the complex representation is 
assumed to exist as a distinct memory trace. In single-representation theories, on the 
other hand, complex representations are not assumed to exist as distinct memory traces, 
but just are combinations of simple representations. 
Although it might seem natural to assume that distinct kinds of cognitive process operate 
upon distinct memory traces (especially when those processes are assumed to operate in 
parallel), the independent assumption that higher-level representations are reducible to 
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lower-level representations leaves dual-representation models vulnerable to criticism on 
the grounds of parsimony. Specifically, dual-process models that posit two distinct 
memory traces, one of which is reducible to the other (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; 
Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Wilson et al., 2000), introduce a redundancy that is not 
found in single-representation models (e.g., Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).5 The root problem is that the 
compositional relation between the two memory traces in dual-representation models 
undermines their classification as qualitatively different kinds: Because both higher-level 
and lower-level representations are built from the same components, they must in 
principle be reducible. Conversely, the parsimony critique implies that single-
representation theories must assume that higher-level representation is completely 
reducible to lower-level representation, such that there is no loss of information when 
knowledge moves across levels; thus, these models are committed to a single kind of 
mental representation. 
The parsimony critique is valid when targeting existing dual-representation models: 
Compositionality implies the reducibility of one kind of representation to another, 
creating a theoretical redundancy. As a critique of dual-representation theories in general, 
however, this argument begs the question by assuming that there is only one way an 
“object” can be mentally represented—that is, compositionally. This assumption reflects 
an entrenched linguocentrism in psychology, whereby natural language, which is 
                                                 
5
 Although dual-representation models in social-cognition generally avoid explicit statements of 
representational assumptions, these can be inferred from how implicit cognition is characterized. For 
example, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) define an implicit construct as an “introspectively unidentified (or 
inaccurately identified) trace of past experience” (p. 5), but do not claim that these constructs are 
unidentifiable in principle. Consistent with this interpretation, Greenwald and Banaji assume that the key 
empirical property of indirect measurement procedures is that they do not alert the participant to what is 
being measured, implying that it is possible for implicit constructs to be explicitly represented. Echoing 
Fazio’s (1995) definition of an attitude as an object-evaluation association, Wilson et al. (2000) state that 
implicit and explicit attitudes are “summary evaluations that can be based on a variety of sources of 
information” (p. 107); thus, Wilson et al. claim that implicit and explicit attitudes do not differ in terms of 
how or what information is represented, but in the extent to which the attitude has become “ingrained” or 
automatized. Rydell and McConnell (2006) take a similar approach, assuming that all attitudes are object-
evaluation associations, and distinguishing between explicit and implicit attitudes in terms of how they are 
learned. In each of these cases, the authors appear to assume that implicit representations can in principle 
be represented explicitly, implying their reducibility. 
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generally assumed to be compositional (Fodor, 2007; Szabó, 2009), is treated as the 
paradigm example of cognitive information processing. Consequently, the principles by 
which language operates are expected to inform our understanding of cognition: 
Since the birth of cognitive science, language has provided the dominant 
theoretical model. Formal cognitive models have taken their structure 
from the syntax of formal languages, and their content from the semantics 
of natural language. The mind has been taken to be a machine for formal 
symbol manipulation, and the symbols manipulated have assumed 
essentially the same semantics as words of English. (Smolensky, 1988, p. 
4, emphasis in orginal) 
This reasoning reached its apex in Fodor’s (1975) language of thought hypothesis, which 
claimed that cognition can only be understood as computation—that is, as the rule-based 
manipulation of discrete symbols (see also Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Opposition to the 
classical, linguocentric view of mental representation grew out of evidence for a 
distinction between verbal and imagistic cognitive processing (e.g., Kosslyn, 1980; 
Paivio, 1971) as well as advances in neural network modeling techniques that provided a 
plausible explanation for how non-computational cognition might be implemented. These 
connectionist models demonstrated that weighted networks of densely interconnected 
nodes could simulate many aspects of human cognition (Rogers & McClelland, 2004). 
Critically, however, these models do not require an assumption of compositionality, such 
that individual nodes would each possess a discrete meaning or represent a discrete 
object. Instead, they can also be constructed such that meaning is found only in overall 
patterns of activated nodes (Chrisley, 1998; Smolensky, 1988), analogous to the way in 
which the pattern of pixels on a monitor can be meaningful without any one pixel 
carrying a discrete meaning. This holistic, distributed style of representation is indeed a 
qualitatively different kind of mental representation compared to the classical, localist 
style of representation, and as such it provides a basis for dual-representation theories that 
are not vulnerable to the parsimony critique: Because distributed representations are non-
compositional, they cannot be reduced to localist, compositional representations (and vice 
versa). Loosely speaking, this is why a bitmap image of a scene and a verbal description 
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of the same scene will inevitably be non-equivalent—because they carry different kinds 
of information. Thus, as Smolensky (1988) noted, localist descriptions of distributed 
cognitive processing will inevitably be “incomplete (describing only certain aspects of 
the processing) or informal (describing complex behaviors in, say, qualitative terms) or 
imprecise (describing the performance up to certain approximations or idealizations…)” 
(p. 7). 
In fact, dual-process models of social-cognition frequently appeal to the distinction 
between classical and connectionist architectures in specifying the cognitive covariation 
thesis (e.g., Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), but 
for very particular reasons. First, connectionist architectures provide a mechanism for 
similarity-based associative processing via the phenomenon of pattern matching, in 
which the activation of one pattern of nodes facilitates the activation of overlapping (and 
hence similar) patterns without any need for rule-based, symbolic computation (Smith, 
1996). Second, connectionist architectures provide a plausible implementation-level 
account of associative processing, as they are inspired by the networks of neurons that 
make up the brain (Smolensky, 1988). 
Most appeals to connectionist architectures in social-cognition, however, ignore the 
further possibility of non-compositional, distributed representation, and instead treat 
connectionist architectures simply as providing an associative (as opposed to rule-based) 
mechanism for processing compositional, localist representations. For single-
representation models, adhering to a localist version of connectionism makes sense, 
because these models must assume that there is only one kind of mental representation. 
Indeed, single-representation theorists are admirably clear on this point. For example, 
Fazio (2007, p. 612) argues that the object-evaluation associations underlying his MODE 
model would be represented equivalently in either classical or connectionist architectures. 
Likewise, both Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2006, in press) APE model and Strack 
and Deutsch’s (2004) RIM appeal to connectionist networks underlying lower-level 
associative processing, but conceive of these networks in terms of discrete, localist nodes. 
For example, Strack and Deutsch (2004, Figure 3) describe the activation of nodes in a 
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network representing the discrete concepts PERSON, ELDERLY, SLOW, etc., which 
can be directly combined into truth-evaluable propositions by higher-level processing.  
The commitment to a single, localist kind of representation becomes less tenable, 
however, in light of empirical evidence suggesting that mental representation is not 
always discrete and categorical (Medin, 1989; Murphy, 2002; Rogers & McClelland, 
2004). In summarizing this literature, Medin (1989) pointed to three critical findings: The 
inability of lay persons and experts alike to specify core feature sets for concepts; 
typicality effects, whereby some objects are considered “better” examples of a concept 
than others (e.g., an orange is a better exemplar of the concept FRUIT than a tomato); 
and unclear cases, whereby appeal to defining features seems to be unhelpful (e.g., does a 
rug count as instance of the concept FURNITURE?). The ubiquity of these findings 
suggests that category representations in general are not sets of necessary features, but are 
rather clusters of (sub-featural) properties that tend to covary—in other words, they are 
more like distributed patterns than discrete definitions. Based on such evidence, it seems 
that the question begged by the parsimony critique of dual-representation theories is not 
trivial. If different kinds of process are assumed to operate upon genuinely different kinds 
of representation (i.e., localist vs. distributed), the distinction between kinds of cognitive 
process will be, at least partly, a result of the distinction between kinds of representation; 
therefore, the theoretical properties distinguishing kinds of representation should lead to 
testable predictions about how to distinguish kinds of process, and in this way should 
inform the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis. 
Below, I will explore the possibility of a dual-process theory that combines localist and 
distributed representations, and thereby takes full advantage of the insights from 
connectionist modeling (see Conrey & Smith, 2007, Smith & Conrey, 2007, for initial 
steps in this direction). As I will discuss, the possibility of non-compositional, distributed 
representation and its relation to compositional, localist representation may provide a 
solution to the challenges facing the contextualization and validation hypotheses. 
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1.2.4 Summary 
In discussing the problem of specification in dual-process research, I have focused on 
how to specify the relation between the operating conditions and the operating principles 
of cognition—that is, the cognitive covariation thesis. Any such specification constitutes 
a hypothesis about how to carve cognition into distinct kinds of process. The two major 
hypotheses in social-cognitive psychology are both built upon a monitoring-and-
correction processing schema in which knowledge automatically activated in lower-level 
processing is monitored relative to some criterion and corrected, given the conditions of 
control, by higher-level processing. In the case of the contextualization hypothesis, the 
criterion is situational appropriateness, such that higher-level processing functions to 
qualify automatically activated, stable category knowledge with respect to situational 
demands. The key principle distinguishing automatic and controlled processes is 
therefore assumed to be sensitivity to the situational context. In the case of the validation 
hypothesis, the criterion is situational consistency, such that higher-level processing 
functions to evaluate the validity of automatically activated knowledge with respect to 
currently endorsed beliefs. From this perspective, the key principle distinguishing 
automatic and controlled processes is assumed to be sensitivity to perceived validity. 
Both hypotheses have received empirical support but also face significant challenges. The 
contextualization hypothesis does not readily predict top-down influences of controlled 
processing on automatic processing, and it is contradicted by evidence of the context-
sensitivity of the latter. The validation hypothesis is consistent with both lines of 
evidence, but is itself challenged by findings suggesting that automatic processing can be 
sensitive to perceived validity. In response, I have suggested that the specification of the 
cognitive covariation thesis may need to account for distinct kinds of mental 
representation (i.e., localist vs. distributed) underlying kinds of cognitive process. This 
distinction has been largely ignored or misconstrued in existing dual-process models, 
which assume the compositionality of mental representation and thus that representations 
at one level are reducible to those at the other. If this is not the case, then understanding 
the relation between these (genuinely) different kinds of mental representation may be 
critical to the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis. 
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1.3 The unity problem 
Most research and theorizing in the dual-process literature has focused on the 
specification problem and, to a lesser extent, the measurement problem. Yet there 
remains a more fundamental question that is rarely addressed: Why would cognition be 
divided into distinct kinds of cognition in the first place? And why would that division 
take the particular shape it does? Samuels (2009) refers to this as the unity problem, and 
he discusses it with respect to the common “cluster” approach to specifying the cognitive 
covariation thesis, in which clusters of operating principles correlate with different 
clusters of operating conditions (e.g., the received view of associative, similarity-based 
processing is that it is resource-efficient, unintentional, uncontrollable, and less 
accessible to conscious awareness). For Samuels, the unity problem follows on the heels 
of the specification problem: That is, once the cognitive covariation thesis has been 
specified, one can ask why this particular cluster of operating principles correlates with 
this particular cluster of operating conditions. For example, why is associative processing 
inherently less accessible to conscious awareness? Why is rule-based processing more 
controllable and less resource-efficient? 
In fact, despite its popularity in the social-cognitive literature, the cluster approach to the 
specification problem involves dangerous theoretical excess, since there is no a priori 
reason that specification of the cognitive covariation thesis requires paired clusters of 
principles and conditions rather than a single key distinction to characterize each. Of 
course, the cluster approach to specification would seem to have the virtue of making the 
cognitive covariation thesis more falsifiable, because it makes stronger empirical claims. 
For example, on the received view, all of the functional properties of automaticity should 
be perfectly coincident, and should always correspond to the operating principles of 
implicit cognition. These are indeed strong empirical claims, and are readily 
disconfirmed by evidence that these clusters are not aligned (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2007; 
Moors & De Houwer, 2006; see Keren & Schul, 2009). The cluster approach to 
specifying the cognitive covariation thesis survives, however, because in practice these 
clusters are treated more like heuristics for deriving predictions rather than theoretical 
claims, making them moving targets that are difficult to falsify. Consequently, 
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disconfirming evidence is more easily attributed to the failure of the psychometric 
covariation thesis—that is, due to the failure of indirect and direct measurement 
procedures to select purely automatic and controlled cognitive processes. As argued 
above, however (see §1.1.2.3), the process purity of measurement cannot be abandoned 
without compromising the ability to draw inferences about cognitive processes from 
observed behavior. For this reason, restricting specification of the cognitive covariation 
thesis to single distinctions between operating conditions and operating principles is not 
only theoretically simpler but empirically safer, as there is less room to maneuver around 
disconfirming evidence. 
This has been the approach taken above, in which I sought to identify the key distinctions 
between operating conditions and operating principles that characterize the two major 
attempts to specify the cognitive covariation thesis. Thus, the contextualization 
hypothesis characterizes automatic processing as being comparatively insensitive to the 
situational context (Table 1.1), whereas the validation hypothesis characterizes automatic 
processing as being comparatively insensitive to perceived validity (Table 1.2). An 
advantage of these one-dimensional distinctions is that the unity problem becomes more 
tractable: Rather than explaining why clusters of operating principles covary with clusters 
of operating conditions in monolithic systems (cf. Keren & Schul, 2009), the challenge is 
to explain why a specific principle characterizes cognitive processing operating under a 
specific condition. Based on the earlier characterization of both major hypotheses in 
terms of a monitoring-and-correction processing schema, the question is therefore why 
early processing would be comparatively insensitive to the situational context (either in 
general or with respect to situational consistency in particular). 
Although any response to the unity problem will almost certainly be speculative, it 
nevertheless imposes an important constraint on attempts to specify the cognitive 
covariation thesis—that is, that the specification respect known neurological, and 
ultimately phylogenetic, distinctions between cognitive processing capacities (Evans, 
2008). At minimum, then, any specification of the cognitive covariation thesis should be 
supported by a prima facie valid story about why cognitive processes are distinguished 
into the particular kinds specified. Conversely, dual-process theories unable to supply a 
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reasonable explanation for the distinction in cognitive processes they propose should lose 
a measure of support. Below, I will briefly consider three such explanations of the 
monitoring-and-correction processing schema, which forms the basis for both the 
contextualization and validation hypotheses, and argue that all three are inadequate. 
1.3.1 The architectural explanation 
To the extent that they provide an explicit response to the unity problem, dual-process 
theories of social-cognition have focused on implementation-level analyses. As discussed 
earlier, many dual-process models have appealed to the distinction between classical and 
connectionist cognitive architectures to ground the distinction between controlled and 
automatic processes (e.g., Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The general idea is that classical architectures 
provide the capacity to flexibly qualify and “correct” stable knowledge automatically 
activated in connectionist networks, either with respect to the situational context in 
general or situational consistency in particular. Such uses of the classical/connectionist 
distinction, however, ignore the deeper implications of localist vs. distributed 
representation—specifically, that distributed representations are inherently no less 
flexible and context-sensitive than localist representations (and potentially even more so; 
Smolensky, 1988). Nor are connectionist networks in principle incapable of encoding 
truth-values as a property of learned information, though distributed representations of 
truth-values may be more probabilistic than binary (cf. Osherson & Smith, 1981). 
1.3.2 The neurophysiological explanation 
A slightly different approach is to ground the distinction within two physiologically 
distinct memory systems in the brain (e.g., Lieberman, 2007), usually divided into 
subcortical and cortical systems. The cortical system is assumed to have exclusive access 
to serial working memory, which accounts for both its capacity for deliberate, syllogistic 
reasoning and its relative slowness and inefficiency. As critics have pointed out, 
however, dependence on working memory may provide an explanation for the properties 
of controlled processing but sheds little light on the nature of automatic processing 
(Evans, 2008; Samuels, 2009). In response, the neurophysiological distinction is 
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sometimes linked to the architectural distinction, such that the subcortical system is 
assumed to implement connectionist processing while the cortical system implements 
classical (rule-based) processing (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). As just discussed, however, 
the classical/connectionist distinction provides no inherent justification for the distinction 
between early and late processing in terms of sensitivity to the situational context when 
both architectures are assumed to operate upon localist representations. 
1.3.3 The phylogenetic explanation 
Nevertheless, it is often assumed that the neurophysiological distinction reflects a deeper 
phylogenetic distinction, such that the subcortical system is evolutionarily older than the 
cortical system (Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2004). Ultimately, the appeal to phylogeny boils 
down to an evolutionary story that has (often tacitly) provided the inspiration for the 
monitoring-and-correction processing schema (see §1.2.1.1). The assumption is that, to 
be evolutionarily adaptive, the early cognition underlying fast responses must quickly 
match stimuli in the environment with rough, stable categories (e.g., predator vs. prey). 
The incorporation of contextual information, either to individuate the early stimulus 
representation or to assess the situational consistency of the early response, is thus a 
luxury afforded by time. Moreover, it is assumed that only higher animals have 
developed the capacity for this downstream, controlled processing (which is an important 
source of the normative connotations that continue to color dual-process theorizing in the 
monitoring-and-correction tradition). 
The problem with this evolutionary story is that it doesn’t make much sense: To be 
evolutionarily adaptive, early responding needs to be flexible and context-sensitive, not 
rigid and context-insensitive (Schwarz, 2007). In the complexity of the ecological 
environment, the discrimination of a stimulus as predator vs. prey would frequently fail if 
the situational context were not taken into account; rather, early cognition needs to do its 
best with incomplete and varying contextual cues to determine what a stimulus is. This 
supposition is strongly supported by the evidence reviewed in §1.2.1.2, which 
demonstrates that that early affective reactions to a stimulus are moderated by the context 
in which it is perceived (e.g., Cesario et al., 2010; Schaller et al., 2003). 
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1.3.4 Summary 
In the end, the monitoring-and-correction processing schema appears to lack a reasonable 
explanation for the distinction between cognitive processes in terms of sensitivity to the 
situational context. Architectural, neurophysiological, and phylogenetic explanations 
have all been proposed, but none stands up to analysis (see also Samuels, 2009). 
Although this is not a devastating flaw, it does cast doubt on the accuracy of the 
monitoring-and-correction processing schema and, by implication, the contextualization 
and validation hypotheses built upon it. 
1.4 Overview of present research 
Above, I discussed three problems that must be addressed in any attempt to carve 
cognition into distinct kinds of process. Based on this discussion, the received view of 
how to carve cognition (Figure 1.2) appears to face serious difficulties. To begin with, the 
measurement problem cannot be solved by rejecting the covariation theses in principle, as 
these are required for cognitivist research; instead, the lack of process purity indicates a 
need to draw cleaner distinctions between observation conditions, operating conditions, 
and operating principles. The two major attempts to specify the cognitive covariation 
thesis in social-cognitive psychology both face empirical challenges. Furthermore, these 
hypotheses lack reasonable explanations for why higher-level processing would be 
distinguished by greater sensitivity to the situational context (either generally or with 
respect to situational consistency in particular). These difficulties suggest that the 
underlying monitoring-and-correction processing schema, in which higher-level 
processes function to control or make sense of lower-level impulses, may provide a 
misleading metaphor for carving cognition. 
The present research has implications for each of these problems. In both sets of studies, 
the observed relations between implicit and explicit cognition cast doubt on current 
assumptions about how these processes interact. The first manuscript investigates the 
dynamics underlying self-concept change in terms of the interaction between implicit and 
explicit self-knowledge. This research demonstrates that implicit and explicit cognition 
exert mutual bottom-up and top-down influences on each other, which is consistent with 
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the validation hypothesis but inconsistent with the assumption of the contextualization 
hypothesis that higher-level processing functions merely as an integrator of automatically 
activated lower-level knowledge. The second manuscript investigates the mechanisms 
underlying evaluative learning, demonstrating that perceived validity can, under certain 
conditions, have an impact on the learning of both explicit and implicit evaluations. To 
the extent that implicit and explicit evaluations are assumed to be learned via different 
mechanisms, this research has two implications immediately relevant to the current 
discussion. First, it suggests a strong top-down effect of rule-based learning, which again 
contradicts the assumption of the contextualization hypothesis that the direction of 
processing is bottom-up. Second, it suggests that implicit cognition may be sensitive to 
perceived validity under certain conditions, which contradicts the assumption of the 
validation hypothesis that implicit cognition should be insensitive to perceived validity.6 
In the final chapter, I will discuss the implications of this research for the questions raised 
above. The major goal will be to provide a more empirically accurate specification of the 
psychometric and cognitive covariation theses, which can help guide future research on 
dual-process cognition. Ultimately, I will argue that existing social-cognitive theories 
have identified important pieces of the dual-process puzzle, but have put them together in 
the wrong way. The present research points toward a different and potentially more 
accurate approach to fitting these pieces together. 
  
                                                 
6
 To prevent confusion, it should be noted that the research reported in §2 on self-concept change is framed 
in terms of the validation hypothesis, and the APE model in particular. Although the findings from these 
studies are consistent with this perspective, they contradict the assumptions of the contextualization 
hypothesis. Furthermore, these findings are also consistent with an alternative interpretation of the relation 
between higher-level and lower-level cognition developed later (see §4). 
44 
 
 
 
1.5 References 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on behavior. In D. 
Albarracín, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 
173-221). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Arkes, H. R., & Tetlock, P. E. (2004). Attributions of implicit prejudice, or “Would Jesse 
Jackson ‘fail’ the Implicit Association Test?”. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 257-
278.  
Barden, J., Maddux, W. W., Petty, R. E., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). Contextual moderation 
of racial bias: The impact of social roles on controlled and automatically activated 
attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 5-22. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, 
and control in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of 
social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Blair, I. V., Ma, J. E., & Lenton, A. P. (2001). Imagining stereotypes away: The 
moderation of implicit stereotypes through mental imagery. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 828-841. 
Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., & van Heerden, J. (2004). The concept of validity. 
Psychological Review, 111, 1061-1071. 
Bosson, J., K., Swann, W. B., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2000). Stalking the perfect measure 
of implicit self-esteem: The blind man and the elephant revisited? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 631-643. 
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull & R. 
S. Wyer Jr. (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 1-36). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum.  
Bruner, J. S. (1957). On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review, 64, 123-152. 
Cesario, J., Plaks, J. E., Hagiwara, N., Nvarrete, C. D., & Higgins, E. T. (2010). The 
ecology of automaticity: How situational contingencies shape action semantics 
and social behavior. Psychological Science, 21, 1311-1317. 
Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, 26-58. 
Chrisley, R. (1998). Non-compositional representation in connectionist networks. In 
Niklasson, L., Boden, M., & Ziemke, T. (Eds.), ICANN 98: Proceedings of the 8th 
International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks. 
Conrey, F. R., Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., Hugenberg, K., & Groom, C. J. (2005). 
Separating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: The quad model of 
implicit task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 469-
487. 
Conrey, F. R., & Smith, E. R. (2007). Attitude representation: Attitudes as patterns in a 
distributed, connectionist representational system. Social Cognition, 25, 718-735. 
45 
 
 
 
Cunningham, W. A., Preacher, K. J., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). Implicit attitude measures: 
Consistency, stability, and convergent validity. Psychological Science, 12, 163-
170. 
Cunningham, W. A., Zelazo, P. D., Packer, D. J., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2007). The iterative 
reprocessing model: A multilevel framework for attitudes and evaluation. Social 
Cognition, 25, 736-760. 
Dasgupta, N., & Greenwald, A. G. (2001). On the malleability of automatic attitudes: 
Combating automatic prejudice with images of admired and disliked individuals. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 811-814. 
De Houwer, J. (2006). What are implicit measures and why are we using them? In R. 
Wiers & A. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of implicit cognition and addiction (1st ed., 
pp. 11-28). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
De Houwer, J. (2008). Comparing measures of attitudes at the functional level and 
procedural level: Analysis and implications. In R. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol 
(Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures. New York: Psychology 
Press. 
De Houwer, J. (2011). Why the cognitive approach in psychology would profit from a 
functional approach and vice versa. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 
202-209. 
De Houwer, J., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Spruyt, A., & Moors, A. (2009). Implicit 
measures: A normative analysis and review. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 347-
368. 
Deutsch, R., Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2006). At the boundaries of automaticity: 
Negation as reflective operation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
91, 385-405. 
Deutsch, R., Kordts-Freudinger, R., Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2009). Fast and fragile: 
A new look at the automaticity of negation processing. Experimental Psychology, 
56, 434-446. 
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled 
components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5-18. 
Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2004). Aversive racism. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances 
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 36, pp. 1-52). San Diego: Elsevier.  
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). Implicit and explicit prejudice 
and interracial interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 62-
68. 
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., Smoak, N., & Gaertner, S. L. (2008). The roles of implicit 
and explicit processes in contemporary prejudice. In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. 
Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures (pp. 165-192). 
New York: Psychology Press. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social 
cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255-278. 
46 
 
 
 
Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determinants, 
consequences, and correlates of attitude accessibility. In R. E. Petty & J. A. 
Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 247-282). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Fazio, R. H. (2007). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations of varying strength. 
Social Cognition, 25, 736-760. 
Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in 
automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide 
pipeline? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 1013-1027. 
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: 
Their meaning and uses. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 297-327. 
Fazio, R. H., & Towles-Schwen, T. (1999). The MODE model of attitude-behavior 
processes. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social 
psychology (pp. 97-116). New York: Guilford.  
Ferguson, M. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). Liking is for doing: The effects of goal pursuit on 
automatic evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 557-572. 
Ferguson, M. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2007). Beyond the attitude object: Implicit attitudes 
spring from object-centered contexts. In B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz (Eds.), 
Implicit measures of attitudes (pp. 216-246). New York: Guilford. 
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from 
category-based to individuating processes: Influences of information and 
motivation on attention and interpretation. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 1-74). New York: Academic Press. 
Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Fodor, J. (2007). The revenge of the given. In B. P. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.), 
Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind (pp. 105-116). Malden, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A 
critical analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71. 
Foroni, F., & Mayr, U. (2005). The power of a story: New, automatic associations from a 
single reading of a short scenario. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 139-144. 
Freud, S. (1927). The ego and the id. London: Hogarth Press. 
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. 
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692-731.  
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2009). Operating principles versus operating 
conditions in the distinction between associative and propositional processes. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 207-208. 
47 
 
 
 
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (in press). The associative-propositional 
evaluation model: Theory, evidence, and open questions. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology. 
Gawronski, B., Cunningham, W. A., LeBel, E. P., & Deutsch, R. (2010). Attentional 
influences on affective priming: Does categorization influence spontaneous 
evaluations of multiply categorizable objects? Cognition and Emotion, 24, 1008-
1025. 
Gawronski, B., Deutsch, R., LeBel, E. P., & Peters, K. R. (2008). Response interference 
as a mechanism underlying implicit measures: Some traps and gaps in the 
assessment of mental associations with experimental paradigms. European 
Journal of Psychological Assessment, 24, 218-225. 
Gawronski, B., LeBel, E. P., & Peters, K. R. (2007). What do implicit measures tell us? 
Scrutinizing the validity of three common assumptions. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 2, 181-193. 
Gawronski, B., Peters, K. R., Brochu, P. M., & Strack, F. (2008). Understanding the 
relations between different forms of racial prejudice: A cognitive consistency 
perspective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 648-665. 
Gawronski, B., Rydell, R. J., Vervliet, B., & De Houwer, J. (2010). Generalization versus 
contextualization in automatic evaluation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 139, 683-701. 
Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2004). On the propositional nature of cognitive consistency: 
Dissonance changes explicit, but not implicit attitudes. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 40, 535-542. 
Greenwald, A. G. (1992). New look 3: Unconscious cognition reclaimed. American 
Psychologist, 47, 766-779.  
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-
esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Farnham, S. D. (2000). Using the Implicit Association Test to 
measure self-esteem and self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 79, 1022-1038. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Nosek, B. A. (2008). Attitudinal dissociation: What does it mean? 
In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new 
implicit measures (pp. 65-82) . Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Gregg, A. P., Seibt, B., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). Easier done than undone: Asymmetry in 
the malleability of implicit preferences. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90, 1-20. 
Hofmann, W., Friese, M., & Strack, F. (2009) Impulse and self-control from a dual-
systems perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 162-176. 
48 
 
 
 
Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H., & Schmitt, M. (2005). A meta-
analysis on the correlation between the Implicit Association Test and explicit self-
report measures. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1369-1385. 
Hofmann, W., Gschwendner, T., Nosek, B. A., & Schmitt, M. (2005). What moderates 
implicit-explicit consistency? European Review of Social Psychology, 16, 335-
390.  
Hofmann, W., & Wilson, T. D. (2010). Consciousness, introspection, and the adaptive 
unconscious. In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social 
cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications. New York: Guilford Press. 
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process-dissociation framework: Separating automatic from 
intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513-541. 
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Henry Holt & Co. 
Jordan, C. H., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Hoshino-Browne, E., & Correll, J. (2003). 
Secure and defensive high self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85, 969-978. 
Keren, G., & Schul, Y. (2009) Two is not always better than one: A critical evaluation of 
two-system theories. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 533-550. 
Kosslyn, S. M. (1980). Image and mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Kruglanski, A. W., Erb, H., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & Chun, W. Y. (2006). On 
parametric continuities in the world of binary either ors. Psychological Inquiry, 
17, 153-165. 
LeBel, E. P., & Paunonen, S. V. (2011). Sexy but often unreliable: Impact of unreliability 
on the replicability of experimental findings involving implicit measures. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 570-583. 
Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: A review of core processes. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 259-289.  
Medin, D. L. (1989). Concepts and conceptual structure. American Psychologist, 44, 
1469-1481. 
Murphy, G. L. (2002). Typicality and the classical view of categories. In G. L. Murphy, 
The big book of concepts (pp. 11-40). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). Math = male, me = female, 
therefore math ≠ me. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 44-59. 
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2007). The Implicit Association Test 
at age 7: A methodological and conceptual review. In J. A. Bargh (Ed.), Social 
psychology and the unconscious: The automaticity of higher mental processes 
(pp. 265-292). New York: Psychology Press. 
Nosek, B. A., Smyth, F. L., Hansen, J. J., Devos, T., Lindner, N. M., Ratliff (Ranganath), 
K. A., Smith, C. T., Olson, K. R., Chugh, D., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. 
(2007). Pervasiveness and correlates of implicit attitudes and stereotypes. 
European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 36-88. 
49 
 
 
 
Osherson, D. N., & Smith, E. E. (1981). On the adequacy of prototype theory as a theory 
of concepts. Cognition, 9, 35-58. 
Paivio, A. (1971). Imagery and verbal processes. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. 
Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled 
processes in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81, 181-192. 
Payne, B. K., & Bishara, A. J. (2009). An integrative review of process dissociation and 
related models in social cognition. European Review of Social Psychology, 20, 
272-314. 
Payne, B. K., Burkley, M. A., & Stokes, M. B. (2008). Why do implicit and explicit 
attitude tests diverge? The role of structural fit. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 94, 16-31. 
Payne, B. K., Cheng, C. M., Govorun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for 
attitudes: Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 89, 277-293.  
Peters, K. R., & Gawronski, B. (2011a). Mutual influences between the implicit and 
explicit self-concepts: The role of memory activation and motivated reasoning. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 436-442. 
Peters, K. R., & Gawronski, B. (2011b). Are we puppets on a string? Comparing the 
impact of contingency and validity on implicit and explicit evaluations. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 557-569. 
Ranganath, K. A., Smith, C. T., & Nosek, B. A. (2008). Distinguishing automatic and 
controlled components of attitudes from direct and indirect measurement 
methods. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 386-396. 
Richeson, J. A., Baird, A. A., Gordon, H. L., Heatherton, T. F., Wyland, C. L., Trawalter, 
S., & Shelton, J. N. (2003). An fMRI investigation of the impact of interracial 
contact on executive function. Nature Neuroscience, 6, 1323-1328.  
Richeson, J. A., & Shelton, J. N. (2003). When prejudice does not pay: Effects of 
interracial contact on executive function. Psychological Science, 14, 287-290.  
Rogers, T. T., & McClelland, J. L. (2004). Semantic cognition: A parallel distributed 
processing approach. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Rydell, R. J., & McConnell, A. R. (2006). Understanding implicit and explicit attitude 
change: A systems of reasoning analysis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 91, 995-1008.  
Samuels, R. (2009). The magical number two, plus or minus: Dual process theory as a 
theory of cognitive kinds. In J. St. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two 
minds: Dual processes and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schaller, M., Park, J. J., & Mueller, A. (2003). Fear of the dark: Interactive effects of 
beliefs about danger and ambient darkness on ethnic stereotypes. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 637-649. 
50 
 
 
 
Schwarz, N. (2007). Attitude construction: Evaluation in context. Social Cognition, 25, 
638-656. 
Sherman, J. W. (2006). On building a better process model: It’s not only how many, but 
which ones and by which means? Psychological Inquiry, 17, 173-184. 
Sherman, J. W. (2008). Controlled influences on implicit measures: Confronting the myth 
of process-purity and taming the cognitive monster. In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & 
P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new wave of implicit measures (pp. 
391-426). New York: Psychology Press. 
Sherman, J. W., Klauer, K. C., & Allen, T. J. (2010). Mathematical modeling of implicit 
social cognition: The machine in the ghost. In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne 
(Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and 
applications. New York: Guilford Press. 
Sinclair, S., Lowery, B. S., Hardin, C. D., & Colangelo, A. (2005). Social tuning of 
automatic racial attitudes: The role of affiliative motivation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 583-592. 
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological 
Bulletin, 119, 3-22.  
Smith, E. R. (1996). What do connectionism and social psychology have to offer each 
other? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 893-912. 
Smith, E. R., & Conrey, F. R. (2007). Mental representations are states, not things: 
Implications for implicit and explicit measurement. In B. Wittenbrink & N. 
Schwarz (Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes (pp. 247-264). New York: 
Guilford. 
Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual-process models in social and cognitive 
psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 108-131.  
Smolensky, P. (1988). On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 11, 1-74.  
Stanovich, K. E. (2004). The robot’s rebellion: Finding meaning in the age of Darwin. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social 
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247. 
Szabó, Z. G. (2009). Compositionality. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (Spring 2009 ed.). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/compositionality/ 
Whitfield, M., & Jordan, C. H. (2009). Mutual influences of explicit and implicit 
attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 748-759. 
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of dual attitudes. 
Psychological Review, 107, 101-126. 
51 
 
 
 
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (2001). Spontaneous prejudice in context: 
Variability in automatically activated attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81, 815-827. 
52 
 
 
 
2 Mutual Influences between the Implicit and 
Explicit Self-Concepts: The Role of Memory 
Activation and Motivated Reasoning7 
Historically, the self-concept has been understood as the collection of things we believe 
about ourselves. The use of recently developed techniques for indirectly measuring 
mental contents, however, has suggested that an individual’s self-concept can differ 
depending on how it is measured—specifically, depending on whether information about 
the self is explicit or implicit in behavioral responses on the measurement procedure (cf. 
De Houwer, 2006). Thus, measures of the “explicit” self-concept, typically assessed via 
self-report, have been shown to diverge from measures of the “implicit” self-concept, 
typically assessed via performance-based measures (e.g., Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; 
see Schnabel & Asendorpf, 2010, for a review). Measures of the implicit self-concept 
predict behavior above and beyond measures of the explicit self-concept (Asendorpf, 
Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009), and this incremental validity 
appears to derive from a difference between the conditions under which the two types of 
self-information influence behavior. For example, Asendorpf et al. (2002) found evidence 
for a double dissociation between explicit and implicit self-concepts, such that the 
explicit self-concept uniquely predicted controlled behaviors and the implicit self-concept 
uniquely predicted spontaneous behaviors. Moreover, it has been shown that 
discrepancies between the explicit and implicit self-concepts on a particular dimension 
(e.g., shyness) uniquely predict behaviors intended to reduce these discrepancies (Briñol, 
Petty, & Wheeler, 2006). 
Based on these findings, it appears that measures of explicit and implicit self-concepts do 
tap different types of information about the self, and that these different self-conceptions 
can become dissociated. It is currently less clear, however, how these two self-
conceptions may correspond. Based on theoretical perspectives that conceive of the self 
                                                 
7
 A version of this chapter has been published elsewhere (Peters & Gawronski) and has been used with 
permission of Elsevier Limited. 
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as an integrated system for facilitating adaptive behavior (Cross & Markus, 1990; Steele, 
1988), it makes sense to expect these conceptions to be related. In fact, measures of the 
explicit and implicit self-concepts are typically correlated, suggesting a significant degree 
of correspondence. For example, Asendorpf et al. (2002), Briñol et al. (2006), and Back 
et al. (2009) observed correlations in the range of .30 to .40 between measures of the 
explicit and implicit self-concepts. A meta-analysis of correlations between self-report 
measures and the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998) also found that these assessments of the explicit and implicit self-concepts 
correlated at .21, more strongly than assessments of self-esteem and roughly equal to the 
overall correlation between self-report measures and the IAT across research domains 
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwender, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Thus, although explicit and 
implicit self-conceptions appear to be distinct, it is equally clear that they can correspond, 
raising the possibility that these two aspects of self-representation are related through 
processes of mutual influence. 
The aim of the present research is to provide a framework for understanding these mutual 
influences by viewing the explicit and implicit self-concepts as distinct but interacting 
aspects of an individual’s self-representation. Within this framework, measures of the 
implicit self-concept are assumed to reflect the momentary activation of specific self-
associations in memory. Measures of the explicit self-concept are assumed to reflect 
validated self-beliefs, which are descriptive propositions about the self based on activated 
self-associations that are regarded as true by the individual. From this perspective, the 
explicit self-concept can be considered a “working” self-concept, in that it constitutes a 
continuously maintained network of beliefs about the self (Markus & Wurf, 1987). The 
implicit self-concept provides an online, context-sensitive source of activated information 
that substantiates, and potentially informs the revision of, this network of self-beliefs. 
The construction and maintenance of the working self-concept—a process we refer to as 
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self-construal—is thus understood as a fundamentally epistemic enterprise involving the 
generation and validation of self-beliefs (Kruglanski, 1989; Quine & Ullian, 1970).8 
This framework for relating the explicit and implicit self-concepts suggests two specific 
routes of influence underlying the general process of self-construal. First, a bottom-up, 
“data-driven” process of self-construal can occur when self-associations in memory are 
activated without the intention to revise the explicit, working self-concept. The increased 
accessibility of newly activated self-knowledge will then promote its incorporation into 
the explicit, working self-concept. Second, a top-down, “hypothesis-driven” process of 
self-construal can occur when the explicit, working self-concept is intentionally revised, 
which involves asserting the validity of a new propositional belief about the self (e.g., “I 
am extraverted”). To test this hypothesis about the self, autobiographical memory can be 
searched for relevant evidence; however, it is expected that this search will be biased 
toward activating confirmatory information that substantiates the asserted self-belief 
(Klayman & Ha, 1987; Kunda, 1990). In either of these cases, the process of self-
construal should produce correspondence between the explicit and implicit self-concepts. 
The key difference is that during bottom-up self-construal, change in the implicit self-
concept is expected to mediate change in the explicit self-concept, whereas during top-
down self-construal, the reverse mediation is expected. 
The following two experiments were designed to test these predictions concerning the 
mutual influences between the explicit and implicit self-concepts. In Experiment 1, self-
associations in memory were activated independently of the intention to revise the 
explicit, working self-concept as a test of bottom-up self-construal. In Experiment 2, 
participants were motivated to revise their working self-concepts directly as a test of top-
down self-construal. By relating the explicit and implicit self-concepts together within an 
                                                 
8
 In line with the broader use of the term construal in the social-cognitive literature, we use the term self-
construal to refer to a general process of constructing beliefs based on momentarily accessible information. 
Previous use of the term self-construal to refer to the influence of culture on self-definition (e.g., Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991) can thus be understood within the present framework as self-construal in a particular 
content domain, whereby cultural factors influence the accessibility and desirability of specific self-
information (e.g., independent versus interdependent self-characteristics). 
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overall framework of self-construal, this research promises to clarify the connection 
between these two aspects of self-representation. 
2.1 Experiment 1 
The first experiment tested the proposed account of bottom-up self-construal by asking 
participants to recall autobiographical memories relating to a specific personality trait 
(ostensibly as part of a study investigating the relation between personality styles and 
autobiographical memory). The recall task was intended to activate specific self-
associations in memory independent of the intention to revise the working self-concept, 
thus initiating a process of bottom-up self-construal. To ensure that most participants 
would possess relevant memories and that the revision of the working self-concept 
implied by activated self-associations would not be resisted, it was necessary to 
manipulate a relatively broad and malleable domain of self-knowledge. Toward that end, 
the trait dimension of extraversion-introversion was identified as sufficiently fluid to 
ensure that most participants would be willing and able to see themselves as more or less 
extraverted (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). 
The current experiment tested three specific predictions derived from the framework of 
self-construal outlined above. First, the measure of the implicit self-concept (in this case, 
a self-concept IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) was expected to reflect the selective 
activation of self-associations congruent with the personality trait (i.e., extraversion or 
introversion) targeted in the memory recall task. Second, the measure of the explicit, 
working self-concept was expected to reflect the revision of beliefs about the self in line 
with the recalled memories, such that participants recalling extraverted (or introverted) 
memories would report more (or fewer) extraversion-related self-beliefs. Finally, it was 
predicted that these changes in the explicit, working self-concept would be mediated by 
changes in the activation of self-associations in the implicit self-concept, consistent with 
the proposed account of bottom-up self-construal. 
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2.1.1 Method 
2.1.1.1 Sample and design 
A total of 118 undergraduate students (80 women and 38 men) participated in a study on 
personality and autobiographical memory for course credit. The experimental design 
consisted of a single between-subjects factor with two conditions (Recalled Trait: 
Extraversion vs. Introversion). Order of the two dependent measures was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
2.1.1.2 Memory recall task 
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated at individual computer carrels and given 
informed consent documents to sign. Participants then began the memory recall task, 
which guided them through the process of sequentially recalling and describing two 
memories of their past behavior that they considered to be extraverted or introverted, 
according to the experimental condition. To encourage recalled behaviors to be 
interpreted as arising from the self rather than situational influences, participants were 
instructed to recall each memory using an observer’s (as opposed to an actor’s) visual 
perspective (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005). For each memory, once the participant 
indicated that the requested memory had been recalled, a series of brief questions was 
asked to increase its vividness (e.g., “Can you see what your facial expression was?”; 
Libby et al., 2005). Participants were then asked to describe the recalled memory briefly 
in writing, again using an observer’s visual perspective. 
2.1.1.3 Measurement of implicit self-concept 
A “self/extravert” IAT was used to assess the selective activation of trait-related self-
knowledge following the memory recall task (see Appendix A for stimuli). The IAT 
compares reaction times to responses that pair a target (e.g., me) with an attribute (e.g., 
extraverted) against responses that pair the same target (e.g., me) with a complementary 
attribute (e.g., introverted). The resulting difference score provides a sample-relative 
index of the degree to which target-attribute associations are activated in memory. In the 
first block of the IAT, “me” and “not me” words had to be assigned to the categories Me 
(right) and Not Me (left). In the second block, extraversion and introversion words had to 
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be assigned to the categories Extravert (right) and Introvert (left). In the third block, 
target and attribute trials were presented in alternating order, with “me” and extraversion 
words on the right and “not me” and introversion words on the left. In the fourth block, 
participants practiced categorizing only extraversion and introversion words with key 
assignments reversed. In the fifth block, target and attribute trials were again combined, 
with “me” and introversion words on the right and “not me” and extraversion words on 
the left. Blocks 1, 2, and 4 consisted of 20 trials, and blocks 3 and 5 consisted of 80 trials. 
The inter-trial interval was 250 ms. Following incorrect responses the word “ERROR!” 
was presented in the center of the screen for 1000 ms. 
2.1.1.4 Measurement of explicit self-concept 
A self-report rating scale was used to measure participants’ perceptions of their own 
personality traits, which are assumed to reflect the self-beliefs constituting the explicit, 
working self-concept. To mitigate demand effects following the memory recall task, 
participants were told that the researchers were “also interested in how a variety of 
personality dimensions influence recalled memories” and the scale was therefore 
presented as a general personality assessment. The scale consisted of six items relating to 
extraversion and six items relating to introversion (identical to the stimuli used in the 
IAT), along with six positively valenced filler items and six negatively valenced filler 
items (see Appendix B). The items were presented in an a priori randomized order and 
were rated on a 7-point scale. 
All participants were debriefed at the completion of the experiment. None indicated 
suspicion of a link between the memory recall task and either of the dependent measures. 
2.1.2 Results 
2.1.2.1 Data preparation 
An index of extraversion-related (vs. introversion-related) self-associations was 
calculated from responses in the IAT following Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji’s (2003) 
D-600 algorithm (Cronbach’s α = .84). Scores were calculated such that higher values 
reflect stronger associations between the self and extraversion (compared to introversion) 
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in the implicit self-concept. An index of extraversion-related (vs. introversion-related) 
self-beliefs was calculated from the self-report scale by reverse-coding the six 
introversion-related items and computing the combined mean of the six extraversion-
related items with the six reverse-coded introversion items (Cronbach’s α = .92). Higher 
scores therefore reflect a more extraverted (compared to introverted) explicit, working 
self-concept. The index of activated self-knowledge and the index of self-beliefs were 
significantly correlated, r = .53, p < .001. 
2.1.2.2 Effects of memory recall task 
Inspection of participants’ written descriptions of recalled memories suggested that they 
complied with instructions to recall the requested extraversion- or introversion-related 
memories. Means and standard deviations for the two self-concept measures are 
presented in Table 2.1. As predicted, participants who recalled extraversion-related 
memories revealed significantly stronger associations between the self and extraversion 
(relative to introversion) on the IAT compared to participants who recalled introversion-
related memories, t(116) = 2.54, p = .01, d = 0.47. Similarly, and again in line with 
predictions, participants who recalled extraversion-related memories reported 
significantly more extraverted (relative to introverted) self-beliefs than participants who 
recalled introversion-related memories, t(116) = 1.97, p = .05, d = 0.37.  
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Recall 
Extraversion 
 
Recall 
Introversion 
 
Pro- 
Extraversion 
 
Pro- 
Introversion 
Measure M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Explicit 
Self-Concept 4.64 1.10  4.24 1.09  4.98 1.04  4.53 1.04 
Implicit 
Self-Concept 0.61 0.56  0.35 0.53  0.61 0.45  0.44 0.52 
Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations by condition for measures of explicit and 
implicit self-concepts in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. 
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2.1.2.3 Mediation analysis 
The third prediction tested in the current experiment was that the activation of trait-
related self-associations in memory would mediate the effect of the recall task on the 
explicit, working self-concept, in line with the proposed account of bottom-up self-
construal (see Figure 2.1). To test this prediction, self-report scores were simultaneously 
regressed on both the memory recall task and IAT scores (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The 
relation between IAT scores and self-report scores remained significant, β = .51, t(115) = 
6.31, p < .001, but the effect of the recall task became non-significant, β = .06, t(115) = 
0.77, p = .45. Thus, changes in the implicit self-concept fully accounted for changes in 
the explicit self-concept. The indirect effect of the memory recall task on self-report 
scores when IAT scores were included as a mediator was significant, Sobel’s Z = 2.38, p 
= .02.  
 
 
To rule out the alternative possibility of a top-down influence, we also tested the reverse 
mediation model, in which IAT scores were simultaneously regressed on both the 
memory recall task and self-report scores. In this mediation model, changes in self-report 
Implicit Self-Concept 
(IAT) 
Explicit Self-Concept 
(Self-Report) 
Recall Task 
β = .23* β = .53* 
β = .18† (.06) 
Figure 2.1. Mediation model tested in Experiment 2.1 (on the basis of Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). The indirect effect of the recall task on the explicit self-concept 
(mediated by the implicit self-concept) is statistically significant, Sobel’s Z = 2.38, p 
= .02. 
†p = .05; *p < .05. 
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scores failed to account for the obtained effect on IAT scores, in that the memory recall 
task still had a marginally significant effect on IAT scores after controlling for self-report 
scores, β = .14, t(115) = 1.76, p = .08. Thus, changes in the implicit self-concept fully 
accounted for changes in the explicit self-concept, but not the other way around. 
2.1.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 provided support for all three predictions concerning bottom-
up self-construal. The memory recall task selectively activated trait-related self-
associations in the implicit self-concept and also led to congruent revision of the explicit, 
working self-concept. The mediation analysis supported the prediction that the effect of 
the recall task on the explicit self-concept would be mediated by activation of self-
associations in the implicit self-concept. Consistent with this prediction, changes in self-
associations fully accounted for changes in explicit self-beliefs, but not the other way 
around. Taken together, these findings suggest that differences in participants’ explicit, 
working self-concepts between the memory recall conditions were due to the bottom-up 
integration of the self-beliefs implied by activated self-associations in memory. 
2.2 Experiment 2 
The second experiment was designed to test the proposed account of top-down self-
construal. In contrast to bottom-up self-construal, in which the explicit, working self-
concept is influenced independent of the intention to revise it, top-down self-construal 
begins with the intentional revision of the working self-concept. Thus, participants in the 
current experiment were asked to generate explanations for (fabricated) scientific 
findings linking either extraversion or introversion to successful life outcomes. By 
making a specific personality trait desirable, this manipulation was intended to motivate 
participants to assert the validity of the corresponding propositional belief about 
themselves (i.e., “I am extraverted” or “I am introverted”). Having marked this 
propositional belief as valid, participants were expected to treat it as a hypothesis to be 
tested by searching autobiographical memory for relevant evidence. Due to the 
confirmatory nature of hypothesis testing (Klayman & Ha, 1987), however, participants 
were expected to selectively activate self-associations in memory that would substantiate 
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the asserted propositional belief (Sanitioso et al., 1990), leading to corresponding effects 
on the explicit and implicit self-concepts. 
The current experiment tested three specific predictions derived from the proposed 
framework of self-construal. First, the measure of the explicit, working self-concept was 
expected to reflect the revision of beliefs about the self in line with the motivation 
manipulation, such that participants motivated to see themselves as extraverted (or 
introverted) would report more (or fewer) extraversion-related self-beliefs. Second, the 
measure of the implicit self-concept (a self-concept IAT) was expected to reflect the 
selective activation of self-associations congruent with the personality trait (i.e., 
extraversion or introversion) that participants were motivated to believe they possessed. 
Finally, it was predicted that these changes in the implicit self-concept would be 
mediated by changes in the explicit, working self-concept, consistent with the proposed 
account of top-down self-construal. 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Sample and design 
A total of 148 undergraduate students (111 women and 37 men) participated in a study on 
personality and explanation styles for course credit. The experimental design consisted of 
a single between-subjects factor with two conditions (Desired Trait: Pro-Extraversion vs. 
Pro-Introversion). Order of the two dependent measures was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
2.2.1.2 Motivation induction task 
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated at individual computer carrels and given 
informed consent documents to sign. Participants then began the motivation induction 
task (adapted from Sanitioso et al., 1990). The task was framed as an investigation of 
how people generate explanations for scientific findings. As with Experiment 1, the 
current experiment manipulated self-perceptions along the extraversion-introversion 
dimension of personality. Participants were presented with a fabricated newspaper 
clipping reporting the findings of a recent scientific study comparing the benefits of 
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extraverted personality traits with introverted personality traits (Appendix C). The 
clipping briefly described a study that found that extraversion leads to more academic 
and job success than introversion (or vice versa in the Pro-Introvert condition). After 
reading the clipping, participants were asked to write down two brief explanations for the 
observed relationship between extraversion (or introversion) and positive life outcomes. 
Generating the two explanations was intended to strengthen the manipulation and 
reinforce the cover story. Because most people presumably desire to see themselves as 
successful in life, the newspaper clipping was expected to motivate participants to 
hypothesize that they themselves possessed the personality trait that contributed to 
positive life outcomes, thereby initiating a process of top-down self-construal. 
2.2.1.3 Dependent measures 
The measures of the implicit and explicit self-concepts were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. 
2.2.1.4 Control measure and manipulation check 
A manipulation check was included to ensure that the motivation induction task 
influenced the desirability of extraverted and introverted personality traits. For three of 
the extraversion-related and three of the introversion-related trait words used in the 
measurement of the explicit self-concept, participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point 
scale how much that trait contributed to success after university. 
All participants were debriefed upon completion of the experiment. None indicated 
suspicion of a link between the motivation induction task and either of the dependent 
measures. 
2.2.2 Results 
2.2.2.1 Data preparation 
Indices of extraversion-related (vs. introversion-related) self-associations (Cronbach’s α 
= .76) and of extraversion-related (vs. introversion-related) self-beliefs (Cronbach’s α = 
.91) were calculated as described in Experiment 1. The two indices were significantly 
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correlated, r = .46, p < .001. For the manipulation check, an index of the degree to which 
extraversion vs. introversion contributes to positive life outcomes was calculated by 
reverse-coding the three introversion-related items and computing the combined mean 
with the three extraversion-related items (Cronbach’s α = .85). Higher scores thus reflect 
increased desirability of extraversion compared to introversion. 
2.2.2.2 Manipulation check 
The motivation induction task led participants in the Pro-Extravert condition to report 
that extraversion was more desirable (M = 5.82, SD = 0.75) than participants in the Pro-
Introvert condition (M = 5.10, SD = 0.78), t(146) = 5.75, p < .001, d = 0.95. Thus, given 
that most people desire positive life outcomes for themselves, it is reasonable to assume 
that the induction task indeed motivated participants to perceive themselves as possessing 
more extraverted or introverted qualities, according to the experimental condition. 
2.2.2.3 Effects of motivation induction task 
Means and standard deviations for the primary measures are presented in Table 2.1. 
Participants in the Pro-Extravert condition revealed significantly stronger associations 
between the self and extraversion (relative to introversion) on the IAT compared to 
participants in the Pro-Introvert condition, t(146) = 2.10, p = .04, d = 0.35. Similarly, and 
again in line with predictions, participants in the Pro-Extravert condition reported 
significantly more extraverted (relative to introverted) self-beliefs than participants in the 
Pro-Introvert condition, t(146) = 2.65, p = .01, d = 0.44. 
2.2.2.4 Mediation analysis 
The third prediction tested in the current experiment was that asserting the validity of a 
propositional belief within the explicit, working self-concept would initiate a biased 
search through memory to activate substantiating self-associations, thereby mediating the 
effect of the motivation induction on the implicit self-concept (see Figure 2.2). To test 
this prediction, IAT scores were simultaneously regressed on both the motivation 
induction and self-report scores (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The relation between self-report 
scores and IAT scores remained significant, β = .45, t(145) = 5.97, p < .001, but the effect 
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of the motivation induction became non-significant, β = .08, t(145) = 1.00, p = .32. Thus, 
changes in the explicit self-concept fully accounted for changes in the implicit self-
concept. The indirect effect of the motivation induction on IAT scores when self-report 
scores were included as a mediator was significant, Sobel’s Z = 2.44, p = .02. 
 
 
To rule out the alternative possibility of a bottom-up influence, we also tested the reverse 
mediation model, in which self-report scores were simultaneously regressed on both the 
motivation induction and the IAT scores. In this mediation model, changes in IAT scores 
failed to account for the obtained effect on self-report scores, in that the motivation 
induction still had a marginally significant effect on self-report scores after controlling 
for IAT scores, β = .14, t(115) = 1.88, p = .06. Thus, changes in the explicit self-concept 
fully accounted for changes in the implicit self-concept, but not the other way around.  
2.2.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 provided support for all three predictions concerning top-
down self-construal. The motivation induction led to revision of the explicit, working 
self-concept in line with the desired trait and selectively activated congruent trait-related 
Explicit Self-Concept 
(Self-Report) 
Implicit Self-Concept 
(IAT) 
Motivation Induction 
β = .21* β = .46* 
β = .17* (.08) 
Figure 2.2. Mediation model tested in Experiment 2.2 (on the basis of Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). The indirect effect of the motivation induction on the implicit self-
concept (mediated by the explicit self-concept) is statistically significant, Sobel’s Z = 
2.44, p = .02. 
*p < .05. 
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self-associations in the implicit self-concept. The mediation analysis supported the 
prediction that the effect of the motivation induction on the implicit self-concept would 
be mediated by changes in the explicit self-concept. Consistent with this prediction, 
changes in explicit self-beliefs fully accounted for changes in self-associations, but not 
the other way around. Taken together, these findings suggest that differences in 
participants’ implicit self-concepts between motivation induction conditions were due to 
the top-down, intentional activation of self-associations in memory to substantiate the 
assertion of a propositional belief within the explicit, working self-concept. 
2.3 General Discussion 
The current experiments were designed to test a framework specifying how the explicit 
and implicit self-concepts are related through processes of mutual influence. The results 
of these two experiments provide converging evidence for the predictions derived from 
this framework regarding the roles of memory activation and motivated reasoning in 
achieving correspondence between these two aspects of self-representation. In 
Experiment 1, participants recalled specific autobiographical memories independent of 
the intention to revise the explicit, working self-concept. The recall task produced 
congruent changes in the implicit and explicit self-concepts and, consistent with the 
proposed account of bottom-up self-construal, changes in the implicit self-concept fully 
mediated changes in the explicit self-concept. In Experiment 2, participants were 
motivated to revise their explicit, working self-concepts directly by asserting the validity 
of a propositional self-belief. The induced motivation produced congruent changes in the 
explicit and implicit self-concepts; however, in this case—consistent with the proposed 
account of top-down self-construal—changes in the explicit self-concept fully mediated 
changes in the implicit self-concept. These results together support the claim that the 
explicit and implicit self-concepts are integrated, interacting aspects of a dynamic self-
system. 
Although the mediation analyses generally confirmed our predictions about bottom-up 
and top-down self-construal, a potential concern is that the reverse mediation models in 
both experiments revealed evidence for partial mediation (for similar findings, see 
Gawronski & Walther, 2008; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009). Specifically, the reverse 
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mediation models showed simultaneous direct and indirect effects that were close to or at 
statistical significance.9 These data patterns reflect an inherent limitation of correlation-
based approaches to mediation, in which mediation is established on the basis of the 
shared covariance between two measured variables and an independent variable (cf. 
Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). The possibility of partial mediation, however, becomes 
theoretically implausible when examined alongside evidence from the predicted 
mediation models. In Experiment 1, the effect of the recall task on self-associations fully 
accounted for changes in explicit self-beliefs. Likewise, in Experiment 2, the effect of the 
motivation induction on explicit self-beliefs fully accounted for changes in self-
associations. If the current manipulations influenced our dependent measures through 
processes of partial mediation, the proposed mediators in the two experiments would be 
unable to fully account for changes in the proposed distal outcomes. Rather, there should 
still be a direct effect on the distal outcome in the predicted mediation model after 
controlling for the proposed mediator. For instance, if the data in Experiment 1 reflected 
the operation of a direct influence on self-associations and a simultaneous indirect 
influence on self-associations mediated by a direct influence on explicit self-beliefs, the 
obtained effect on explicit self-beliefs should remain significant after controlling for self-
associations. Similarly, if the data in Experiment 2 reflected the operation of a direct 
influence on self-beliefs and a simultaneous indirect influence on self-beliefs mediated by 
a direct influence on self-associations, the obtained effect on self-associations should 
remain significant after controlling for self-beliefs. This was not, however, the case. 
Instead, changes in self-associations fully accounted for the obtained effect on self-beliefs 
in Experiment 1, and changes in self-beliefs fully accounted for the obtained effect on 
self-associations in Experiment 2. These results are consistent with the current 
                                                 
9
 In Experiment 1, the reverse mediation model revealed a marginally significant direct effect, β = .14, 
t(115) = 1.76, p = .08, and a marginally significant indirect effect, Sobel’s Z = 1.89, p = .06; in Experiment 
2, the reverse mediation model revealed a marginally significant direct effect, β = .14, t(115) = 1.88, p = 
.06, and a significant indirect effect, Sobel’s Z = 1.99, p = .05. 
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hypotheses of bottom-up and top-down construal, but they are inconsistent with the 
alternative possibility of partial mediation.10          
2.3.1 Correspondence vs. Dissociation 
The present research emphasized the correspondence between measures of the explicit 
and implicit self-concepts, in contrast to previous research that has emphasized their 
dissociation (Schnabel & Asendorpf, 2010). An obvious question for the proposed 
framework of self-construal, then, is how to account for such dissociations. To begin 
with, the results of the current experiments provide evidence for mutual influences 
between the explicit and implicit self-concepts via a knowledge-activation process 
(Förster & Liberman, 2007). All else being equal, the activation of self-knowledge, 
whether occurring via a process of bottom-up or top-down self-construal, should increase 
correspondence between the explicit and implicit self-concepts. This correspondence may 
break down during either of these processes, however, resulting in a dissociation. First, in 
the case of bottom-up self-construal, the influence of self-associations on explicit self-
beliefs is likely moderated by a belief-validation process. Following Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006, in press), the belief-validation process is expected to operate 
according to principles of cognitive consistency, such that activated self-associations that 
are inconsistent with other (subjectively valid) self-beliefs may be rejected as invalid 
information about the self. Whereas validation of activated self-associations should 
increase the correspondence between the explicit and implicit self-concepts, invalidation 
should result in a dissociation within the relevant domain of self-knowledge. Second, in 
the case of top-down self-construal, dissociations may arise when new beliefs are 
asserted as valid within the explicit, working self-concept, but are not substantiated via 
selective activation of confirmatory self-associations. Thus, whereas selective activation 
                                                 
10
 Further evidence for our mediation hypotheses could be obtained through experimental approaches that 
do not rely on simple covariations between the mediator and the distal outcome (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005). One option is to experimentally manipulate the effect of the proposed mediator on the distal 
outcome (see Gawronski & LeBel, 2008, for an example). To the extent that the effect of the mediator on 
the distal outcome can be disrupted, the effect of the original manipulation (e.g., the motivation induction) 
should remain intact for the mediator (e.g., explicit self-concept), but it should disappear for the distal 
outcome (e.g., implicit self-concept). 
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of confirmatory self-associations should increase the correspondence between the explicit 
and implicit self-concepts, disrupting the process of confirmatory information search 
should lead to a dissociation. 
Accounting for both correspondence and dissociation between the explicit and implicit 
self-concepts suggests a more comprehensive framework for understanding self-construal 
as an epistemic enterprise, characterized in terms of the basic principles of knowledge-
activation and belief-validation (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007). Such a framework 
has the potential to clarify both how the explicit and implicit self-concepts correspond 
and how they become dissociated. 
2.3.2 Future Directions 
Based on the above discussion, an important next step in the development of this 
framework is to investigate the proposed account of self-concept dissociations. In 
particular, the framework predicts that the overall self-system comprising the explicit and 
implicit self-concepts can become “unbalanced” when the processes that maintain 
correspondence break down. On the one hand, inconsistent beliefs implied by self-
associations activated within the implicit self-concept may not be validated for 
incorporation into the explicit, working self-concept (though self-associations may 
nevertheless influence spontaneous behaviors; Asendorpf et al., 2002). On the other hand, 
propositional beliefs asserted within the explicit, working self-concept may remain 
unsubstantiated if the activation of confirmatory self-associations in memory is 
interrupted. The resulting discrepancies may promote uncertainty in self-definition 
(Briñol et al., 2006) and compensatory behaviors intended to substantiate the asserted 
self-beliefs (e.g., Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981). Thus, the current framework not only 
offers specific predictions about the mutual influences between these two aspects of self-
representation, but also integrates earlier findings on the dynamics of the explicit and 
implicit self-concepts, providing intriguing directions for future research. 
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2.5 Appendix A 
Implicit Association Test Stimuli 
The following tables list the stimuli used in the Implicit Association Test (IAT) for the 
target (“me” vs. “not me”) and attribute (“extravert” vs. “introvert”) categories in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Target words 
“me” “not me” 
I few 
me some 
my any 
mine it 
self other 
 
Attribute words 
“extravert” “introvert” 
active passive 
talkative quiet 
sociable withdrawn 
outgoing private 
assertive reserved 
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2.6 Appendix B 
Self-Report Scale of Self-Perceived Personality Traits 
For each of the 24 items in the scale, subjects rated the statement “I am X,” where X was 
one of the personality traits below, on a 7-point agree/disagree scale. The same scale was 
used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Extraversion Introversion Filler (positive) Filler (negative) 
active passive curious anxious 
talkative quiet disciplined impulsive 
sociable withdrawn generous selfish 
outgoing reserved humorous dishonest 
assertive private optimistic cynical 
extraverted introverted rational superstitious 
  
  
74 
 
 
 
2.7 Appendix C 
Manipulation of Motivation in Experiment 2 
The following text was presented in the form of a fake newspaper clipping (adapted from 
Sanitioso et al., 1990). The text used in the Pro-Extravert condition is shown here; in the 
Pro-Introvert condition, all references to extraversion and introversion were switched. 
Extraverts get ahead 
A recent study at Stanford University investigating the effects of extraverted 
personality on academic and job success has concluded that outgoing people are 
more successful than their less talkative peers. Dr. Brian Carswell, the lead 
investigator, reports that although roughly equal numbers of extraverts and 
introverts exist in the population, being extraverted appears to predict success in 
these settings to a high degree. In particular, Carswell and his colleagues found 
that extraverts tend to receive higher grades in school and are more likely to earn 
graduate and professional degrees compared to introverts. Carswell also reports 
that extraverted individuals are more likely to end up in successful, high-paying 
careers. “Extraversion appears to confer distinct advantages in the modern world,” 
Carswell said. 
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3 Are We Puppets on a String? 
Comparing the Impact of Contingency and 
Validity on Implicit and Explicit Evaluations 
In the run-up to the 2008 US Presidential election, as the competition between Barack 
Obama and John McCain intensified, The New Yorker magazine published a cover 
illustration depicting Obama as a terrorist occupying the Oval Office. The resulting 
uproar from Obama’s supporters reflected a suspicion that the illustration could lead 
voters to form negative associations with Obama even if they rejected the depicted link to 
terrorism (Banaji, 2008). Negative political campaigning has likewise been criticized for 
exploiting the ease with which evaluative associations can be manipulated (e.g., Carraro, 
Gawronski, & Castelli, 2010), and the veracity of these associations matters, as they have 
been shown to predict voting behavior in undecided voters independent of conscious 
beliefs (Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008; Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, Lelkes, Akhtar, & 
Thompson, 2010). These examples suggest that learning might involve more than just the 
formation of beliefs, such that evaluative associations might be formed independent of, 
and even despite, conscious assessment of their validity. The unnerving implication is 
that we may be no more than “puppets on a string,” helpless to resist being influenced by 
all the contingencies to which we are exposed in an information-saturated world.  
The difference between associations and beliefs is supported by research in social 
cognition showing that it is possible for people to express divergent evaluations of the 
same object under different conditions (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, for a 
review). For instance, explicit evaluations expressed under conditions of controlled 
processing often diverge from implicit evaluations expressed under conditions of 
automatic processing (Bargh, 1994). These results suggest that evaluative responses do 
not always reflect conscious beliefs about an object and that automatically activated 
associations may influence evaluative responses under suboptimal processing conditions. 
In line with suspicions about the effects of media influence, evaluative dissociations are 
often explained by appeal to dual-process theories of learning, which posit two learning 
processes that may operate in parallel (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & 
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McConnell, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). On this account, explicit evaluations are the 
product of a belief-based learning process, which qualifies the evaluation implied by 
object-valence contingencies by the perceived validity of these contingencies. Implicit 
evaluations, in contrast, are thought to be the product of a contingency-based learning 
process, which encodes contingencies independent of their perceived validity and hence 
is sensitive to the dominant valence associated with an object. Because the two learning 
processes are assumed to operate in parallel, evaluative dissociations may already occur 
at the time of learning if the evaluation implied by observed contingencies is qualified by 
conscious beliefs about its validity. 
Indeed, evidence for dual-process theories of learning seems compelling, such that 
evaluative dissociations may often arise at the time of learning about an object. For 
example, Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, and Strain (2006) employed a learning procedure 
in which participants had to guess the validity of valenced behavioral descriptions about a 
social target named Bob. Preceding the display of Bob’s photograph on each trial, 
participants were subliminally presented with a prime word whose valence was opposite 
to the evaluation implied by the validity of the behavioral descriptions. Rydell et al. 
found that explicit evaluations of Bob reflected the valence of the valid behavioral 
descriptions whereas implicit evaluations of Bob reflected the valence of the subliminal 
primes. 
Although findings like these provide evidence that implicit and explicit evaluations are 
differentially sensitive to contingency-based versus belief-based learning processes, they 
remain silent about whether the two learning mechanisms can operate simultaneously on 
the basis of the same information (as is implied in the depiction of Obama as a terrorist). 
In particular, the currently available evidence is limited in answering this question given 
that demonstrations of learning-related dissociations typically involved multiple 
manipulations of an object’s valence via distinct sources of information. For instance, in 
Rydell et al.’s (2006) study, contingency-based learning was driven by the subliminal 
primes that preceded the presentation of Bob, whereas belief-based learning was driven 
by the validity of the behavioral descriptions that followed the presentation of Bob. 
Moreover, the contingencies established through the priming manipulation may not be 
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subject to conscious qualification if they are learned outside awareness. Consequently, it 
remains unclear if evaluative dissociations can arise in situations in which the evaluation 
implied by contingencies can itself be assessed as true or false. Such conditions are more 
consistent with the examples of media influence described above, where the observer is 
frequently confronted with information that is immediately perceived to be invalid. 
The present experiments aim to address this question by directly manipulating the 
perceived validity of object-valence contingencies in a single learning episode. Based on 
dual-process theories that propose two parallel learning mechanisms (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we expected 
an evaluative dissociation in this situation due to the simultaneous operation of belief-
based and contingency-based learning processes. Specifically, given evidence that the 
negation of an association has been shown to qualify explicit, but not implicit, 
evaluations (Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006), 
evaluative dissociations were expected to arise when the valence most frequently 
associated with an object is perceived to be false. In these cases, explicit evaluations 
should reflect the perceived validity of observed contingencies, whereas implicit 
evaluations should reflect observed contingencies independent of their perceived validity.  
To anticipate our findings, this prediction was not confirmed in our studies. Contrary to 
the assumption that contingency-based and belief-based learning mechanisms may 
operate simultaneously on the basis of the same information, we found that the perceived 
validity of evaluative information about social targets qualified both explicit and implicit 
evaluations when validity information was available during the learning of the valence 
information. The expected dissociations only occurred when the presentation of validity 
information was delayed, which reduced its qualifying effect on implicit, but not explicit, 
evaluations. Taken together, these results support accounts that explain evaluative 
dissociations in terms of expression-related, as opposed to learning-related processes, 
such that dissociations can be explained by the rejection of previously formed 
associations during the course of generating a controlled evaluative response (see 
Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005, for a review). Consequently, these 
findings pose a challenge to the view that evaluative dissociations may be explained by 
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the simultaneous operation of two independent learning mechanisms on the basis of the 
same information. 
3.1 Experiment 1 
In the first experiment, we sought to test the basic question of whether an evaluative 
dissociation can arise during a single learning episode, in which the perceived validity of 
object-valence contingencies is directly manipulated. The experiment involved a social 
learning task that required participants to form impressions of four novel targets by 
reading valenced behavioral descriptions about each of them. To manipulate the 
perceived validity of the resulting contingencies, each behavioral description was 
immediately marked as either true or false. The four targets in the learning task thus 
differed according to the valence with which they were most frequently associated 
(positive vs. negative) as well as the “true” valence of each target. The key empirical 
question is whether an evaluative dissociation will arise when the “true” valence diverges 
from the valence most frequently associated with the target. Based on the assumption that 
contingency-based and belief-based learning mechanisms may operate simultaneously on 
the basis of the same information, we originally expected that explicit evaluations would 
reflect the observed contingencies qualified by their perceived validity, whereas implicit 
evaluations would reflect these contingencies without any qualification.  
3.1.1 Method 
3.1.1.1 Participants and design 
A total of 28 undergraduate students (20 women; 8 men) participated in a study on 
impression formation for course credit. The experiment employed a 2 (Dominant 
Valence: 75% Positive vs. 75% Negative) × 2 (Validity of Dominant Valence: True vs. 
False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) factorial design with all three variables 
varying within-participants. Order of the two evaluation measures was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
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3.1.1.2 Learning task 
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated at individual computers and signed 
informed consent documents. Participants then began the computerized learning task, in 
which they were asked to form accurate impressions of four different people based on 
minimal information about each of them. The learning paradigm consisted of a guessing 
task in which participants were sequentially presented with photographs of four men 
along with valenced behavioral descriptions of each of them. Participants’ task was to 
guess the accuracy of each description with feedback provided immediately following 
each guess (i.e., “RIGHT!” or “WRONG!”; see Rydell et al., 2006). Feedback following 
guesses was 100% consistent for all targets so that there was no misleading feedback 
about the true valence of any target. Each participant thus learned the true valence of each 
target according to his or her own pattern of guesses. In addition, instructions preceding 
the task informed participants that, when a behavioral description turned out to be false, 
they should infer that the opposite of the implied evaluation was true (i.e., a positive 
description that turns out to be false implies a negative evaluation, and vice versa). 
A total of 20 behavioral descriptions (adapted from Rydell et al., 2006) were presented 
for each of the four targets, including both positively valenced descriptions (e.g., “Mike 
lent money to a friend in financial trouble”) and negatively valenced descriptions (e.g., 
“Mike cheated during a poker game”). The valence of the behavioral descriptions for 
each target was held in 3:1 proportion such that two targets were paired with 15 positive 
and 5 negative descriptions and two targets were paired with 5 positive and 15 negative 
descriptions. The “true” valence was varied orthogonally to the dominant valence of the 
behavioral descriptions so that either the positive descriptions were true and the negative 
descriptions were false, or vice versa. These two manipulations created four different 
impression-formation targets: (1) a target with mostly positive descriptions that were 
described as accurate, (2) a target with mostly negative descriptions that were described 
as accurate, (3) a target with mostly positive descriptions that were described as 
inaccurate, and (4) a target with mostly negative descriptions that were described as 
inaccurate. The particular mappings of the four photographs with the four experimental 
conditions were counterbalanced across participants. 
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With 20 behavioral descriptions presented for each of the four targets, the learning 
procedure consisted of a total of 80 trials presented to each participant in computer-
randomized order. Each learning trial started with the presentation of a shoulder-up 
photograph of one of the four impression-formation targets, all of whom were young, 
white men, centered on the computer screen. At the same time, a valenced behavioral 
description was displayed below the picture. Participants were instructed to use two 
response keys on the keyboard to indicate their true/false guess on each trial. Upon 
making a response, the display was cleared and participants were given feedback about 
the validity of their guess. The feedback remained centered on the screen for 1000 
milliseconds, followed by a 1000 millisecond inter-trial interval. 
3.1.1.3 Measurement of explicit evaluations 
Following the learning procedure, participants completed measures of explicit and 
implicit evaluations in counterbalanced order. To assess explicit evaluations, participants 
completed three self-report items (likeability, friendliness, and trustworthiness) for each 
of the four impression-formation targets in computer-randomized order. Responses for all 
items were made on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
3.1.1.4 Measurement of implicit evaluations 
The affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) 
was used to measure implicit evaluations of each of the four impression-formation 
targets. Each trial of the AMP was displayed in the following sequence: A fixation cross 
was presented for 1000 milliseconds; a valenced stimulus (i.e., a photograph of one of the 
four targets) for 75 milliseconds; a blank screen for 125 milliseconds; a Chinese 
pictograph for 100 milliseconds; and finally, a pattern mask of black and white noise was 
presented. Participants were instructed that, upon presentation of the mask, they were to 
indicate how “visually pleasant” they found the preceding Chinese pictograph using two 
response keys on the keyboard signifying less pleasant and more pleasant. Following 
Payne et al. (2005), participants were told that the pictures appearing before the Chinese 
pictographs may bias responses and that they should try not to let the pictures influence 
their judgments. Twenty-five AMP trials were presented for each impression-formation 
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target, resulting in a total of 100 trials presented in computer-randomized order. 
Participants were debriefed following completion of the dependent measures. 
3.1.2 Results 
3.1.2.1 Data preparation 
The three self-report items were averaged to create an index of the explicit evaluation of 
each of the four targets (all Cronbach’s α > .56). To create an index of the implicit 
evaluation of each target, the proportion of more pleasant responses on the relevant AMP 
trials was calculated, which varied between 0% (negative) and 100% (positive).  
3.1.2.2 Explicit and implicit evaluations 
The primary analyses collapsed across the order of the two evaluation measures. To test 
the effects of validity information on explicit and implicit evaluations, indices of both 
explicit and implicit evaluations were standardized to obtain a common metric and then 
submitted to a 2 (Dominant Valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity of Dominant 
Valence: True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Significant main effects were observed for valence, F(1, 
27) = 19.07, p < .001, η2p = .41, and validity, F(1, 27) = 11.77, p = .002, η2p = .30. In 
addition, significant two-way interactions were observed between valence and validity, 
F(1, 27) = 73.07, p < .001, η2p = .73, and validity and evaluation type, F(1, 27) = 25.89, p 
< .001, η2p = .49. Finally, the three-way interaction between valence, validity, and 
evaluation type was significant, F(1, 27) = 17.63, p < .001, η2p = .40. Further inspection 
of this interaction suggests that the qualification of the validity × valence effect by 
evaluation type does not reflect the expected dissociation between explicit and implicit 
evaluations as a function of validity. Instead, the interaction simply reflects a slightly 
weaker effect size of the valence × validity cross-over interaction for implicit evaluations, 
as described below. 
To specify the obtained three-way interaction, the effects of the valence and validity 
manipulations were assessed separately for both explicit and implicit evaluations using 
raw scores for all analyses. With respect to explicit evaluations, significant main effects 
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of valence, F(1, 27) = 22.53, p < .001, η2p = .46, and validity, F(1, 27) = 64.57, p < .001, 
η
2
p = .63, were observed, qualified by a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 27) = 72.30, 
p < .001, η2p = .73. As shown in Figure 3.1, validity information influenced explicit 
evaluations as expected, such that explicit evaluations reflected the dominant valence 
when it was true and the opposite of the dominant valence when it was false. Paired-
samples t-tests revealed that when the dominant valence was true, explicit evaluations 
favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(27) = 9.08, p < 
.001; but when the dominant valence was false, explicit evaluations favored negatively 
described targets over positively described targets, t(27) = 6.04, p < .001. Moreover, 
when the dominant valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, explicit evaluations 
were more positive when the validity feedback for the dominant information was true 
rather than false, t(27) = 12.80, p < .001; but when the dominant valence of behavioral 
descriptions was negative, explicit evaluations were more positive when the validity 
feedback for the dominant information was false rather than true, t(27) = 4.28, p < .001. 
 
Figure 3.1. Explicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative) 
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false), Experiment 3.1. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
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With respect to implicit evaluations, no main effects were significant but the two-way 
interaction between valence and validity was significant, F(1, 27) = 16.85, p < .001, η2p = 
.38. As shown in Figure 3.2, the interaction effect for implicit evaluations was identical to 
that obtained for explicit evaluations; that is, implicit evaluations reflected the dominant 
valence when it was true and the opposite of the dominant valence when it was false. 
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the dominant valence was true, implicit 
evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(27) = 
4.03, p < .001; but when the dominant valence was false, implicit evaluations favored 
negatively described targets over positively described targets, t(27) = 2.66, p = .013. 
Moreover, when the dominant valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, implicit 
evaluations were more positive when the validity feedback for the dominant information 
was true rather than false, t(27) = 3.16, p = .004; but when the dominant valence of 
behavioral descriptions was negative, implicit evaluations were more positive when the 
validity feedback for the dominant information was false rather than true, t(27) = 3.44, p 
= .002.11 
                                                 
11
 The order of the two evaluation measures did not moderate the effect of valence and validity information 
on the measure of implicit evaluations, F(1, 26) = .02, p = .879, η2p < .01, but did moderate the effect of 
valence and validity on the measure of explicit evaluations, F(1, 26) = 6.59, p = .016, η2p = .20. The order 
effect reflects a stronger effect of the valence × validity interaction on explicit evaluations when the 
measure of explicit evaluations was completed first, although in both cases the interaction remained 
significant. Specifically, when the measure of explicit evaluations was completed after the measure of 
implicit evaluations, the two-way interaction between valence and validity was relatively weaker, F(1, 13) 
= 15.62, p = .002, η2p = .55, compared to when it was completed first, F(1, 13) = 133.60, p < .001, η2p = 
.91. Because measurement order had no effect on the results in Experiments 2 and 3, we refrain from 
speculating on the nature of this effect. 
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Figure 3.2. Implicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative) 
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false), Experiment 3.1. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
3.1.3 Discussion 
Counter to our predictions, Experiment 1 revealed that perceived validity qualified the 
effect of object-valence contingencies for both explicit and implicit evaluations. When 
the dominant valence was true, explicit and implicit evaluations reflected the dominant 
valence, but when the dominant valence was false, explicit and implicit evaluations 
reflected the opposite of the dominant valence. Thus, no evaluative dissociation was 
observed when the perceived validity of observed contingencies was manipulated in a 
single learning episode. This pattern of results challenges the assumption that belief-
based and contingency-based learning may operate simultaneously on the basis of the 
same information. Drawing on dual-process theories that propose the simultaneous 
operation of two parallel learning mechanisms, we originally expected that explicit 
evaluations would reflect the perceived validity of contingencies, whereas implicit 
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evaluations would reflect contingencies independent of their perceived validity. This 
prediction was clearly disconfirmed in the current study. There is, however, a 
methodological concern with drawing this conclusion directly from the present results, 
which was addressed in the next experiment. 
3.2 Experiment 2 
The present experiment sought to rule out the concern that the absence of a dissociation 
in Experiment 1 resulted from inadequate measurement procedures. Recent evidence 
suggests that validity information pertaining to the primes can influence responses on the 
AMP (Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009), whereas Fazio’s 
evaluative priming task (EPT; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) remains 
unaffected by validity information (Deutsch et al., 2006, 2009). Moreover, the AMP and 
the EPT have been shown to produce divergent effects of the same experimental 
manipulation under some conditions, suggesting that task-specific mechanisms may 
shape responses on these measures in a non-trivial manner (e.g., Deutsch & Gawronski, 
2009; Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, & Deutsch, 2010). It would therefore be valuable 
to replicate the findings from Experiment 1 using an EPT to ensure that they are not 
unique to one measure of implicit evaluations but reflect a genuine effect that replicates 
across different measures of the same construct. 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants and design 
A total of 45 undergraduate students (37 women; 8 men) participated in a study on 
impression formation for course credit. One participant was excluded from analysis due 
to chance responding on the EPT (error rate > 40%). As with Experiment 1, this 
experiment employed a 2 (Dominant Valence: 75% Positive vs. 75% Negative) × 2 
(Validity of Dominant Valence: True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. 
Implicit) factorial design with all three variables varying within-participants. Order of the 
two evaluation measures was counterbalanced across participants. 
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3.2.1.2 Procedure 
The learning task and the measure of explicit evaluations were identical to Experiment 1. 
Fazio et al.’s (1995) EPT was used to measure implicit evaluations of the four 
impression-formation targets. Each trial of the EPT was displayed in the following 
sequence: A fixation cross was presented for 500 milliseconds; a valenced prime (i.e., a 
photograph of one of the four targets) for 200 milliseconds; and then a positive or 
negative target word (e.g., “paradise” or “poison”), which remained onscreen until the 
participant indicated whether the word was positive or negative using one of two 
response keys on the keyboard. If the response was incorrect, “ERROR!” was displayed 
for 1500 milliseconds. An interval of 1000 milliseconds preceded the start of the next 
trial. According to Fazio et al. (1995), the affect elicited by the prime should facilitate 
evaluative decisions for valence-congruent target words but inhibit evaluative decisions 
for valence-incongruent target words, so that response latencies to the target words can be 
used to infer implicit evaluations of each impression-formation target. Each of the four 
targets served as a prime on 20 trials, split between 10 trials with negative and 10 trials 
with positive target words, creating a total of 80 trials presented in computer-randomized 
order. Participants were debriefed following completion of the dependent measures. 
3.2.2 Results 
3.2.2.1 Data preparation 
Indices of the explicit evaluation of each of the four impression-formation targets were 
calculated as described in Experiment 1 (all Cronbach’s α > .83). In creating indices of 
the implicit evaluation of each of the four impression-formation targets, EPT trials with 
incorrect responses (5.1%) were excluded. To control for anticipations and outliers 
(Ratcliff, 1993), response cutoffs were employed to exclude trials with reaction times 
shorter than 300 milliseconds or longer than 1000 milliseconds (8.7% of valid trials). 
Then, for each of the four primes in the EPT, the mean reaction time to trials with 
positive target words was subtracted from trials with negative target words, so that higher 
scores reflect a relatively more positive implicit evaluation of the target (see Wentura & 
Degner, 2010).   
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3.2.2.2 Explicit and implicit evaluations 
The order of the two evaluation measures had no effect, so analyses collapsed across this 
factor. To test the effects of validity information on explicit and implicit evaluations, 
indices of both explicit and implicit evaluations were standardized and submitted to a 2 
(Dominant Valence: 75% Positive vs. 75% Negative) × 2 (Validity of Dominant Valence: 
True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) repeated measures ANOVA. 
Significant two-way interactions were observed between valence and validity, F(1, 43) = 
358.08, p < .001, η2p = .89, and valence and evaluation type, F(1, 43) = 4.53, p = .039, η2p 
= .10. The three-way interaction between valence, validity, and evaluation type was also 
significant, F(1, 43) = 270.53, p < .001, η2p = .86. No other effects were significant. As 
with Experiment 1, the qualification of the validity × valence effect by evaluation type 
does not reflect the expected dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations. 
Instead, the interaction reflects a slightly weaker effect size of the valence × validity 
cross-over interaction for implicit evaluations, as described below. 
To specify the obtained three-way interaction, the effects of the valence and validity 
manipulations were assessed separately for both explicit and implicit evaluations, using 
raw scores for all analyses. With respect to explicit evaluations, significant main effects 
were observed for valence, F(1, 43) = 8.10, p = .007, η2p = .16, and for validity, F(1, 43) 
= 5.39, p = .025, η2p = .11, qualified by a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 43) = 
445.49, p < .001, η2p = .91. As shown in Figure 3.3, validity information influenced 
explicit evaluations as expected, such that explicit evaluations reflected the dominant 
valence when it was true and the opposite of the dominant valence when it was false. 
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the dominant valence was true, explicit 
evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(43) = 
21.60, p < .001; but when the dominant valence was false, explicit evaluations favored 
negatively described targets over positively described targets, t(43) = 16.67, p < .001. 
Moreover, when the dominant valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, explicit 
evaluations were more positive when the validity feedback for the dominant information 
was true rather than false, t(43) = 21.98, p < .001; but when the dominant valence of 
behavioral descriptions was negative, explicit evaluations were more positive when the 
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validity feedback for the dominant information was false rather than true, t(43) = 17.17, p 
< .001. 
 
Figure 3.3. Explicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative) 
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false), Experiment 3.2. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
With respect to implicit evaluations, no main effects were significant but the two-way 
interaction between valence and validity was significant, F(1, 43) = 8.31, p = .006, η2p = 
.16. As shown in Figure 3.4, the effect of validity information on implicit evaluations was 
identical to its effect of explicit evaluations; that is, implicit evaluations reflected the 
dominant valence when it was true and the opposite of the dominant valence when it was 
false. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the dominant valence was true, implicit 
evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(43) = 
2.15, p = .037; but when the dominant valence was false, implicit evaluations favored 
negatively described targets over positively described targets, t(43) = 2.29, p = .027. 
Moreover, when the dominant valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, implicit 
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evaluations were more positive when the validity feedback for the dominant information 
was true rather than false, t(43) = 2.11, p = .041; but when the dominant valence of 
behavioral descriptions was negative, implicit evaluations were more positive when the 
validity feedback for the dominant information was false rather than true, t(43) = 2.42, p 
= .020. 
 
Figure 3.4. Implicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative) 
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false), Experiment 3.2. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1 using a measure of 
implicit evaluations less sensitive to validity information (Deutsch et al., 2006, 2009). 
Once again, perceived validity qualified the effect of object-valence contingencies for 
both explicit and implicit evaluations. These results rule out the concern that the absence 
of dissociation in Experiment 1 was due to suboptimal measurement procedures. 
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3.3 Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that during a single learning episode, the perceived validity 
of object-valence contingencies influences both explicit and implicit evaluations. In other 
words, it appears that in situations that involve exposure to information that is considered 
invalid, it is possible to exercise control over what is learned. There is, however, evidence 
for evaluative dissociations arising from asymmetric influences of validity information on 
explicit and implicit evaluations. For example, Gregg et al. (2006) found that both 
explicit and implicit evaluations initially reflected the valence of behavioral descriptions 
of two novel groups, but that subsequently acquired information about the validity of 
these descriptions qualified explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. This finding is at odds 
with the results of the preceding experiments, in which validity information qualified 
both explicit and implicit evaluations. 
An important factor that may account for the difference between the two findings is the 
time at which validity information was provided. Whereas in our studies validity 
information was available during the learning of the behavioral descriptions, Gregg et 
al.’s (2006) study included a substantial delay between the initial learning of the 
behavioral descriptions and the subsequent presentation of validity information. Thus, 
counter to the notion of learning-related dissociations due to the simultaneous operation 
of two distinct learning mechanisms on the basis of the same information, Gregg et al.’s 
(2006) findings are better described as a case of expression-related dissociations. Such 
dissociations occur when information that has been stored in memory at an earlier time is 
later learned to be invalid. In such cases, newly acquired validity information may be 
unable to erase previously formed associations from memory, even though these 
associations are rejected as invalid in the course of expressing an explicit evaluative 
judgment (Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). As a result, newly acquired 
validity information will influence explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. In fact, many 
examples of evaluative dissociations can be parsimoniously explained by the subsequent 
rejection of previously learned information without assuming a simultaneous operation of 
two independent learning mechanisms (see Hofmann et al., 2005, for a review).  
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If this interpretation is correct, then it should be possible to create an evaluative 
dissociation using the present experimental paradigm by manipulating the delay between 
the presentation of the behavioral descriptions and information about their validity. 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that, when validity information is available during the 
learning of the behavioral descriptions, perceived validity produces equivalent effects on 
explicit and implicit evaluations. On the other hand, if the presentation of validity 
information is delayed, it must be applied to existing associations post-hoc, presumably 
qualifying explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. This pattern would be consistent with 
the idea that evaluative dissociations arising from perceived validity are due to 
expression-related, rather than learning-related, processes. Experiment 3 was designed to 
test this hypothesis. 
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants and design 
A total of 218 undergraduate students (159 women and 59 men; mean age = 22.03) 
participated in a study on impression formation for course credit. Data from 14 
participants were unusable due to a programming error and another 15 participants were 
excluded due to chance responding on the EPT (error rates > 40%). The final sample 
consisted of 189 students (139 women; 50 men). The experiment employed a 2 (Valence: 
Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity of Valence: True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: 
Explicit vs. Implicit) × 2 (Validity Timing: Short-Delay vs. Long-Delay) factorial design 
with the first three variables varying within-participants and the last varying between-
participants. Order of the two evaluation measures was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
3.3.1.2 Learning procedure 
The learning procedure employed in Experiment 3 was broadly similar to that used in 
Experiments 1 and 2, with a few important differences. First, a more detailed cover story 
was provided, which framed the learning procedure in terms of learning about co-workers 
at a new job based on second-hand comments (adapted from Gawronski & Walther, 
2008). To strengthen the overall effect of valence during the learning procedure, the four 
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impression-formation targets were paired with 100% positive or 100% negative 
behavioral descriptions. The guessing component of the procedure was therefore dropped 
and the learning task was instead introduced as a slideshow that required only that 
participants attend to the information presented. Furthermore, because 100% consistent 
behavioral descriptions should be easily learned, only five learning trials were displayed 
for each target, for a total of 20 learning trials presented in computer-randomized order. 
New positive and negative behavioral descriptions were created to conform with the 
“workplace” cover story (adapted from Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005). 
To test the effects of immediate versus delayed presentation of validity information on 
explicit and implicit evaluations, the delivery of validity information during the learning 
procedure was manipulated to be either (a) interleaved with the learning trials in the 
short-delay condition or (b) presented after all learning trials had finished in the long-
delay condition. Instructions prior to the learning task in the short-delay condition 
informed participants that some behavioral descriptions would turn out to be false and 
that in these cases they should infer that the opposite of the implied evaluation was true. 
In the long-delay condition, instructions prior to the learning task informed participants 
that some behavioral descriptions would turn out to be false but that they should initially 
assume that all of the descriptions are true. 
Each learning trial in the short-delay condition (similar to Experiments 1 and 2) began 
with the presentation of a photograph of one of the four targets together with a valenced 
behavioral description. After 3000 milliseconds, validity information was presented just 
below the behavioral description and remained onscreen for another 3000 milliseconds. A 
1500 millisecond inter-trial interval preceded the start of the next learning trial. In the 
long-delay condition, each learning trial began with the presentation of a photograph of 
one of the four targets together with a valenced behavioral description. This information 
remained onscreen for 6000 milliseconds and a 1500 millisecond inter-trial interval 
preceded the start of the next trial. The total duration of the 20-trial slideshow in both 
conditions was 150 seconds. 
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Following completion of the slideshow in the short-delay condition, participants were 
asked to take a moment to integrate the behavioral descriptions with the validity 
information to arrive at a clear impression of each target and to proceed to the next 
component of the study at their own pace. In the long-delay condition, participants were 
told that the behavioral descriptions for two of the targets were all true whereas the 
behavioral descriptions for the other two targets were all false. A photograph of each 
target and the validity of the descriptions associated with that target (i.e., “TRUE 
COMMENTS” or “FALSE COMMENTS”) were displayed on one screen to make this 
clear. Participants were asked to take their time to arrive at a clear impression of each 
target in light of the new validity information. In both conditions, the valence and validity 
of the four targets were crossed to produce a positive/true, positive/false, negative/true, 
and negative/false target. The particular mappings of the four photographs with the four 
experimental conditions were counterbalanced across participants. 
3.3.1.3 Measurement of explicit and implicit evaluations 
The measures of explicit evaluations of each target were identical to those used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Implicit evaluations of each target were assessed using an EPT 
identical to that used in Experiment 2, except that the total number of trials was doubled 
to 160. Participants were debriefed following completion of the dependent measures. 
3.3.2 Results 
3.3.2.1 Data preparation 
Indices of the explicit evaluation of each of the four impression-formation targets were 
calculated as described in Experiment 1 (all Cronbach’s α > .90). In creating indices of 
the implicit evaluation of each of the four impression-formation targets, EPT trials with 
incorrect responses (4.3%) were excluded. Response cutoffs were also employed to 
exclude trials with reaction times shorter than 300 milliseconds or longer than 1000 
milliseconds (7.3% of valid trials). Calculation of the implicit indices from the EPT 
scores followed the procedure described in Experiment 2.  
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3.3.2.2 Explicit and implicit evaluations 
The order of the two evaluation measures had no effect, so analyses collapsed across this 
factor. To test the effects of delayed validity information on explicit and implicit 
evaluations, indices of both explicit and implicit evaluations were standardized and 
submitted to a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity of Valence: True vs. 
False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) × 2 (Validity Timing: Short-Delay vs. 
Long-Delay) mixed-model ANOVA with repeated measures on the first three factors. 
Significant main effects were observed for valence, F(1, 187) = 54.48, p < .001, η2p = .23, 
and validity, F(1, 187) = 13.28, p < .001, η2p = .07. In addition, significant two-way 
interactions were observed between valence and validity, F(1, 187) = 618.97, p < .001, 
η
2
p = .77, between valence and timing, F(1, 187) = 11.61, p = .001, η2p = .06, between 
valence and evaluation type, F(1, 187) = 11.58, p = .001, η2p = .06, and between validity 
and evaluation type, F(1, 187) = 4.64, p = .033, η2p = .02. Significant three-way 
interactions were observed between valence, validity, and timing, F(1, 187) = 18.91, p < 
.001, η2p = .09, between valence, validity, and evaluation type, F(1, 187) = 532.18, p < 
.001, η2p = .74, and between validity, timing, and evaluation type, F(1, 187) = 7.27, p = 
.008, η2p = .04. Finally, and most relevant to the current hypothesis, a significant four-
way interaction was observed, F(1, 187) = 14.07, p < .001, η2p = .07, indicating that the 
effects of valence and validity on explicit and implicit evaluations was differentially 
moderated by the timing of validity information. To specify the particular nature of this 
interaction, analyses of explicit and implicit evaluations are reported separately for each 
of the two validity timing conditions. 
3.3.2.3 Evaluations under short-delay validity timing 
The condition involving a short delay before the presentation of validity information is 
conceptually identical to the design employed in Experiments 1 and 2, and analyses will 
proceed similarly. To test the effects of valence and validity feedback on explicit and 
implicit evaluations in the short-delay condition, standardized indices of explicit and 
implicit evaluations were submitted to a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity 
of Valence: True vs. False) × 2 (Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) repeated 
measures ANOVA. A significant main effect was observed for valence, F(1, 102) = 
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10.51, p = .002, η2p = .09. In addition, significant two-way interactions were observed 
between valence and validity, F(1, 102) = 561.63, p < .001, η2p = .85, and between 
valence and evaluation type, F(1, 102) = 4.14, p = .044, η2p = .04. Finally, the three-way 
interaction between valence, validity, and evaluation type was significant, F(1, 102) = 
393.56, p < .001, η2p = .79. No other effects were significant. As with Experiments 1 and 
2, the qualification of the validity × valence interaction by evaluation type does not 
reflect the expected dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations. Instead, the 
interaction reflected a slightly weaker effect size of the valence × validity cross-over 
interaction for implicit evaluations, as described below. 
The effects of the valence and validity manipulations were assessed separately for both 
explicit and implicit evaluations using raw scores for all analyses. With respect to explicit 
evaluations, a significant main effect of valence was observed, F(1, 102) = 17.98, p < 
.001, η2p = .15, qualified by a significant two-way interaction between valence and 
validity, F(1, 102) = 763.14, p < .001, η2p = .88. As shown in Figure 3.5, validity 
information influenced explicit evaluations as expected, such that explicit evaluations 
reflected the valence of behavioral descriptions when it was true and the opposite valence 
when it was false. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the behavioral descriptions 
were true, explicit evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively 
described targets, t(102) = 26.27, p < .001; but when the behavioral descriptions were 
false, explicit evaluations favored negatively described targets over positively described 
targets, t(102) = 20.92, p < .001. Moreover, when the valence of behavioral descriptions 
was positive, explicit evaluations were more positive when the validity information was 
true rather than false, t(102) = 21.52, p < .001; but when the valence of behavioral 
descriptions was negative, explicit evaluations were more positive when the validity 
information was false rather than true, t(102) = 25.08, p < .001. 
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Figure 3.5. Explicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative) 
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false) with short-delay validity feedback, 
Experiment 3.3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
With respect to implicit evaluations, no main effects were significant but the two-way 
interaction between valence and validity was significant, F(1, 102) = 32.37, p < .001, η2p 
= .24. As shown in Figure 3.6, the pattern of the valence × validity interaction was 
identical to that obtained for explicit evaluations. Specifically, under quick validity 
feedback, implicit evaluations reflected the dominant valence when it was true and the 
opposite valence when it was false. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the 
behavioral descriptions were true, implicit evaluations favored positively described 
targets over negatively described targets, t(102) = 4.62, p < .001; but when the behavioral 
descriptions were false, implicit evaluations favored negatively described targets over 
positively described targets, t(102) = 3.44, p = .001. Moreover, when the valence of 
behavioral descriptions was positive, implicit evaluations were more positive when the 
validity information was true rather than false, t(102) = 5.11, p < .001; but when the 
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valence of behavioral descriptions was negative, implicit evaluations were more positive 
when the validity information was false rather than true, t(102) = 3.72, p < .001. 
 
Figure 3.6. Implicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative) 
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false) with short-delay validity feedback, 
Experiment 3.3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Taken together, these results replicate the findings of Experiments 1 and 2: When the 
delay between the presentation of valence and validity information was short, both 
explicit and implicit evaluations reflected the qualification of the behavioral descriptions 
by their perceived validity.  
3.3.2.4 Evaluations under long-delay validity timing 
To test for a potential dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations in the long-
delay condition, standardized indices of explicit and implicit evaluations were submitted 
to a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Validity of Valence: True vs. False) × 2 
(Evaluation Type: Explicit vs. Implicit) repeated measures ANOVA. Significant main 
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effects were observed for valence, F(1, 85) = 44.15, p < .001 , η2p = .34, and validity, 
F(1, 85) = 11.46, p = .001, η2p = .12. In addition, significant two-way interactions were 
observed between valence and validity, F(1, 85) = 161.51, p < .001, η2p = .66, between 
valence and evaluation type, F(1, 85) = 6.99, p = .010, η2p = .08, and between validity 
and evaluation type, F(1, 85) = 9.02, p = .004, η2p = .10. Finally, the three-way 
interaction between valence, validity, and evaluation type was significant, F(1, 85) = 
172.05, p < .001, η2p = .67. No other effects were significant. In this case, contrary to the 
results under quick validity timing, the qualification of the validity × valence effect by 
evaluation type does reflect a dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations, as 
described below. 
The effects of the valence and validity manipulations were assessed separately for both 
explicit and implicit evaluations using raw scores for all analyses. With respect to explicit 
evaluations, significant main effects were observed for valence, F(1, 85) = 33.38, p < 
.001, η2p = .28, and validity, F(1, 85) = 19.60, p < .001, η2p = .19, qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction, F(1, 85) = 254.95, p < .001, η2p = .75. As shown in 
Figure 3.7, validity information influenced explicit evaluations as expected, such that 
explicit evaluations reflected the valence of the behavioral descriptions when they were 
true and the opposite valence when they were false. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that 
when the behavioral descriptions were true, explicit evaluations favored positively 
described targets over negatively described targets, t(85) = 16.72, p < .001; but when the 
behavioral descriptions were false, explicit evaluations favored negatively described 
targets over positively described targets, t(85) = 7.93, p < .001. Moreover, when the 
valence of behavioral descriptions was positive, explicit evaluations were more positive 
when the validity information was true rather than false, t(85) = 16.18, p < .001; but 
when the valence of behavioral descriptions was negative, explicit evaluations were more 
positive when the validity information was false rather than true, t(85) = 10.11, p < .001. 
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Figure 3.7. Explicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative) 
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false) with long-delay validity feedback, 
Experiment 3.3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
With respect to implicit evaluations, a significant main effect of valence was observed, 
F(1, 85) = 9.75, p = .002, η2p = .10, qualified by a significant two-way interaction 
between valence and validity, F(1, 85) = 9.55, p = .003, η2p = .10. No other effects were 
significant. As shown in Figure 3.8, the main effect of valence revealed that implicit 
evaluations of the positive targets were on average more positive than evaluations of the 
negative targets. This main effect of valence was qualified, however, by the validity of 
the behavioral descriptions, such that implicit evaluations reflected the valence of the 
behavioral descriptions when they turned out to be true, but this effect was only 
attenuated (rather than reversed) when the behavioral descriptions turned out to be false. 
Paired-samples t-tests revealed that when the behavioral descriptions were true, implicit 
evaluations favored positively described targets over negatively described targets, t(85) = 
38.88, p < .001; but when the behavioral descriptions were false, implicit evaluations of 
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negatively described targets were not significantly different from implicit evaluations of 
positively described targets, t(85) = 0.31, p = .756. Moreover, when the valence of 
behavioral descriptions was positive, implicit evaluations were more positive when the 
validity information was true rather than false, t(85) = 2.37, p = .020; but when the 
valence of behavioral descriptions was negative, implicit evaluations were more positive 
when the validity information was false rather than true, t(85) = 2.25, p = .027. 
 
Figure 3.8. Implicit evaluations as a function of dominant valence (positive vs. negative) 
and validity of dominant valence (true vs. false) with long-delay validity feedback, 
Experiment 3.3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Thus, when the delay between the presentation of valence and validity information was 
relatively long, explicit and implicit evaluations became dissociated such that explicit 
evaluations reflected the full qualification of the behavioral descriptions by the validity 
information but effects on implicit evaluations were merely attenuated. 
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3.3.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 support the hypothesis that evaluative dissociations may 
arise when the acquisition of validity information is delayed. When validity information 
was available during the learning of evaluative information, it qualified both explicit and 
implicit evaluations, replicating the results of Experiments 1 and 2. When the 
presentation of validity information was delayed, however, its impact was significantly 
reduced for implicit, but not explicit, evaluations. The current results thus imply a 
boundary condition on the emergence of evaluative dissociations, such that validity 
information may qualify both explicit and implicit evaluations when it is available during 
the acquisition of evaluative information; with the passage of time, however, changes in 
the perceived validity of previously acquired information may still qualify explicit 
evaluations, but will have a weaker effect on implicit evaluations. Evidence for 
asymmetric effects of validity information on explicit and implicit evaluations may 
therefore be explained as resulting from expression-related processes, rather than the 
simultaneous operation of two independent learning processes. 
Although validity information had an asymmetric effect on implicit and explicit 
evaluations in the long delay condition, it is worth noting that it was still capable of 
partially qualifying implicit evaluations. Instead of reflecting the original valence of the 
behavioral descriptions, implicit evaluations did not differ between the two valence 
conditions when these descriptions were learned to be false. This attenuation deviates 
from Gregg et al.’s (2006) results, where validity information had no effect on implicit 
evaluations. Comparing the paradigms of the two sets of studies, there are at least two 
possible explanations for this difference. One explanation is that participants in the 
current experiments were forewarned that some information might turn out to be false, 
raising the possibility that our participants may have suspended belief in the observed 
contingencies until they knew their validity. To test this possibility, we conducted a 
replication of Experiment 3 in which participants were not informed, prior to the learning 
task, that some information might turn out to be false. The pattern of results was identical 
to that observed in Experiment 3, suggesting that the qualification of implicit evaluations 
observed in the current study is not due to the suspension of belief during learning. A 
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second possible explanation is that Gregg et al.’s (2006) experiments involved a much 
longer delay between learning of evaluative information and subsequent acquisition of 
validity information. Whereas in our study, validity information was provided after all 
behavioral descriptions had been presented, participants in Gregg et al.’s studies 
completed measures of explicit and implicit evaluations before they were told that the 
initial behavioral information had been false. Thus, consistent with our emphasis on time 
as a critical factor, longer delays may allow consolidation of the initially formed 
associations. As a result, the impact of newly acquired validity information may decrease 
with increasing delays between the initial learning of evaluative information and the 
subsequent acquisition of validity information. Future research investigating the effects 
of continuously increasing intervals may help to clarify the role of time as a critical factor 
for the impact of validity information on implicit evaluations.   
3.4 General Discussion 
The present results provide converging evidence that during a single learning episode, in 
which the validity of the evaluation implied by an object-valence contingency can be 
quickly assessed, both explicit and implicit evaluations reflect a process of belief-
formation rather than distinct effects of belief-based and contingency-based learning 
processes. In Experiments 1 and 2, the perceived validity of behavioral descriptions of 
social targets qualified both explicit and implicit evaluations of these targets. This result 
suggests that validity information is incorporated into the mental representation of 
evaluative objects at the time of learning. Expanding on these findings, Experiment 3 
demonstrated that validity information can have asymmetric influences later at the time 
of expression, when evaluative responses are reconsidered in light of additional 
information. Manipulating the delay between the presentation of contingencies and the 
presentation of validity information revealed that the impact of validity information was 
reduced for implicit, but not explicit, evaluations when validity information became 
available after a substantial delay.  
103 
 
 
 
3.4.1 Implications for Dissociations between Explicit and Implicit 
Evaluations 
Experimentally induced dissociations between explicit and implicit evaluations are often 
viewed as evidence for two independent learning mechanisms that may operate 
simultaneously on the basis of the same information (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The experiments reported 
here suggest that the best interpretation of evaluative dissociations depends on the 
specific conditions of the learning situation. Although there is compelling evidence that 
dissociations can arise during learning when the valence of an object is manipulated 
using multiple, distinct sources of information (e.g., Rydell et al., 2006), the present 
experiments found no evidence for the simultaneous operation of dual learning processes 
on the basis of the same information. In these situations, when the evaluations implied by 
observed contingencies are immediately qualified by validity information, both explicit 
and implicit evaluations seem to be driven by a single process of belief-formation. 
Considering earlier evidence for evaluative dissociations arising during a single learning 
episode, it is worth noting that virtually all of this evidence can be straightforwardly 
interpreted as resulting from expression-related, rather than learning-related, processes. 
For example, using a learning procedure with a single, consciously available source of 
information, Ratliff and Nosek (2010) found that explicit evaluations showed the classic 
illusory correlation effect, whereas implicit evaluations reflected the actual contingencies 
of the observed information. Although they interpreted this finding as support for the 
independent operation of belief-based and contingency-based learning processes during a 
single learning episode, the dissociation can also be explained as a result of expression-
related processes. In particular, illusory correlation effects may occur for explicit 
evaluations to the extent that infrequent information is more salient (Hamilton & Gifford, 
1976), and salient information is given more weight in the process of generating an 
evaluative judgment. Importantly, such biases in the weighting of salient information 
may occur even if the relative strength of the underlying associations does not differ from 
the associations reflecting less salient information. From this perspective, the evaluative 
dissociation obtained by Ratliff and Nosek may not be due to the simultaneous operation 
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of two learning mechanisms, but to processes operating during the generation of 
evaluative judgments. 
3.4.2 Implications for Dual-Process Theories 
The present findings seem, prima facie, more compatible with recent arguments for 
single-process theories of learning, according to which all learning is the product of a 
single process of belief-formation (e.g., Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). 
Evidence for dual-process learning in other situations notwithstanding, drawing such a 
conclusion in the present case seems premature for both empirical and epistemological 
reasons. First, it is always possible that in a single learning episode, the belief-based 
learning process is simply more powerful than the contingency-based learning process, 
thereby obscuring evidence for the operation of the latter process. Second, because 
theoretical entities cannot be observed directly, claims about their existence are not 
subject to direct empirical tests (Popper, 1934). Instead, existence claims have be 
evaluated indirectly by testing empirical predictions derived from assumptions about 
these entities. The underlying existence claims gain a measure of support when 
predictions are confirmed, but they will most likely be rejected when predictions 
repeatedly fail (Quine, 1969).  
From this perspective, the current experiments can be understood as failing to confirm 
predictions derived from specific assumptions about contingency-based learning. The 
failure to confirm these predictions does not, however, conclusively demonstrate the non-
existence of contingency-based, as opposed to belief-based, learning processes. Indeed, 
there is evidence for the operation of both contingency-based and belief-based learning 
processes in certain conditions, such that specific conditions may promote the operation 
of one process and inhibit the operation of the other (e.g., Rydell et al., 2006). The 
current findings do, however, challenge the idea that two learning processes operate 
simultaneously and lead to divergent explicit and implicit evaluations on the basis of the 
same information (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). In these situations, it appears 
that conscious beliefs exert a strong qualifying influence on the evaluations implied by 
observed contingencies at the time of learning. The current findings thus impose a 
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constraint on the conditions under which dual learning processes may produce divergent 
outcomes, though they do not rule out their existence. 
3.4.3 Implications for Mental Control  
The findings of the present research also shed light on the question raised at the outset of 
this paper: Were Obama’s supporters justified in worrying about an uncontrollable 
influence of negative images on voters? The answer seems to be: It depends. The 
experiments reported here suggest that beliefs about the invalidity of perceived object-
valence contingencies (e.g., between Obama and terrorism) can qualify how that 
information is encoded and mentally represented, but only when the perceiver invalidates 
that information quickly. Otherwise, as the delay between the perception of a contingency 
and its invalidation increases, the mental association resulting from that contingency 
becomes more difficult to qualify (Gregg et al., 2006; Petty et al., 2006). Thus, if a 
potential voter observed the illustration of Obama as a terrorist, she might be able to 
prevent the depicted link from being stored in memory by immediately rejecting it as 
false; failing to do so, however, might lead to the formation of a mental association that 
directly reflects it. This outcome would indeed be worrisome for Obama’s supporters, as 
implicit evaluations have been shown to predict significant behavioral outcomes, 
including choice decisions in the political domain (e.g., Galdi et al., 2008; Payne et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, there seems to be some room for control over the evaluations we 
form in typical learning situations, such that contingency-based learning may not be 
powerful enough to create mental associations that contradict our beliefs about what we 
observe. If we are puppets on a string to those who would seek to influence us, we at least 
have a brief opportunity to pull back. 
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4 General Discussion 
In this chapter, I will explore a new approach to carving cognition in light of the 
challenges the present research poses for existing approaches. I will first work up to a 
specification of this new version of the cognitive covariation thesis by considering a 
distinction between two kinds of mental representation. Second, I will discuss the 
implications of this new version of the thesis for the problem of measurement, both with 
regard to the reinterpretation of existing measurement procedures and the design of new 
procedures. Finally, I will describe directions for future research implied by the new 
versions of the cognitive and psychometric covariation theses developed here. 
4.1 A new approach to carving cognition 
The findings from the present research underscore the empirical challenges facing the 
contextualization and validation hypotheses. The self-construal research reported in §2 
provides further evidence for top-down influences on implicit cognition; this finding is 
consistent with the validation hypothesis, but contradicts the assumption of the 
contextualization hypothesis that the direction of influence between processes is 
essentially bottom-up. The evaluative learning research reported in §3 suggests that 
implicit cognition is, under certain conditions, sensitive to perceived validity; this finding 
is consistent with the contextualization hypothesis, but contradicts the assumption of the 
validation hypothesis that only higher-level cognition is sensitive to perceived validity. 
Together with the difficulties addressed in the introduction, these findings call into 
question the accuracy of the underlying monitoring-and-correction processing schema for 
modeling human cognition: Perhaps, despite its folk psychological appeal, the 
characterization of lower-level cognition as requiring higher-level correction to be made 
situationally appropriate is simply incorrect. 
In this section, I will sketch an alternative approach to carving cognition that does not 
rely upon the monitoring-and-correction schema. The basic insight can be found with a 
closer examination of the studies of evaluative learning presented in §3, particularly 
Experiment 3. The original conclusion drawn from this experiment was that temporal 
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delay weakened the top-down influence of negation on implicit evaluations and thereby 
produced a dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations. It is not immediately 
clear, however, why time between the encoding of valence information and the encoding 
of validity information should asymmetrically influence these evaluations—in other 
words, why implicit evaluations (compared to explicit evaluations) should show such a 
strong primacy effect (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). The validation hypothesis, as 
described in the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, in press) and the RIM 
(Strack & Deutsch, 2004), provides no inherent reason why implicit evaluations should 
show a stronger primacy effect than explicit evaluations, especially given that implicit 
evaluations were sensitive to validity information when it was available without delay 
(see Experiments 3.1 and 3.2). The contextualization hypothesis might provide a basis for 
this prediction based on the assumptions that, once learned, the simple object-valence 
associations underlying implicit evaluations are less sensitive to contextual information in 
general, and that when validity information was presented after a delay it was somehow 
more “contextual” than when it was presented immediately during the learning task. Yet 
the assumption that lower-level, implicit processing is generally less context-sensitive 
than higher-level, explicit processing has not been supported by empirical evidence (see 
§1.2.1.2); for example, the experiments on self-construal in §2 demonstrated that 
contextual changes in the accessibility of information (Experiment 2.1) or in motivational 
orientation (Experiment 2.2) effectively influenced the implicit self-concept. It is 
therefore difficult to argue that the delayed presentation of validity information had an 
asymmetric effect solely because it created a stronger distinction between object and 
context. 
Neither of the major approaches to dual-process social-cognition, then, provides a 
satisfactory account of why the temporal delay in Experiment 3.3 uniquely weakened the 
influence of validity on implicit evaluations. A promising alternative approach, however, 
is based on the insight that in this experiment, temporal delay was confounded with 
quantification, by which I mean the notion of quantifying across a number of tokens by 
grouping them into a single type. This is in fact an accurate description of the delayed 
validity manipulation in Experiment 3.3, in which participants were required to quantify 
across all of the object-valence associations they had previously observed for each target 
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by labeling the whole group as true or false. This manipulation required participants to 
create a new type-level representation for each of the four targets, comprising each of the 
(token-level) object-valence associations observed in the learning task. Crucially, it was 
the evaluation of this quantified, type-level representation that participants in this 
condition were asked to negate, rather than each individual (token-level) object-valence 
association. Reversing learned evaluations after a delay, therefore, amounted to 
quantified negation, and this may be the reason that implicit evaluations were insensitive 
to perceived validity after the delay: The key distinction between higher-level and lower-
level cognition may be the capacity for quantification, such that lower-level cognition 
represents unique tokens, whereas higher-level cognition is capable of grouping these 
tokens into abstract types and manipulating these abstractions via quantified operations. 
4.1.1 Grounding the cognitive covariation thesis in mental 
representation 
In order to state this quantification hypothesis more clearly as a specification of the 
cognitive covariation thesis (i.e., in terms of operating conditions and operating 
principles), it will help to clarify first why the capacity for quantification might be 
expected to distinguish between kinds of cognition. In the earlier discussion of the unity 
problem (§1.3), the monitoring-and-correction processing schema was criticized as 
lacking a reasonable explanation for distinguishing between kinds of cognition in terms 
of sensitivity to the situational context. The weakness of the various explanations, 
however, was not a result of the appeal to context-sensitivity itself but to the manner in 
which that distinction was applied. In particular, both the contextualization and validation 
hypotheses view higher-level processing as more sensitive to situational context (either in 
general or with respect to situational consistency) than lower-level processing, the basic 
idea being that higher-level processing “corrects” lower-level processing by taking 
aspects of the situational context into account. The architectural explanation attempts to 
derive this distinction from differences in mental representation, such that similarity-
based processing in connectionist networks is corrected by rule-based processing in 
classical architectures. When mental representation is assumed to be exclusively 
compositional, however, the classical/connectionist distinction fails to justify this 
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argument: Compositionality requires that representation in both classical and 
connectionist architectures be localist (i.e., represent a discrete object or concept), with 
the consequence that neither architecture is inherently more context-sensitive. Likewise, 
the phylogenetic explanation for viewing higher-level processing as more situationally 
sensitive is unconvincing. Insofar as quick responses need to be evolutionarily adaptive, 
early cognition must be more, not less, sensitive to the situational context (Schwarz, 
2007); carving percepts into discrete stimuli and sorting these into abstract categories 
would seem to be luxuries afforded by time and cognitive capacity. 
As anticipated earlier (see §1.2.3), the basic problem with the monitoring-and-correction 
processing schema may be that it rests on the assumption that mental representation is 
exclusively compositional—that is, that representations in one kind of process are 
completely reducible to those in another kind of process. Indeed, if the contrast between 
classical and connectionist architectures has any value for dual-process theories, it is that 
it makes possible a distinction between localist, compositional representation and 
distributed, non-compositional representation. This distinction between kinds of mental 
representation, moreover, is capable of grounding a distinction between kinds of 
cognitive process in terms of context-sensitivity, though in a way fundamentally different 
from that envisioned by the monitoring-and-correction processing schema. Specifically, 
distributed representation is not just context-sensitive but context-dependent: Not being 
composed from discrete units of meaning, distributed representations lack a clear 
distinction between object and context; instead, such representations are holistic in that 
the object of representation is a unique “object-in-context” (Chrisley, 1998; Ferguson & 
Bargh, 2007; Smolensky, 1988; cf. Fodor, 1987; Fodor & Lepore, 1992). The major 
consequence for present purposes is that, because holistic representations lack discrete 
units of meaning, they are fundamentally non-conceptual and non-linguistic—and 
therefore cannot be reduced to localist representations in a classical architecture. Indeed, 
the contrast between these two kinds of mental representation has long been recognized 
as central to cognitivist psychology. James (1890) devoted an entire chapter of his 
Principles to describing the holistic “stream of thought,” and he placed heavy emphasis 
on the notion that cognition is not altogether discrete and linguistic: 
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Language works against our perception of the truth. We name our 
thoughts simply, each after its thing, as if each knew its own thing and 
nothing else. What each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for, 
with dimly perhaps a thousand other things. It ought to be named after all 
of them, but it never is. Some of them are always things known a moment 
ago more clearly; others are things to be known more clearly a moment 
hence. (p. 241) 
I will refer to this distinction between kinds of mental representation, and the kinds of 
cognitive process that operate upon them, as holistic and symbolic.12 Holistic 
representation is distributed, which entails that it is non-compositional, non-linguistic, 
and context-dependent. Holistic processing is assumed to be realized by distributed 
connectionist architectures that operate according to principles of similarity and 
contiguity across patterns of activation (Smolensky, 1988). In contrast, symbolic 
representation is localist, which entails that it is compositional, linguistic, and context-
independent. Symbolic processing is assumed to be realized by classical architectures that 
are essentially rule-based Turing machines (i.e., manipulators of abstract symbols), per 
the Computational Theory of Mind (Horst, 2009; Newell, 1980). 
By virtue of the underlying distinction between kinds of mental representation, the 
relation between these two kinds of cognition involves quantification: Unique, holistic 
tokens at the lower level may be abstracted into symbolic types at the higher level.13 
                                                 
12
 A brief note on nomenclature: Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) distinguish between analytic 
and holistic cognition, whereas Smolensky (1988) distinguishes between symbolic and subsymbolic 
cognition. With regard to the former case, I have chosen to use the term symbolic rather than analytic 
because it gives a clearer sense of the representational assumptions underlying this kind of cognition. In the 
latter case, I have chosen to use the term holistic rather than subsymbolic because is offers a direct, rather 
than relative, characterization of the representational assumptions underlying this kind of cognition.  
13
 With its emphasis on the relation between abstract type-level representations and unique token-level 
representations, the quantification hypothesis might be seen as similar to existing social-cognitive theories 
that take the “level of representation” of an object into account (e.g., Lord & Lepper, 1999; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). This similarity is only superficial, however, given that these 
theories assume that all representations are localist, though they can differ in degrees of abstraction. The 
quantification hypothesis, in contrast, assumes a qualitative distinction between kinds of representation 
(i.e., holistic vs. symbolic), meaning that representations at different levels are not reducible. Thus, for 
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Thus, quantification across context-dependent tokens creates context-independent types 
that can be processed in a classical architecture. In formal logic, the relevant notion of 
quantification is specifically universal quantification, denoted . The capacity assumed 
to be the hallmark of higher-level, symbolic cognition is therefore any quantified 
predication of the form , which is read “for all tokens of type ,  is .” In this 
sense, types are mental categories (i.e., concepts) that subsume similar tokens. For 
example, in the statement “Dogs are red,” it is obvious that dogs is a category. Yet even 
in predications of singular concepts, such as in the statement “My dog is red,” my dog is 
equally categorical, for the reason that the predication subsumes all representational 
instances or tokens of my dog in memory or perception; essentially, my dog is a type 
rather than a token in the current perspective because it is repeatable. Quantified 
predication is therefore involved in any attribution of a property to a linguistic concept 
(i.e., a noun), which is obviously a frequent occurrence in human cognition. Conversely, 
holistic processing in connectionist architectures is incapable of quantification, because 
distributed representations cannot be treated as discrete, repeatable types. Once again, 
James (1890) gave lucid expression to this point: 
Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and 
only bears a resemblance of kind with our other thoughts of the same fact. 
When the identical fact recurs, we must think of it in a fresh manner, see it 
under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations from 
those in which it last appeared. And the thought by which we cognize it is 
the thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffused with the 
consciousness of all that dim context. (p. 233) 
Although quantification is a powerful cognitive capacity, its use involves a tradeoff 
between representational flexibility and sensitivity to the immediate situation. Symbolic, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
example, token-level representations in Trope and Liberman’s (2003) construal level theory would 
nevertheless be viewed as type-level, abstract representations from the perspective of the quantification 
hypothesis. Most importantly, tokens in the current perspective are assumed to be represented holistically. 
114 
 
 
 
type-based processing allows for the consideration of counterfactuals, such that 
alternatives to the immediate situation can be conceived via context-independent 
representation (Roese & Olson, 1995); yet the symbolic processing that makes 
counterfactual cognition possible also requires that the holistic meaning of the immediate 
situation to the organism is lost. Essentially, the tradeoff is that symbolic processing 
facilitates long-range planning, but requires a compositional reconstruction of the 
immediate situation in terms of discrete, quantifiable types (i.e., linguistic concepts) that 
can be mentally manipulated to simulate various contingencies; holistic processing 
facilitates immediate, context-sensitive responses, but being context-dependent cannot 
perform such counterfactual manipulations. 
In light of this tradeoff, it is important to note that neither kind of cognition is inherently 
normative from the perspective of the quantification hypothesis. The monitoring-and-
correction processing schema locates the distinction between kinds of cognition in their 
relative complexity, such that higher-level processing is assumed to be more sensitive to 
situational context (either in general or with respect to situational consistency). The 
implication of this schema is that higher-level processing will always be more 
“situationally appropriate,” because it is able to take more situational information into 
account. In contrast, the distinction between holistic and symbolic cognition avoids this 
normative implication, because it does not locate the distinction in the relative amount of 
information considered but in the kinds of information considered, which serve 
complementary functions for an organism. Thus, holistic representations, being context-
dependent, make possible behavioral responses that are acutely sensitive to immediate 
contingencies. Symbolic representations, being context-independent, make possible 
behavioral responses that can take counterfactual contingencies into account. Neither 
kind of cognition, however, is inherently more normative than the other, as each serves 
distinct goals that are potentially adaptive for an organism (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
Indeed, this perspective offers a more nuanced view of normativity in psychology by 
recognizing that the “situational appropriateness” of a behavioral response can be 
understood in terms of both immediate and long-term contingencies, and that both can 
serve adaptive functions for an organism. Which of these two responses might be more 
“correct” when they conflict cannot be decided a priori, based on the principles by which 
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holistic and symbolic cognition operate, but is rather a question that depends on external 
assumptions about what constitutes normative behavior (Rey, 2007). In this sense, the 
quantification hypothesis altogether dispenses with the monitoring-and-correction 
processing schema for modeling human cognition, which has informed the vast majority 
of dual-process research in social-cognitive psychology. 
We are now in a position to return to the question raised at the beginning of this section: 
Why might the capacity for quantification be expected to distinguish between kinds of 
cognition? In contrast to the contextualization and validation hypotheses, the 
quantification hypothesis is grounded in a distinction between kinds of mental 
representation that provides the foundation for reasonable responses to the unity problem. 
First, the architectural and neurophysiological explanations become defensible with the 
distinction between genuinely different kinds of mental representation (cf. §§1.3.1-1.3.2). 
As discussed above, the relation between holistic and symbolic representations can be 
described as a process of quantification. Thus, if the human mind is characterized by 
these two kinds of representation in particular, it makes sense that the capacity for 
quantification would be the key distinction between kinds of cognition. Second, the 
quantification hypothesis is more amenable to a phylogenetic explanation. As discussed 
earlier (§1.3.3), one problem with the monitoring-and-correction processing schema is 
that it makes little sense that the behavior of lower animals, which presumably lack 
higher-level cognitive capacities, would be evolutionarily adaptive if it were based on 
normatively deficient cognition. In particular, the idea that early, resource-efficient 
cognitive processing is insensitive to immediate contingencies, including situational 
consistency, is difficult to square with the fact that lower animals are capable of 
manifestly intelligent behavior. The quantification hypothesis suggests, instead, that it is 
not the amount of information guiding behavior that distinguishes between different 
kinds of cognition, but the kind of information: Thus, behavior in lower animals should 
be guided more or less exclusively by similarity-based processing across holistic 
representations, a contention supported by comparative research on category learning and 
use (e.g., Smith, Minda, & Washburn, 2004; Smith et al., 2011). Such context-dependent 
cognition would be eminently adaptive in the short term, but would lack the capacity for 
counterfactual representation that makes long-range planning possible. It may not be 
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coincidental that this capacity for “decoupling” cognition from the immediate situation is 
frequently identified as the hallmark of human sentience (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; 
Dienes & Perner, 1999; Stanovich, 2004). 
These considerations offer a final push toward a precise specification of the 
quantification hypothesis. In particular, they suggest that the conditions under which 
holistic and symbolic processes operate can be characterized with respect to their 
complementary functions: Holistic processing, though tied to the immediate situation, 
facilitates context-sensitive responding much faster than would be possible if the 
situation were reconstructed compositionally, in terms of discrete concepts; symbolic 
processing, on the other hand, does depend on such an effortful reconstruction (via 
quantification), but the decomposition of a holistic representation into discrete, context-
independent concepts makes possible counterfactual thinking. Based on this 
characterization of holistic and symbolic cognition, the key distinction between their 
respective operating conditions would appear to be the sensory-dependence of cognitive 
processing. Thus, holistic cognition should be expected to operate under conditions of 
high sensory-dependence, whereas symbolic cognition should be expected to operate 
under conditions of low sensory-dependence—in other words, when a person has time to 
“think about” his or her response. Indeed, this colloquial expression is intended quite 
literally here, as the proposed relation between holistic and symbolic cognition is 
essentially metacognitive: Holistic cognition can be considered first-order, experiential 
cognition, whereas symbolic cognition involves thinking about these first-order processes 
(Dienes & Perner, 1999; Rosenthal, 2002). It is this capacity for discretizing holistic 
representations—essentially, abstracting repeatable types from unique tokens—that is the 
hallmark of symbolic cognition. 
The relation between high and low sensory-dependence and the more traditional 
distinction between automaticity and control (e.g., Bargh, 1994) is likely not isomorphic, 
and this is an important area for future research (see §4.2.1 for further discussion). For 
the present, I will simply emphasize that sensory-independence should require time and 
capacity to decouple cognition from perception (i.e., to make the leap from experiential to 
metacognitive processing). A rough assumption, then, is that (all else being equal) early 
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responses will be highly sensory-dependent and later responses should be less so. 
Furthermore, in specifying the operating conditions of the quantification hypothesis, I 
will use the terms online and offline to refer to conditions of high and low sensory-
dependence, respectively (for similar uses of these terms, see Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005, and Wilson, 2002). One reason for doing so is 
that these terms succinctly capture the meaning of the proposed distinction between 
operating conditions, such that cognitive processing under high sensory-dependence is 
directly connected to experience, whereas processing under low sensory-dependence is to 
some degree decoupled from experience as a result of quantification. Second, the 
online/offline nomenclature avoids the normative connotations inherent in the distinction 
between automaticity and control, and thus carries no implications about which operating 
conditions are more likely to produce more adaptive responses. 
4.1.2 The quantification hypothesis 
The quantification hypothesis is presented in Table 4.1 as a proposed specification of the 
cognitive covariation thesis. 
 
The Quantification Hypothesis 
 Operating Conditions  
Online 
High sensory-dependence 
(“Experiential”) 
 
 
Offline 
Low sensory-dependence 
(“Metacognitive”) 
 
 
 Operating Principles  
Holistic 
Distributed/Connectionist* 
Situation-dependent 
Continuous 
 
 
Symbolic 
Localist/Classical* 
Counterfactual 
Discrete 
 
 
Table 4.1. The specification of the cognitive covariation thesis per the quantification 
hypothesis. 
*Denotes the key distinction between cognitive operating principles. 
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The basic claim of the quantification hypothesis is that online cognition is characterized 
by the principles of holistic processing, whereas offline cognition is characterized by the 
principles of symbolic processing. The hypothesis assumes that these two kinds of 
cognition are related via a process of quantification, in which holistic representations are 
decoupled from immediate experience to produce abstract, context-independent concepts 
that can be manipulated via quantified operations (e.g., linguistic syntax, formal logic, 
etc.). This perspective suggests that the distinctions drawn by the monitoring-and-
correction approach to dual-process cognition (i.e., in terms of automaticity/control and 
situational sensitivity; Table 1.1) were on the right track, but the quantification 
hypothesis turns this approach on its head by suggesting that early processing should be 
more sensitive to situational context rather than less so (cf. §§1.2.1.1, 1.2.2.1). According 
to this new approach, generality is an effortful cognitive achievement, not the starting 
point of cognitive processing (Ferguson & Bargh, 2007). 
4.1.2.1 Sources of influence on holistic and symbolic cognition 
The quantification hypothesis implies that, due to the nature of distributed vs. localist 
representation, the early meaning of a stimulus to an individual should be context-
dependent and later meaning should be less so. This suggests how the current scattershot 
approach to investigating the context-sensitivity of implicit cognition—which essentially 
involves testing whether a given contextual factor (e.g., visual background, active goals, 
physical environment, etc.) influences implicit processing—might be brought into focus: 
by recognizing that it is not what is manipulated, but how, that is responsible for 
asymmetric effects on higher-level and lower-level processing. In particular, the symbolic 
meaning of a stimulus can be directly assigned, independent of context, simply by 
relabeling a symbol to mean something else; in other words, symbolic cognition is 
capable of predication, as described in §4.1.1. In contrast, holistic meaning is determined 
by the situational context and cannot simply be changed through reassignment, since 
there is no discrete symbol upon which the (quantified) reassignment can operate. 
Consequently, the quantification hypothesis predicts that attempts to change the meaning 
of a stimulus through direct reassignment should affect symbolic (explicit) processing but 
not holistic (implicit) processing; conversely, attempts to change meaning by 
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manipulating the context of a stimulus should affect holistic (implicit) processing but not 
symbolic (explicit) processing.  
These predictions are borne out by existing research on the context-sensitivity of implicit 
processing (see §1.2.1.2), but go further by providing a general rationale that ties these 
varied findings together: Manipulations of context directly influence early, context-
dependent meaning, whereas reassignments of meaning directly influence late, context-
independent meaning. An experiment by Foroni and Mayr (2005) provides an excellent 
illustration of this point. When participants were simply told to think of insects as 
positive and flowers as negative, implicit evaluations of insects and flowers were 
unaffected, with insects being more strongly associated with negativity than flowers on 
an IAT (see also Gregg et al., 2006). This is a standard finding and is assumed to reflect 
the evaluation associated with each stereotype (i.e., insects are bad, flowers are good; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In another condition, however, participants 
were asked to imagine that they were searching for food in a post-apocalyptic world in 
which flowers are highly radioactive and insects provide the only safe source of 
sustenance. This manipulation, which changed the meaning of the targets via the context 
in which they were perceived, successfully reversed implicit evaluations, such that 
flowers were more strongly associated with negativity than insects. In general, then, 
lower-level processing might be usefully understood as reflecting the contextual meaning 
of a stimulus, whereas higher-level processing reflects its decontextualized (assigned) 
meaning. 
From this perspective, the current, somewhat atheoretical approach to investigating the 
context-sensitivity of implicit cognition can be viewed more coherently as a program 
seeking to identify the aspects of situational context that are relevant to the determination 
of holistic meaning—and it seems there are indeed many (see §1.2.1.2). This perspective, 
moreover, conceptually integrates the explosion of findings within the “situated” and 
“embodied” cognition literatures, in which a supposedly irrelevant aspect of the 
situational context systematically influences behavior (Niedenthal et al., 2005; Smith & 
Semin, 2004). For example, Williams and Bargh (2008) found that holding a warm (vs. 
cold) mug of coffee increased perceptions of interpersonal warmth, despite the fact that 
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participants reported no awareness of this influence. Lee and Schwartz (2010) found that 
asking participants to wash their hands (ostensibly as part of an unrelated product testing 
study) reduced feelings of regret after making a choice between two equally attractive 
alternatives. Although such findings are generally regarded as novel, they appear much 
less surprising when it is simply assumed that holistic meaning (which presumably 
mediates the behavioral outcomes in such experiments) is dependent on the situational 
context. Put the other way around, these findings are counterintuitive only if it is assumed 
that the meaning of a stimulus is always context-independent and that the only contextual 
factors that might influence meaning are those that have been explicitly identified. 
Although such computer-like cognition might be viewed as the ideal (at least within 
analytic Western cultures; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), research in social 
psychology has long made clear that cognition is heavily influenced by context, 
regardless of whether it is explicitly identified or not (Markus, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). For example, Schwarz and Clore (1983) famously found that reports of life-
satisfaction were systematically influenced by the weather at the time of the interview. 
Likewise, the extensive literature on affective forecasting errors reveals that people have 
a difficult time controlling for the influence of the immediate context, and taking 
counterfactual contexts into account, when predicting their behavior in future situations 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
The current fascination with “situated” effects in social psychology is due largely to an 
experiment by Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996), the history of which helps to illuminate 
the broader point being made here. In this experiment, participants surreptitiously primed 
with words related to the “elderly” stereotype were found to walk more slowly after 
leaving the laboratory. Bargh et al. interpreted this finding as evidence for the activation 
of the “elderly” concept (i.e., stereotype) in memory, which had a direct influence on 
behavior. In later work, however, Cesario, Plaks, and Higgins (2006) found that this 
effect was moderated by individual differences in participants’ associations with the 
elderly, such that participants with positive associations walked more slowly after being 
primed whereas participants with negative associations walked more quickly. Cesario et 
al. concluded that these behavioral differences could be understood as a result of 
participants’ preparation to interact with the primed group; in other words, participants 
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with more positive associations behaved more sympathetically, presumably to smooth 
social interaction (see also Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005). Contrary to 
Bargh et al.’s (1996) interpretation, this conclusion suggests that “priming” via the 
manipulation of supposedly irrelevant aspects of the situational context does not activate 
a context-independent concept, or stereotype, but rather activates the meaning of the 
prime within that specific situation—that is, a holistic, rather than symbolic, meaning (for 
similar accounts, see Perugini & Prestwich, 2007; Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007). 
4.1.2.2 Directions of influence 
So far, I have focused on the relation between holistic and symbolic cognition in terms of 
a bottom-up process of quantification. Thus, the evaluative dissociation observed in 
Experiment 3.3, which resulted from the introduction of a delay between the learning of 
object-valence associations and their validity, may be more fruitfully interpreted as the 
result of the unique influence of quantified negation on symbolic representations, which 
have been abstracted from lower-level, holistic representations. Yet it is clear that top-
down influences can also occur, such that changes in directly measured cognition appear 
to mediate changes in indirectly measured cognition (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
From the perspective of the quantification hypothesis, Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, which 
involved a short delay between the learning of object-valence associations and their 
validity, would not in fact be interpreted as top-down effects, since the hypothesis allows 
for the direct influence of perceived validity at both levels; the critical difference is 
whether or not the application of the truth-value is quantified, and in these two 
experiments this was not the case. 
Experiment 2.2 does, however, provide a good example of how a top-down influence can 
be understood from the perspective of the quantification hypothesis. In that experiment, 
participants were motivated to assert an abstract belief about themselves (e.g., “I am 
extraverted”). Essentially, this belief can be understood as a quantified affirmation, such 
that it asserts the validity of any and all token-level self-knowledge that confirms the 
type-level belief. In order to substantiate this belief, participants were presumably 
motivated to engage in a search through token-level self-knowledge in memory biased 
toward confirmation (Kunda, 1990). Thus, from the perspective of the quantification 
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hypothesis, top-down influences can be broadly conceptualized as “deductive” in the 
sense that higher-level assertions serve as premises that lead to the activation of specific 
lower-level knowledge. Conversely, the bottom-up route of self-construal observed in 
Experiment 2.1 can be understood as an “inductive” relation between type-level and 
token-level processes. In this case, an abstract, type-level belief (e.g., “I am extraverted”) 
is induced from the prior activation of multiple tokens of self-knowledge (e.g., specific 
memories of one’s own extraverted behaviors). 
4.1.3 Summary 
The quantification hypothesis is proposed as a response to the conceptual and empirical 
challenges facing the contextualization and validation hypotheses. The quantification 
hypothesis is grounded in a distinction between genuinely different (irreducible) kinds of 
mental representation, and the properties of each kind of representation that are assumed 
to inform the operating principles of cognition: Specifically, distributed representations 
underlie holistic processing whereas localist representations underlie symbolic 
processing. The process of translating between these two kinds of representation—
referred to as quantification—is assumed to characterize dual-process interactions, both 
in a bottom-up, inductive direction and a top-down, deductive direction. Moreover, the 
hypothesis suggests that holistic processing should be directly influenced by changes in 
situational context that affect the meaning of a stimulus, whereas symbolic processing 
should be directly influenced by reassignments of meaning to a stimulus. The operating 
conditions of the quantification hypothesis are derived from the complementary functions 
of each kind of cognition, which serve to generate responses based on either immediate 
situational contingencies or counterfactual contingencies. Thus, online operating 
conditions are highly sensory-dependent (“experiential”), whereas  offline operating 
conditions are less sensory-dependent (“metacognitive”). 
4.2 The measurement problem: Leveraging the cognitive 
covariation thesis 
Dual-process theories of cognition do not just provide a basis for explanations of human 
behavior—they also provide the basis for the design and interpretation of the 
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measurement procedures necessary for testing such explanations. As noted in §1.1, this 
dialectical relation between observed behavior and explanatory theory can be approached 
from either direction, and in the present discussion I have focused initially on the 
theoretical assumptions used to characterize different kinds of cognition. Beyond offering 
a new cognitive framework for explaining behavior, however, this hypothesis also sheds 
light on the enduring problem of measurement: That is, what are our measurement 
procedures measuring? In this way, the specification of the cognitive covariation thesis 
can be leveraged to refine the specification of the psychometric covariation thesis (Figure 
1.2). In this section, I will first address the prospects for reinterpreting existing 
measurement procedures in light of the quantification hypothesis and then discuss 
implications for the development of new measurement procedures. Finally, I will explore 
the possibility that the distinctions between the operating principles and operating 
conditions of cognition are not qualitative but graded. 
4.2.1 Reinterpreting existing measurement procedures 
In the received view of dual-process cognition, direct and indirect measurement 
procedures are classified in terms of the operating conditions of automaticity and control, 
and existing measurement procedures have generally been designed with this distinction 
in mind. This complicates the application of the quantification hypothesis to the 
reinterpretation of existing measurement procedures, since this hypothesis draws an 
alternative distinction between operating conditions in terms of online and offline 
processing. Thus, the first obstacle to reinterpreting these measurement procedures is to 
determine the degree to which the respective operating conditions overlap: In particular, 
how well does the automatic/controlled distinction map on to the online/offline 
distinction? This is a complicated question in itself, given that many functional properties 
of automaticity have been proposed without a clear consensus in the social-cognitive 
literature (Bargh, 1992, 1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). For example, some indirect 
measurement procedures are designed to emphasize distinctions in conscious awareness 
(e.g., subliminal priming), whereas others are designed to emphasize distinctions in 
resource-efficiency (e.g., through the use of a distracter task). Moreover, as mathematical 
modeling has revealed, it is unclear how distinct the proposed features of automaticity 
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and control actually are and how well measurement procedures can selectively establish 
them (Sherman, Klauer, & Allen, 2010). 
Nevertheless, there is at least a family resemblance between the automatic/controlled and 
online/offline distinctions, which might best be captured by the overlap between the 
features of resource-efficiency and sensory-dependence. The link between these two 
features is that the cognitive resources upon which resource-heavy processes depend may 
be precisely those that are required to take online, sensory-dependent cognition offline—
that is, via the (effortful) quantification of holistic representations. From this perspective, 
existing measurement procedures that emphasize resource-efficiency (e.g., through the 
use of a distracter task) might be most easily reinterpreted with the quantification 
hypothesis, insofar as they discriminate between the conditions upon which the capacity 
for quantification depends. If this is the case, then the quantification hypothesis implies 
that such measurement procedures reflect the operation of holistic cognition, rather than 
“implicit” cognition as characterized by the contextualization and validation hypotheses 
(Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). This would mean that such measurement procedures should be 
influenced by situational contingencies in general, including perceived validity, but 
should be specifically insensitive to quantified manipulations (compared to direct 
measurement procedures that allow for resource-inefficient processing).14 
Although the link to resource-efficiency seems to be the most promising route to 
exploring the quantification hypothesis with existing measurement procedures, some 
theorists have suggested that indirect measurement procedures in general can be 
reinterpreted from this perspective based on their demonstrated sensitivity to context. For 
example, Ferguson and Bargh (2007), arguing against the traditional assumption that 
behaviors can be explained as cognitive responses to discrete objects, have suggested that 
                                                 
14
 Resource-efficiency was selected as the feature of automaticity that best approximates the online/offline 
distinction not only for the positive reasons discussed here, but also for the negative reason that the other 
commonly proposed features of automaticity (Bargh, 1994) crosscut the online/offline distinction. In 
particular, offline processing is not assumed to be uniquely influenced by intentions to start or stop 
processing; instead, differences should depend on whether or not these intentions are quantified. Likewise, 
online processing is not assumed to operate outside conscious awareness per se, but is better understood as 
“first-order” awareness (see §4.2.3 for further discussion of this issue). 
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indirect measurement procedures reflect responses to “object-centered contexts.” 
Likewise, De Houwer (2005) has suggested that the most commonly used indirect 
measurement procedure, the IAT, should be regarded as a general measure of similarity, 
which is essentially a function of the situational meaning of a stimulus. Although such 
reinterpretations of existing measurement procedures offer important challenges to the 
received view of dual-process cognition, the preceding discussion suggests that a note of 
caution is in order. Specifically, the reinterpretation of existing measurement procedures 
designed with the automatic/controlled distinction in mind may not be fully justified if 
newly proposed operating principles are assumed to correspond to different operating 
conditions (e.g., online/offline). Thus, before reinterpreting the results of existing direct 
and indirect measurement procedures or employing them in the investigation of newly 
proposed distinctions between kinds of cognition, more research is needed to understand 
which operating conditions existing procedures establish (De Houwer, Teige-
Mocigemba, Spruyt & Moors, 2009). Based on similarities and differences in the 
observation conditions that existing measurement procedures establish, inferences can 
then be drawn about what, exactly, the various existing procedures are measuring. 
4.2.2 Implications for the development of new measurement 
procedures 
4.2.2.1 Re-specifying the psychometric covariation thesis 
Given the complications involved with reinterpreting existing measurement procedures, it 
is useful to consider how new measurement procedures might be designed to take the 
distinction between online and offline operating conditions into account. The first step is 
to draw out the implications of the quantification hypothesis for the psychometric 
covariation thesis, which requires identifying the observation conditions that correspond 
to online and offline operating conditions. In other words, what are the observation 
conditions that a measurement procedure must establish to select, as exclusively as 
possible, online or offline processing (and hence, via the cognitive covariation thesis, 
holistic or symbolic processing)? 
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As suggested above, the key distinction between online and offline operating conditions 
is the degree of sensory-dependence, which is inversely related to the capacity for 
metacognition: Sensory-dependence decreases as holistic representations are quantified, 
or “thought about,” as higher-order symbols. Consequently, online measurement 
procedures should establish observation conditions that preclude metacognition, whereas 
offline measurement procedures should facilitate the operation of this capacity. Given 
that metacognition requires effort and time, online measurement procedures should 
generally feature speeded responses to tap the early cognitive response to a stimulus and, 
as discussed in the previous section, should generally be unaffected by demands on 
cognitive resources. In addition, based on the assumption that holistic processing is 
distributed and hence non-linguistic, online measurement procedures should require 
responses that do not depend on linguistic processing. For the same reason, such 
procedures should not require discrete responses of any sort, but should make use of 
continuous measures that do not require the participant to discretize responses. 
Offline measurement procedures would be characterized conversely, being designed to 
select conditions that facilitate the operation of metacognitive processing. Thus, these 
procedures should not require speeded responses, should not be employed under high 
resource-demand, should require linguistic, or at least verbalizable, responses, and should 
generally require discrete rather than continuous responses. The specification of online 
and offline measurement procedures in terms of the psychometric covariation thesis is 
presented in Table 4.2. 
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The Psychometric Covariation Thesis per the Quantification Hypothesis 
 Observation Conditions  
Online 
Speeded/Early 
High resource demand 
Non-linguistic 
Continuous 
 
 
Offline 
Non-speeded/Late 
Low resource demand 
Linguistic 
Discrete 
 
 
 Operating Conditions  
Online 
High sensory-dependence 
(“Experiential”) 
 
 
Offline 
Low sensory-dependence 
(“Metacognitive”) 
 
 
Table 4.2. The specification of the psychometric covariation thesis per the quantification 
hypothesis. 
 
Whereas existing indirect measurement procedures designed to select implicit cognition 
often require speeded responses and are frequently employed under conditions of high 
resource demand, they do not, as a rule, require non-linguistic and continuous responses. 
These differences from the proposed characteristics of online measurement procedures 
may account for the lack of process purity for which indirect procedures are often 
criticized (see §1.1.1), and the relation between indirect and online measurement 
procedures is an important direction for future research. On the other hand, there is a 
much closer alignment between the characteristics of direct measurement procedures and 
those proposed for offline procedures. Generally, both direct and offline measurement 
procedures rely upon self-report, which is most often assessed without time constraints, 
under low resource demands, and which requires linguistic processing and discrete 
responses. 
4.2.2.2 Measuring continuous cognition 
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of online measurement, as described here, is the use 
of continuous rather than discrete responses. Continuous responses are assumed to better 
reflect holistic processing, which is not obviously segmented—either temporally or 
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semantically—in the way that symbolic processing is (due to the dependence of symbolic 
processing on localist, compositional representation). It might be objected, however, that 
the notion of continuous measurement is a contradiction in terms, given that 
measurement inherently requires the discretization of observed behavior by placing it on 
a metric.15 For just this reason, James (1890) saw little hope for the empirical study of 
continuous, holistic cognition: 
The object of every thought … is neither more nor less than all that the 
thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the 
matter…. It is needless to say that memory can seldom accurately 
reproduce such an object, when once it has passed from before the mind. 
It either makes too little or too much of it. Its best plan is to repeat the 
verbal sentence, if there was one, in which the object was expressed. But 
for inarticulate thoughts there is not even this resource, and introspection 
must confess that the task exceeds her powers. The mass of our thinking 
vanishes for ever, beyond hope of recovery, and psychology only gathers 
up a few of the crumbs that fall from the feast. (p. 276) 
While it is true that measurement requires discretization, James perhaps did not place 
enough stock in the development of alternatives to direct/offline measurement 
procedures, which would make possible the observation of behavior at a much more fine-
grained resolution. The outcomes of such procedures, being necessarily discretized at 
some level, are inevitably approximations of holistic processing, but these procedures 
nevertheless represent the best option for countering James’ pessimism about the limits of 
empirical psychology. 
                                                 
15
 Indeed, this point suggests a powerful analogy between conceptions of science and reality on the one 
hand and symbolic and holistic cognition on the other: Each relation essentially involves measurement. 
Thus, the process of quantification, through which holistic representations are translated into symbolic 
representations, can be understood as a kind of introspective (metacognitive) measurement procedure. 
Taking the analogy a step further, symbolic representations might be viewed as abstract reconstructions of, 
or theories about, holistic representations. 
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In fact, measurement procedures have already been developed that possess many of the 
features of online measurement described above. For example, using a mouse-tracking 
procedure that continuously records the motion of a participant’s hand during the 
generation of response behaviors, Freeman and Ambady (2009) found that early 
responses to stimuli are more holistic, being sensitive to features of the individual 
stimulus, before resolving to more discrete, categorical assessments. Spivey and Dale 
(2006) have reached similar conclusions using eye-tracking procedures. Wojnowicz, 
Ferguson, Dale, and Spivey (2009) also employed a mouse-tracking procedure to shed 
light on the cognitive processing underlying self-reported evaluations of social targets; 
their results suggested that early representations are sensitive to multiple sources of 
information before “self-organizing” into the categorical representations required by self-
report procedures. In addition, a small but growing number of researchers have begun to 
apply the dynamical systems approach to psychology (e.g., Bechtel, 2008; Vallacher, 
Read, & Nowak, 2002; Wiese, Vallacher, & Strawinska, 2010). This approach, inspired 
by the cybernetics movement that originated in the mid-twentieth century, assumes that 
much cognitive processing is continuous and non-linear. A common feature of these 
various approaches to measurement is the emphasis on the time course of cognitive 
processing, which is a crucial aspect of the relation between holistic and symbolic 
cognition. In contrast, direct and indirect measurement procedures have typically ignored 
the temporal aspect of cognitive processing, providing only static cross-sections of 
presumably dynamic processes. 
James’ worries about holistic cognition touch upon a second problem for empirical 
psychology, however: Holistic cognition is not only temporally continuous, but 
semantically continuous as well. This is a consequence of the fundamental context-
dependence of holistic representation, and it poses a serious threat to the practice of 
empirical psychology (Fodor, 1987). In short, if holistic cognition is tightly bound to the 
situational context in which it operates, then it becomes extremely difficult to produce 
valid generalizations about these psychological processes. The solution in mainstream 
psychology has been to ignore this possibility and assume that all cognition can be 
described in general, aggregate-level terms, essentially as if all cognition were symbolic 
(i.e., discrete, linguistic, etc.). In practice, this requires heavy dependence upon the use of 
130 
 
 
 
ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation to subsume all of the unidentified 
variation that can influence the link between an “operationally defined” stimulus and a 
behavioral response (Fodor, 1989). This solution, however, seriously undermines the 
value of general psychological explanations. The difficulty is that psychologists seeking 
to provide precise descriptions of psychological mechanisms cannot ignore the possibility 
that some of those mechanisms may be context-dependent, and in these cases, sweeping 
the “random error” due to context-sensitivity into a ceteris paribus clause precludes the 
possibility of precisely describing the cognitive mechanism underlying behavior 
(Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Cronbach, 1975; Molenaar, 2004; 
Runkel, 1990).16 
The covariation theses offer the framework for a more adequate solution to this problem 
by helping researchers empirically distinguish between conditions under which cognitive 
processing will be more or less context-dependent. The quantification hypothesis thus 
suggests that under online (compared to offline) conditions, descriptions of cognitive 
processes will need to be more context-dependent. The practical problem with this 
suggestion is that mainstream empirical psychology depends heavily upon aggregation in 
the analysis of behavioral data (Epstein, 1979, 1980), and aggregation is inherently 
decontextualizing. One potential solution to this problem is the use of multi-level 
analyses, which allow for the modeling of data at both the aggregate and the individual 
level. Although the practice is not yet mainstream, the tools for measuring and analyzing 
multi-level data are already available (e.g., Hamaker, Dolan, & Molenaar, 2005; 
Molenaar, 2007; Nesselroade & Ram, 2004). Collectively, then, psychometric advances 
offer reason to doubt James’ pessimistic conclusion: The measurement and analysis of 
online, holistic cognition is not only possible but empirically practical. 
                                                 
16
 In considering the threat holistic processing poses to the generality of psychological explanation, Conrey 
and Smith (2007) claim that “Fortunately, the aspects of context that are most important to social 
psychology are relatively few” (p. 254). To the extent this is true, the problem of distinguishing between 
behaviors that require context-dependent vs. context-independent explanations would be relatively 
innocuous, and traditional (aggregative) empirical methods could be applied unconditionally. In light of the 
wide variety of contextual cues to which social behavior is sensitive (see §1.2.1.2), however, the 
assumption that holistic processing is not too holistic appears unwarranted.  
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4.2.3 The possibility of graded distinctions 
Beyond the measurement of continuous cognition, the quantification hypothesis presents 
another challenge for empirical research: Whether the distinction between kinds of 
cognition is itself discrete or continuous—and in the latter case, if the principle of 
covariation loses its value as a guide to theory and measurement (cf. §1.1.2). To begin 
with, the quantified relation between holistic tokens and symbolic types has been 
described as metacognitive. Yet metacognition implies a continuum, from first-order 
cognition through successively higher orders of cognition, each of which “objectifies” the 
preceding level (Rosenthal, 2002). If the transition from holistic to symbolic cognition 
were perfectly graded in this way, lacking any sharp distinction, the cognitive covariation 
thesis would indeed lose much of its value: It is covariation between kinds of operating 
principles and operating conditions that makes the thesis useful for drawing inferences 
about what kind of cognition has been measured and for designing measurement 
procedures to select specific kinds of cognition (Figure 1.2). In short, a graded distinction 
between kinds of cognition undercuts the process purity assumption that makes the 
principle of covariation useful for guiding empirical research. Without an empirical 
criterion for inferring when psychological mechanisms will be more or less context-
sensitive, researchers will have no principled way to move beyond imprecise ceteris 
paribus explanations, as discussed above. 
Of course, whether the distinction between kinds of cognition is qualitative or graded 
depends on assumptions about the operating principles that characterize them. The 
validation hypothesis, with its clear-cut distinction between sensitivity to perceived 
validity, is not amenable to graded distinctions. But the contextualization hypothesis, 
which distinguishes between relative sensitivity to situational context, could be 
interpreted in this way. In fact, Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van Bavel (2007) 
developed their Iterative Reprocessing Model specifically along these lines, such that the 
time course of cognitive processing upon observation of a stimulus is described as a loop 
in which each iteration adds contextual information to an initially rough object 
representation. The quantification hypothesis takes just the opposite approach, assuming 
that the time course of cognitive processing is essentially a process of decontextualizing 
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initially holistic representations of the immediate situation. But the notion of iterative 
reprocessing still applies: Following the initial transition from first-order, holistic, to 
second-order, symbolic cognition, the “metacognitive loop” may continue to cycle, 
producing successively abstract, generalized representations with each iteration. An 
eventual product of these higher-level iterations may be communicable linguistic 
concepts. 
The critical point, however, is that the initial iteration of this metacognitive loop, which is 
responsible for the translation of holistic representations to symbolic representations, 
involves a difference of kind, not just degree. As argued in §4.1.1, the quantification 
hypothesis is rooted in the assumption that there are two genuinely different kinds of 
mental representation (i.e., holistic and symbolic) that are not reducible. Thus, there is a 
qualitative difference between holistic, non-compositional representation and symbolic, 
compositional representation, analogous to the difference between a bitmap image of a 
scene and a linguistic description of the same scene—the description, but not the image, 
is built from meaningful parts (Fodor, 2007). Based on the assumptions specified in the 
quantification hypothesis (Table 4.1), therefore, the distinction between holistic and 
symbolic processing cannot be understood as thoroughly graded. 
Assuming that the distinction between operating principles is qualitative implies that the 
distinction between operating conditions must be as well. With regard to the 
quantification hypothesis, this is true insofar as the operating conditions are understood 
as “experiential” (first-order) and “metacognitive” (higher-order), but the notion of 
sensory-dependence underlying these descriptions is naturally graded (see §4.1.1). This 
discontinuity, however, is an inevitable fact of empirical research. Operating conditions, 
being the link between the cognitive covariation thesis and the psychometric covariation 
thesis, serve a critical mediating role in the relation between theory (i.e., operating 
principles) and observation (i.e., observation conditions; Figure 1.2). In the case of the 
quantification hypothesis, the mapping between theory and observation is necessarily 
approximate, since the distinction between operating principles is assumed to be 
qualitative, but two of the four observation conditions specified in the psychometric 
covariation thesis (i.e., the speed and resource-dependence of responses) are graded 
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(Table 4.2). While measurement procedures either do or do not require linguistic or 
otherwise discrete responses, the speed and resource-dependence of those responses is 
more obviously a matter of degree. Thus, bringing the quantification hypothesis—and the 
underlying assumption of process purity—to bear upon empirical observation requires a 
bit of compromise. For this reason, it is recommended that measurement procedures 
designed or interpreted from the perspective of the quantification hypothesis be 
characterized in terms of the relative speed and resource-dependence required of 
responses (Keren & Schul, 2009; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Establishing a useful 
standard of comparison for relative characterizations of observation conditions remains 
an important goal for future research. 
4.2.4 Summary 
The cognitive covariation thesis is an indispensible tool for resolving the problem of 
measurement in cognitivist psychology: It not only sheds light on what kind of process is 
being measured, but also guides the development of new measurement procedures based 
on assumptions about how cognitive processes operate. From the perspective of the 
quantification hypothesis, existing indirect and direct measurement procedures are not 
designed to select the appropriate operating conditions of cognition, and therefore cannot 
be straightforwardly reinterpreted in terms of holistic and symbolic processing. 
Nevertheless, evidence from these procedures may be informative to the degree that the 
indirect/direct and online/offline distinctions overlap, which is an important empirical 
question. Designing measurement procedures specifically based on the quantification 
hypothesis, however, raises the problem of measuring holistic cognition, which is 
assumed to be temporally and semantically continuous. Fortunately, psychometric 
advances suggest that the measurement of continuous cognition is not an insurmountable 
problem. Finally, because the distinction between holistic and symbolic cognition is 
qualitative rather than graded, the quantification hypothesis and the underlying principle 
of covariation remain useful as a guide to theory and research. The quantification 
hypothesis suggests that the metaphor of “carving cognition at its joints” is accurate, but 
is necessarily approximated in empirical applications given that some observation 
conditions are graded. 
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4.3 Future directions 
Although the research reported in §2 and §3 is consistent with the quantification 
hypothesis, it represents only preliminary support for its central predictions. In future 
work, it will be critical to pit the key predictions of the contextualization, validation, and 
quantification hypotheses against one another. In addition, interpretation of this work 
should be sensitive to potential discrepancies between existing indirect measurement 
procedures and the proposed design of online measurement procedures. In this section, I 
will discuss four directions for future research suggested by the quantification hypothesis: 
first, an empirical approach to comparing the quantification and validation hypotheses; 
second, implications regarding the processing of negations; third, predictions regarding 
mediation patterns; and finally, implications for the interpretation and design of 
measurement procedures. 
4.3.1 Comparing the quantification and validation hypotheses 
As discussed in §4.1.2.1, the quantification hypothesis suggests that asymmetric 
influences on higher-level and lower-level processing are not due to what is manipulated 
but how; in particular, the hypothesis suggests that it is not the content of a manipulation 
but its quantification that should determine which kind of process it directly influences. 
This point can be used to draw out an important contrast with the validation hypothesis, 
which essentially picks out sensitivity to a particular contextual factor (i.e., situational 
consistency) as the key distinction between operating principles of cognition. The basic 
approach would involve crossing how the meaning of a stimulus is manipulated (i.e., via 
reassignment vs. change in situational context) with the content of the manipulation—in 
this case, the perceived validity of a stimulus. Practically speaking, this would require 
manipulating perceived validity either through direct assignment (i.e., labeling stimuli as 
true or false) or through the situational context (i.e., such that the truth or falsity of a 
stimulus is implied by the situation in which it is perceived). Whereas the validation 
hypothesis would predict a holistic/symbolic dissociation due to content (i.e., the 
perceived validity of the stimulus), the quantification hypothesis would predict a 
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dissociation due to how perceived validity was manipulated (i.e., via direct assignment 
vs. situational context).17 
Interestingly, the existing social-cognitive literature relevant to these predictions is 
mixed. Gawronski and Strack’s (2004) finding that induced compliance manipulations 
influence explicit but not implicit evaluations (see §1.2.2.2) appears to disconfirm the 
prediction of the quantification hypothesis, assuming that the manipulation altered the 
context in which the target stimulus was perceived rather than directly reassigning its 
truth-value. On the other hand, Schul, Mayo, and Burnstein (2004) found that statements 
delivered by untrustworthy-looking faces were automatically perceived to be false; in this 
case, the contextual manipulation of perceived validity did appear to have a direct 
influence on lower-level processing. Future work might seek to disentangle these 
findings, perhaps by focusing on differences in how manipulations of situational context 
are empirically realized. 
4.3.2 Negation 
The quantification hypothesis suggests that in Experiment 3.3, it was not temporal delay 
that caused the dissociation between implicit and explicit evaluations but rather the 
different ways in which object-valence associations were negated (see also Gregg et al., 
2006). In the short-delay condition (similar to Experiments 3.1 and 3.2), participants were 
able to negate false associations immediately after viewing them, which amounted to 
token-level, non-quantified negation. In the long-delay condition, however, the negation 
had to be applied to an entire set of false associations, which amounted to type-level, 
                                                 
17
 This approach would be less useful for empirically comparing the quantification and contextualization 
hypotheses, since they essentially differ with regard to the influence of how the meaning of a stimulus is 
manipulated without making any claims about the differential influence of particular kinds of content (e.g., 
perceived validity). It is in this sense that the quantification hypothesis is the converse of the 
contextualization hypothesis: The former predicts that manipulating the meaning of a stimulus via changes 
in situational context should directly influence lower-level processing, whereas the latter predicts a direct 
influence on higher-level processing. This is because, from the perspective of the contextualization 
hypothesis, controlled processing is assumed to make possible the incorporation of situational context for 
individuating initially stereotypical representations. Notably, this prediction has been repeatedly 
disconfirmed by evidence that manipulations of situational context directly influence implicit processing 
(see §1.2.1.2 and Experiment 2.1). 
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quantified negation. As argued in §4.1, there is no obvious reason to expect that temporal 
delay per se should lead to a primacy effect on implicit but not explicit evaluations. Thus, 
an important direction for future research is to deconfound time and quantification as 
potential moderators of the influence of negation on implicit (or online) evaluations. 
On the other hand, the quantification hypothesis is challenged by evidence that non-
quantified, token-level negations fail to influence implicit evaluations (e.g., Deutsch, 
Gawronski, & Strack, 2006). Although the influence of negation on implicit evaluations 
appears to depend on the type of indirect measurement procedure used (Deutsch, Kordts-
Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009), at least when using an evaluative priming task 
the negation of valenced primes is not efficiently processed unless the negation has a 
familiar referent. For example, “no cockroach” fails to facilitate evaluations of positive 
target words, but “no luck” does facilitate evaluations of negative target words (see also 
Mayo, Schul, & Bernstein, 2004). At a conceptual level, this finding is actually consistent 
with the quantification hypothesis because a negation that lacks a concrete (token-level) 
referent (e.g., “no cockroach”) is inherently an abstract concept, and therefore should be 
incapable of holistic representation according to the principles proposed earlier (Table 
4.1). As Osherson and Smith (1981) pointed out, the “fuzzy logic” by which distributed 
connectionist networks operate is incapable of representing logical truth-values per se, 
but instead must represent them in terms of concrete instances; without a concrete 
referent, a negation is purely an abstract concept. A second response to these findings is 
that, because Deutsch et al.’s (2006) evaluative priming task used linguistic negations, 
the procedure was not actually measuring online (and hence holistic, token-level) 
cognition (Table 4.2). Thus, an interesting prediction of the quantification hypothesis 
would be that, using an online measurement procedure, pictorial negations should be 
processed efficiently only when they have a concrete referent, but linguistic negations 
should not be processed even when a concrete referent is available. 
4.3.3 Mediation patterns 
The quantification hypothesis also makes specific predictions regarding the mediation 
patterns that should be observed between holistic and symbolic cognition, due to 
differences in how each is directly influenced and the nature of bottom-up (inductive) and 
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top-down (deductive) processing. Bottom-up mediation patterns should be observed 
when the meaning of a stimulus is manipulated via changes in the situational context that 
are explicitly unidentified. Such manipulations should still have a direct influence on 
holistic processing, but would influence symbolic processing only indirectly via 
metacognitive awareness. It remains an interesting question whether changes in the 
situational context that are explicitly identified nevertheless produce simultaneous 
influences on holistic and symbolic cognition, or if explicit identification of contextual 
manipulations somehow disrupts their influence on holistic meaning. Top-down 
mediation patterns should be observed when meaning is directly reassigned. Experiment 
2.2 provides a relevant example. In this case, the newspaper clipping caused participants 
to directly assign new meanings to their self-concepts (e.g., “I am extraverted”). This 
reassignment then appeared to cause participants to engage in a confirmatory search 
through token-level self-knowledge stored in memory, resulting in a top-down influence 
on holistic cognition. 
4.3.4 Measurement  
The quantification hypothesis implies that current indirect measurement procedures are 
not optimized for the assessment of holistic cognition. An important goal for future 
research, then, is to design genuinely online measurement procedures and to investigate 
the extent to which existing indirect procedures might be considered online. As discussed 
in §4.2.2, there have already been advances in online measurement that make use of 
mouse-tracking and eye-tracking (e.g., Freeman & Ambady, 2009; Spivey & Dale, 2006; 
Wojnowicz et al., 2009), and these procedures can be employed to test the major 
predictions of the quantification hypothesis. For example, the quantification and 
contextualization hypotheses essentially disagree on how the time-course of mental 
representation is characterized: either from context-dependent to context-independent or 
the reverse. Online measurement procedures are necessary for distinguishing between 
early and late mental representations, and are therefore crucial for testing differences in 
context-sensitivity over time. 
With regard to investigating the extent to which existing indirect measurement 
procedures can be considered online, research suggests that the most popular indirect 
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procedure, the IAT, is especially sensitive to type-level as opposed to token-level 
knowledge (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; Olson & Fazio, 2003). For example, 
Foroni and Bel-Bahar (2009) found that IAT effects were significantly larger when 
stimuli were words rather than pictures, presumably because there was a closer match in 
level of representation between the abstract response categories and the words. Findings 
such as these suggest that the IAT may not be particularly adaptable to online 
measurement, as it relies heavily upon categorical (and hence symbolic) knowledge. 
Other indirect measurement procedures, however, may be more suitable given that they 
are less reliant upon categorical responses. For example, preliminary data from a study I 
have conducted with Bertram Gawronski suggest that the AMP, with slight 
modifications, can provide a window onto holistic processing. In earlier work, 
Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, and Deutsch (2010) asked participants to pay attention 
to either the race (black vs. white) or the age (young vs. old) of the primes in an AMP 
and an EPT. They found that implicit evaluations measured with the EPT were not 
influenced by the unattended dimension but that responses on the AMP were, suggesting 
that primes in the AMP were perceived more holistically. The present study sought to test 
the prediction, derived from the quantification hypothesis, that the context-sensitivity of 
responses on the AMP would be higher early on and would decrease over time, once the 
stimuli became represented in terms of discrete categories. In order to test this prediction, 
the delay between presentation of the prime and the Chinese character was manipulated, 
such that in the “early response” condition the delay was 125 ms (the standard stimulus-
onset asynchrony used for the procedure) whereas in the “late response” condition the 
delay was 1000 ms (see Hofmann, van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, Ramanathan, & Aarts, 
2010, for a similar modification of the AMP). Although the data pattern was not 
statistically significant, the trends were consistent with the prediction that responses made 
quickly after viewing a stimulus were influenced by both race and age, whereas responses 
made relatively later were influenced more strongly by the attended category. These 
findings suggest that there may be substantial overlap between particular indirect 
measurement procedures and the proposed design of online procedures, but this remains 
an empirical question that will benefit from future research. 
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4.4 Conclusion: 
Placing the quantification hypothesis in context 
In closing, I would like to address a much broader question: Is the quantification 
hypothesis supposed to provide the basis for all psychological explanations of behavior? 
The short answer is no; the hypothesis is meant to provide structure specifically for 
intentional explanations, which appeal to an individual’s mental representations (i.e., 
what a person is thinking about) to explain behavior (Dennett, 1987; Haugeland, 1978).18 
One way to view the contribution of the quantification hypothesis is that it attempts to 
structure intentional explanations when the possibility of non-localist, non-compositional 
representation is taken into account. The intentional explanations at which the 
quantification hypothesis is aimed characterize the cognitivist, subjective tradition of 
empirical psychology. There is, however, a behaviorist, objective tradition as well, which 
regards mental representation as externally determined (De Houwer, 2011; Fodor, 1980; 
Putnam, 1975). Psychological explanations formulated from this latter perspective are 
effectively non-intentional, since any internal variance in mental representation is 
assumed not to play an explanatory role in the stimulus-response link. In its purest form, 
this approach assumes that behavior can be explained in terms of veridical perception of 
the environment. 
Intriguingly, the cognitivist and behaviorist approaches to psychological explanation each 
appear to be valid, though under different conditions. For example, it has been found that 
perceptions of the size of objects are influenced by cognitive illusions, but that motor 
movements designed to interact with those objects are nevertheless well calibrated to 
their actual size (e.g., Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995; Goodale & Humphreys, 
1998). Such findings suggest that a higher-order covariation thesis may be required to 
distinguish between the conditions under which behavior is better explained with 
cognitivist vs. behaviorist principles. In specifying the quantification hypothesis, I have 
                                                 
18
 In Franz Brentano’s original formulation, intentionality is the mark of the mental; in other words, the 
capacity to represent, or be “about,” something else, is what distinguishes mental from physical 
phenomena. The present usage of the term intentional should not be confused with its more colloquial 
meaning, which typically denotes a planned behavior. 
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assumed that the world does not arrive at perception pre-categorized, and hence that 
quantification (i.e., the categorization of percepts) is an effortful process. But there may 
be senses in which the world can be viewed as pre-categorized, most obviously with 
regard to “natural” or biological kinds (e.g., Bird & Tobin, 2009; Millikan, 1984), and it 
is reasonable to think that cognition would have evolved to exploit these regularities—
even though they are ultimately no less theoretical than ad hoc categories. Thus, the 
possibility of operating conditions that distinguish between cognitivist and behaviorist 
principles of cognition, and their potential interaction (i.e., the point of connection 
between “narrow,” subjective and “wide,” objective representation; Loar, 1988; 
Pereboom, 1995) offer deeply interesting questions for future empirical and theoretical 
work.  
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